Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age by McGarity, Thomas O.
MCGARITY IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2012 12:12 AM 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS BLOOD SPORT: 
POLICY EROSION IN A HIGHLY  
PARTISAN AGE 
THOMAS O. MCGARITY† 
ABSTRACT 
  Students of the policymaking process are familiar with the fashion 
in which the policies underlying crisis-driven legislation are gradually 
eroded during the implementation process. A substantial body of 
administrative-law scholarship stands for the proposition that 
policymaking in administrative agencies is not confined to the formal 
structures of administrative law as envisioned by the drafters of the 
Administrative Procedure Act. This Article suggests that in this era of 
deep divisions over the proper role of government in society, high-
stakes rulemaking has become a “blood sport” in which regulated 
industries, and occasionally beneficiary groups, are willing to spend 
millions of dollars to shape public opinion and influence powerful 
political actors to exert political pressure on agencies. In addition, the 
implementation game has attracted a wider variety of players and has 
spread to arenas that are far less structured and far more overtly 
political than the agency hearing rooms and appellate courtrooms of 
the past. Employing as an illustration the Federal Reserve Board’s 
attempt to implement the Durbin Amendment to the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, this Article 
suggests some general characteristics of this new model of high-stakes 
rulemaking, provides some tentative thoughts on the implications of 
this model for administrative law, and offers some possible responses 
to the phenomenon aimed at taming some of its least attractive 
characteristics and at ensuring that it does not further erode public 
trust in the administrative process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Congress often enacts new regulatory programs and major 
expansions of existing regulatory programs following a crisis or a 
series of crises that focuses public attention on the failure of existing 
laws to protect the public or the environment from abuses of 
economic power by companies pursuing private gain in the 
marketplace.1 As the media report stories about innocent victims of 
irresponsible corporate conduct, the public demands greater 
protection from the powerful economic actors who created the 
conditions that precipitated the crises. Investigative journalists, 
congressional committees, and presidential commissions spotlight 
longstanding abuses that went unnoticed by policymakers and the 
public before the crises. Members of Congress debate the causes of 
the crises and consider legislation designed to bring about a rapid end 
to the suffering, help the victims put their lives back in order, and 
prevent similar crises from occurring in the future. 
Most of the protective regulatory programs of the Progressive 
Era, the New Deal, and the Public Interest Era2 were established after 
 
 1. Cf. STEPHEN J. CECCOLI, PILL POLITICS 15 (2004) (“[T]he occurrences of drug-related 
tragedies throughout the twentieth century in the United States . . . have provided important 
catalysts for drug regulation.”); COMM. TO ENSURE SAFE FOOD FROM PROD. TO 
CONSUMPTION, INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENSURING SAFE FOOD FROM 
PRODUCTION TO CONSUMPTION 8 (1998) (“The federal government response to food safety 
issues is too often crisis-driven.”); JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC 
POLICIES 94–96 (updated 2d ed. 2011) (noting that “a focusing event like a crisis or disaster” 
may provide the “push” needed for a problem “to get the attention of people in and around 
government”). 
 2. I refer to the period of active government extending roughly from the mid-1960s 
through the mid-1970s as the “Public Interest Era.” See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO 
HARM (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript ch. 2). 
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widely publicized tragedies or abuses had stirred public opinion to 
levels sufficient to overcome the inertial forces that otherwise 
overwhelm Congress and the regulatory agencies.3 Students of the 
policymaking process have long understood that the protective 
purposes of regulatory programs established over the opposition of 
regulated industries during times of crisis are often undermined 
through a slow process of erosion, drift, or slippage, as the industries, 
agencies, and beneficiary groups engage in what Professor Eugene 
Bardach calls “the implementation game.”4 As the crises that gave 
 
 3. See id.; cf. Richard J. Lazarus, Climate Change Law in and over Time, 2 SAN DIEGO J. 
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 29, 33–34 (2010) (“I fully expect that, buoyed by a new wave of 
scientific reports and the backing of the White House, climate change’s lawmaking moment will, 
Lazarus-like, soon be resurrected. . . . [T]he inherent problem with such lawmaking moments is 
just that—they are moments.”). This crisis-driven pattern is well known to students of the 
policymaking process as a typical governmental response to the collective-action problem. See 
generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 1–2 (1965) (“[U]nless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, 
or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common 
interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group 
interests.”). The costs of complying with consumer- and environmental-protection regulations 
are borne directly by the companies subject to the requirements or restrictions, but the benefits 
of the protections they provide are spread across a diffuse and unorganized public that is no 
match for the organized opposition of the prospective regulatees. Amy Sinden, In Defense of 
Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1409 
(2005); see also JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW 
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 
113–14 (2010) (asserting that “influenc[ing] the exercise of government authority in a modern 
democracy generally requires a range of formidable capabilities” and observing that those 
capabilities “are the attributes of organizations, not discrete, atomized voters”). Therefore, it 
often takes a consciousness-raising crisis to move Congress or an agency to create a new 
regulatory program. See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE 
POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 29–52 (2008) (noting that “catalysts [for 
collective action] may operate with special force during times of actual or perceived ‘crisis’” and 
that “one very important way citizens respond to the predicament implied by the logic of 
collective action is by delegating regulatory authority to political representatives”). 
 4. See EUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A 
BILL BECOMES LAW 85 (1977) (“The goals embodied in a policy mandate typically undergo 
some change during the implementation phase. . . . The politics of renegotiating goals can lead 
in several directions: trimming them back, distorting or preventing them, and even adding to 
them in a manner that eventually leads to an unsupportable political burden.”); see also 
JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: HOW GREAT 
EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND, at xvii–xxiii, 187 (1979) 
(discussing the problem of divergence between policy and implementation); David Epstein & 
Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers: A Political 
Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 957 (1999) (“[T]he basic problem that Congress 
faces when delegating authority is one of bureaucratic drift, or the ability of an agency to enact 
policies different from those preferred by the enacting coalition.”); Daniel A. Farber, Taking 
Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (1999) (discussing the importance of “slippage” in environmental law); 
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rise to public demand for a government program fade from memory 
and the beneficiary groups that fought for it move on to other 
pressing matters, the agency charged with implementing the new 
program struggles to promulgate and enforce the required regulations 
over the continued opposition of the regulated industry. The industry, 
meanwhile, carefully monitors and frequently interacts with the 
agency as the agency sets its regulatory agenda, collects and analyzes 
scientific and economic information, and prepares the various support 
documents that accompany modern rulemaking.5 
Under the conventional model of administrative rulemaking, the 
agency initiates a rulemaking by assembling and analyzing the 
relevant technical studies and then drafting a notice of proposed 
rulemaking—the preamble of which highlights the issues; discusses 
the relevant scientific, technical, and economic studies; and explains 
the agency’s proposal. The agency then presents the draft to the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB). OIRA elicits comments from 
other interested departments and agencies and provides comments on 
the agency’s lengthy regulatory-impact analysis. Having cleared 
OIRA review, the agency then publishes the notice in the Federal 
Register and invites public comment. The affected industries and the 
general public then provide comments and technical information to 
the agency during the comment period. The agency analyzes the 
comments and drafts a notice of final rulemaking setting out the 
terms and conditions of the final rule, the rationale for the rule, and 
the agency’s response to the public comments that have crossed a 
threshold of materiality. Affected parties may then seek judicial 
review of the agency’s rule.6 
 
Lazarus, supra note 3, at 33–34 (“Subsequent legislative amendments, limited budgets, 
appropriations riders, interpretive agency rulings, massive delays in rule-making, and simple 
nonenforcement are more than capable of converting a seemingly uncompromising legal 
mandate into nothing more than a symbolic aspirational statement. . . . The same powerful 
short-term impulses that seek to prevent a law’s enactment in the first instance . . . . typically 
remain to seek the law’s ultimate undoing over time.”).  
 5. Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1380–83 (2010) (“What develops from the administrative process during the 
development of the actual rule . . . is a form of information symbiosis between the agencies and 
the most knowledgeable and resourceful groups.”); Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa 
Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 110–13 (2011) (describing the “opportunity for imbalanced interest 
group input into rulemakings . . . during the formative development of a proposed rule”). 
 6. See generally Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 
105 NW. U. L. REV. 471, 476 (2011) (outlining the rulemaking process). 
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The regulated industry actively participates in this process by 
offering information and analysis to the agency staff, meeting with 
high-level agency officials, and participating in reviews of proposed 
rules and regulatory-analysis documents before OIRA.7 When the 
agency publishes a notice of proposed rulemaking, the regulated 
companies typically dominate the public-comment process.8 They 
submit reams of material and lengthy briefs explaining why 
disfavored regulatory alternatives are unlawful, unduly burdensome, 
unsupported by the available technical studies, or unlikely to achieve 
the agency’s desired goal.9 When the agency publishes the final rule, 
the regulated industry often challenges the action in court as arbitrary 
and capricious, ultra vires, or both.10 If the industry persuades the 
court to set aside the rule, the agency must either terminate the action 
or attempt to correct the infirmity that the court has identified. If the 
agency prevails in court, some companies will demand variances and 
exemptions, whereas others will probe the edges of legality as their 
lawyers come up with plausible interpretations of the relevant 
 
 7. See, e.g., THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY 271–91 (1991) 
(describing OIRA review, including incidents of industry involvement with the review process); 
RENA I. STEINZOR, MOTHER EARTH AND UNCLE SAM 54–56 (2008) (“EPA is beleaguered by 
business interests trying to forestall implementation of . . . regulations [and] inundating the 
Agency with technical materials regarding the scientific, legal, and economic implications of its 
proposals.”); David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 
365–66 (2006) (“A review of [twenty-five rules that were significantly affected by the OMB] 
showed that OMB never supported changes that would make environmental, health, or safety 
regulations more stringent. . . . In every single case, OMB favored changes that would reduce 
the burdens of regulation on regulated parties.”); see also Wagner, supra note 5, at 1379–80 (“In 
most complex rulemakings, the agency appears to be quite dependant on knowledgeable 
stakeholders to educate it about critical issues peculiarly within their grasp. Such 
communications can be quite a bonus for these select groups, too, providing them with the 
opportunity to shape or even frame the agency’s regulatory project in the course of their 
tutorials and informal discussions.”). 
 8. See Wagner et al., supra note 5, at 117 (“The formal comments lodged on a complex 
rule will come predominantly from regulated industry, and the changes made to the proposed 
rule in the final rule will mirror this imbalance and generally favor industry.”).  
 9. Cf. Wagner, supra note 5 (discussing the problems of “filter failure” and information 
overload in administrative law).  
 10. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 1189, 1295–1315 (1986) (describing how the evolution of judicial review of agency 
rulemaking opened the door to industry challenges); Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of 
Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185, 206 (1974) (“It has been widely assumed that [the 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard of judicial review] is applicable to informal rulemaking.”). 
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definitions and requirements that will mitigate the potential 
constraints on the companies’ activities.11 
Under the pressure of constant opposition from the regulated 
industries and sporadic countervailing pressure from beneficiaries of 
the regulated programs, statutory deadlines are missed, ambitious 
policy goals remain unachieved, and the protections envisioned by the 
authors of the agency’s organic statute gradually erode.12 As the 
agency ages and settles into routines, its policies gradually become 
more industry friendly.13 The industry adapts to the regulatory 
program, and life becomes easier for everyone,14 except perhaps for 
some of the intended beneficiaries.15 After the program has been in 
effect for a number of years, Congress may revisit the organic statute 
to reauthorize it or to make midcourse corrections.16 Alternatively, a 
new crisis may force the program back onto the legislative agenda, 
 
 11. See generally Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975) (evaluating 
the permissibility of individual variances from federally approved state implementation plans); 
Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, Categories, and Compliance in the Regulatory 
State, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1151, 1162–65 (2010) (describing “minimal compliers” with 
administrative regulations); NAM Coalition Petitions CPSC for Interim Final Rule on 
Exclusions to New Lead Limits, 36 PRODUCT SAFETY AND LIABILITY REP. 1271 (2008) 
(discussing a request by the National Association of Manufacturers for certain exemptions from 
lower lead limits set by the Consumer Product Safety Commission in 2008). 
 12. Cf. MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 
74–102 (1955) (describing the life cycle of an administrative agency); William H. Clune III, A 
Political Model of Implementation and Implications of the Model for Public Policy, Research, 
and the Changing Roles of Law and Lawyers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 47, 65 (1983) (describing the 
negotiations between the regulated and regulating organizations that “construct[] the meaning 
of compliance over a period of time” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 13. BERNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 86–87.  
 14. Id. at 87. 
 15. Cf. id. at 91 (“Because the ICC is unable to deal effectively with the regulatory 
demands of transportation media other than railroads, there are signs of growing agitation by 
nonrailroad interests for regulatory changes.”). 
 16. For example, Congress provided “mid-course corrections,” Gershon Eliezer Cohen, 
Mixing Zones: Diluting Pollution Under the Clean Water Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 15 (2000) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), to the 1972 Clean Water Act, Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)), in 1977, when it changed the “best available 
control technology” requirement for existing sources of conventional pollutants to “best 
conventional control technology” and modified the “best available technology” requirement to 
apply exclusively to toxic and nonconventional pollutants, Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 
95-217, sec. 42(a), §§ 301(b)(1)(A), 301(b)(2)(A)–(E), 91 Stat. 1566, 1582–83 (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1311); see also Cohen, supra, at 15 (summarizing these changes). 
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causing the industry and beneficiary groups to rejoin the battle in the 
legislative arena.17 
In this depiction of the regulatory process, the implementation 
game is simply “politics by other means.”18 By passing the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),19 Congress attempted to cabin 
these “other means” through lawyer-dominated procedures. In 
addition, Congress, presidents, and the courts have added to the 
modest procedural protections of Section 553 of the APA20 
requirements that agencies must provide support for scientific and 
technical conclusions in a “rulemaking record,” respond to public 
comments that pass a threshold of materiality, and prepare various 
analyses of the impact of proposed regulations on the economy and 
on small businesses—in an effort to make agency rulemaking more 
transparent and less arbitrary.21 As a result of these requirements, 
however, the rulemaking process is also far more burdensome and 
more expensive for all of the participants in the policymaking process. 
Despite these procedural and analytical requirements, a 
substantial body of administrative-law scholarship demonstrates that 
agency policymaking has not been limited to the formal structures of 
administrative law as articulated in the APA. Administrative lawyers, 
and therefore administrative-law scholars, must also concern 
themselves with decisions made in interactions between high-level 
agency personnel and desk officers in OIRA, between high-level 
agency officials and their counterparts in other regulatory agencies, 
and between high-level agency officials and the staffs of the agency’s 
authorizing and appropriations committees in Congress.22 One 
 
 17. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 95 (“The period of old age is unlikely to terminate 
until some scandal or emergency calls attention dramatically to the failure of the regulation and 
the need to redefine regulatory objectives and public policies.”). 
 18. Thomas O. McGarity, Politics by Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in EPA’s 
Implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 103 (2001) (quoting 
BARDACH, supra note 4, at 85) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 19. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006). 
 20. See APA § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (listing the basic procedural requirements for agency 
rulemaking, including publishing a notice in the Federal Register and requesting and considering 
public comments). 
 21. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1400–13 (1992) (listing additional congressionally, judicially, and presidentially 
imposed requirements on the agency rulemaking process). 
 22. Cf., e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON 
ESTABLISHMENT 45–47 (2d ed. 1989) (“[L]egislation is drafted in very general terms, so some 
agency . . . must translate a vague policy mandate into a functioning program, a process 
that . . . incidentally, [involves] the trampling of numerous toes. At the next 
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primary conclusion of this literature is that the “other means” 
employed in influencing the exercise of delegated policymaking 
power are not necessarily limited to the practices and procedures of 
administrative law as traditionally understood. 
In this Article, I raise the possibility that the nation has entered a 
period in which the population is so deeply divided about the proper 
role of government, regulated industries are so willing to spend 
millions of dollars to vindicate their interests, and political discourse 
is so unrestrained that an even more expansive model of 
implementation may be warranted, at least in the context of high-
stakes rulemaking initiatives.23 First, the implementation game has 
spread to arenas that are far less structured and far more political 
than the agency hearing rooms and appellate courtrooms of the past. 
Second, the roster of players has expanded beyond agency and OIRA 
staffs, advocates for the regulated industry and beneficiary groups, 
and congressional aides to include individuals and organizations with 
broad policy agendas, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, think 
tanks, grassroots organizations, media pundits, and Internet bloggers. 
Third, because many parties play the implementation game in 
multiple arenas, the game has become far more strategic and the 
range of allowable tactics has widened rather dramatically. Finally, in 
this deeply divided political economy, the players in the 
implementation game no longer make a pretense of separation 
 
stage, . . . constituents petition their congressman to intervene in the . . . decision processes of 
the bureaucracy. The cycle closes when the congressman lends a sympathetic ear, piously 
denounces the evils of bureaucracy, intervenes in the latter’s decisions, and rides a grateful 
electorate to ever more impressive electoral showings.”); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas 
Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984) (proposing a theory of congressional oversight of agency action that 
distinguishes between “police-patrol oversight,” in which Congress itself directly monitors 
agencies, and “fire-alarm oversight,” in which “Congress establishes a system . . . enabl[ing] 
individual citizens and organized interest groups to examine administrative decisions, to charge 
executive agencies with violating congressional goals, and to seek remedies from agencies, 
courts, and Congress”); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or 
Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. 
ECON. 765, 766 (1983) (developing “a model of agency decision making based on the premise 
that agencies are controlled by the legislature” and “argu[ing], therefore, that to understand the 
genesis of agencies, as well as the stability and change in agency policy, we must understand the 
underlying legislative politics”). 
 23. I will use the term “high-stakes rulemaking initiatives” to refer to major rulemaking 
exercises in which the stakes are especially high, such as when an agency is attempting to 
implement a new regulatory program or a major expansion of an existing program, or when a 
proceeding has the potential to establish an important precedent with large economic 
consequences for a regulated industry or the beneficiaries of a regulatory program. 
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between the domains of politics and administrative law, and they are 
far less restrained in the rhetoric they employ to influence agency 
policymaking.24 
In this new milieu, “winning” can mean more than compelling 
unreasonable delays in agency action, invoking APA procedures to 
impede the policymaking process, or persuading the agency to accept 
a particular position on the relevant law and facts. Winning can 
consist of extracting promises from nominees during the confirmation 
process, preventing the confirmation of disfavored nominees, or 
preventing the confirmation of any agency leaders until the 
administration has agreed to change the agency’s decisionmaking 
structure. Winning can also mean incapacitating the agency by 
reducing its annual appropriation, repealing the agency’s organic act, 
or whittling away its regulatory authority through rifle-shot riders 
attached to must-pass legislation.25 The players are less reluctant to 
attack agencies and the statutes those agencies administer head on. 
The players launch their attacks much earlier in the evolution of 
regulatory programs, and they feel free to go beyond attacks on the 
agencies as institutions to launch ad hominem attacks on agency 
decisionmakers. 
In short, I raise the possibility that, for some high-stakes 
rulemaking initiatives in some areas of regulation, implementation is 
not so much “politics by other means”26 as it is “politics as usual.” 
And because politics is so very different from the deliberative, 
lawyer-dominated domain of traditional administrative law, the word 
“law” may no longer be an accurate descriptor. Former U.S. 
 
 24. See generally Neal Devins, Tom DeLay: Popular Constitutionalist?, 81 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1055, 1059 (2006) (arguing that politics in the United States has become increasingly 
polarized in recent years and predicting that the “increasing ideological divide” is likely to 
widen in the future). 
 25. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Deregulatory Riders Redux, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & 
ADMIN. L. (forthcoming 2012); see also Donovan Slack, Republicans Seek Repeal of Financial 
Rules, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 7, 2011, at A1 (discussing components of the Republican plan to “rein 
in regulation of businesses”); Jessica Holzer, House Panel Targets Consumer Bureau, SEC 
Budgets, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2011, 6:01 PM ET), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240
52702303339904576404102094921400.html (noting that Rep. Jo Ann Emerson “acknowledged 
that some Republicans want[ed] to hobble the agency created by the Dodd-Frank financial law 
by depriving it of funds”); Kate Sheppard, House Votes To Block EPA Climate Regs, MOTHER 
JONES (Feb. 18, 2011), http://motherjones.com/blue-marble/2011/02/house-votes-block-epa-
climate-regs (noting that the House of Representatives passed a continuing resolution that 
“include[d] a massive cut to the EPA’s budget” in connection with barring the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) from regulating greenhouse-gas emissions). 
 26. See supra note 18. 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Arthur Levitt 
referred in 2010 to federal regulation as a “kind of a blood sport” in 
which the regulated industries attempt “to make the particular 
agency” promulgating an unwelcome regulation “look stupid or inept 
or venal.”27 If the implementation of regulatory statutes has become a 
blood sport in important contexts, and if the goal of administrative 
law extends beyond ensuring procedural regularity to a concern about 
the effective implementation of legislation, then it would behoove 
administrative-law scholars to pay attention to the larger setting in 
which informal rulemaking now takes place and to begin thinking 
about the implications of these developments for the field. 
The conventional model still governs most run-of-the-mill 
rulemaking. The regulations that make up the vast bulk of the 
rulemaking output of the federal agencies are not of such importance 
that they are likely to warrant the considerable expense of an all-out 
war, nor are they likely to attract the attention of the powerful 
political actors who are capable of transforming technical disputes 
into fierce ideological battles. In high-impact rulemaking exercises 
that have the potential for both high political visibility and large costs 
or benefits, however, many regulatees and beneficiary groups have 
dramatically intensified their efforts to influence the conventional 
rulemaking process, while at the same time broadening the focus of 
their strategies beyond the confines of that process to include 
members of Congress, the media, political pundits, and the general 
public. During times of divided government, the battles are waged 
both in the agency and in Congress, where sympathetic committees 
schedule hearings on proposed regulations even as the agencies are 
receiving and analyzing public comments on the same proposed 
regulations pursuant to the conventional rulemaking model. 
The fact that regulated industries do not pursue blood-sport 
strategies for most rules does not mean that the new model is 
irrelevant to most rulemaking exercises. One of the important 
benefits of the blood-sport strategy for a regulated industry is the in 
terrorem effect that it has on regulatory agencies as they go about 
their day-to-day business, knowing that any rulemaking of any 
importance could escalate into a blood-sport battle. Part I of this 
Article provides a detailed examination of the blood-sport model in 
action in the context of the Federal Reserve Board’s (the Fed’s) 
 
 27. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 53 (2011) 
(quoting Interview with Arthur Levitt (Oct. 1, 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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attempt to implement the Durbin Amendment28 to the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank 
Act).29 Drawing on this example and other recent high-stakes 
rulemaking efforts by other agencies, Part II suggests some general 
characteristics of the blood-sport model. Part III provides some 
rather tentative thoughts on the implications of the blood-sport 
model for administrative law, and Part IV offers some possible 
responses to the phenomenon that are aimed at eliminating, or at 
least taming, some of its least attractive characteristics and at ensuring 
that it does not further erode public trust in the administrative 
process. 
I.  BLOOD-SPORT STRATEGIES IN IMPLEMENTING THE  
DURBIN AMENDMENT 
A. Introduction 
In the wake of the financial meltdown of 2008, Congress enacted 
the Dodd-Frank Act, a comprehensive financial-reform statute that 
empowered several existing banking agencies and a new agency 
called the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to 
promulgate regulations to protect consumers from predatory lending 
practices and the financial system from another meltdown.30 
Somewhat surprisingly, the first rulemaking action under the Act to 
generate a blood-sport battle was the Fed’s attempt to implement a 
last-minute amendment to the statute that required it to regulate the 
 
 28. 111 CONG. REC. S3651–52 (daily ed. May 12, 2010). 
 29. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 30. Id.; see also SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS 177, 181–85, 192 (2010) 
(chronicling the events following the 2008 crisis, including the “enormous” “damage to the real 
economy” and to government finances, the surprising recovery of investment banking, the fact 
that “when the banks faced off with the government, they held all the cards” because the 
government could not afford to let them fail, and the financial industry’s attempts to influence 
proposed financial regulations); DAVID SKEEL, NEW FINANCIAL DEAL 3–4 (2011) 
(summarizing the “[p]ath to [e]nactment” of the Dodd-Frank Act); Brady Dennis, Obama 
Ushers in New Financial Era, WASH. POST, July 22, 2010, at A13 (describing the hopes and 
concerns expressed in response to President Obama’s signing of the Dodd-Frank Act); 
Donovan Slack, Republicans Seek Repeal of Financial Rules, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 7, 2011, at A1 
(citing a fall 2010 Gallup poll in which 61 percent of the respondents said they approved of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, making it one of the most popular pieces of legislation passed during the 
Obama administration). 
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“interchange fees” that banks issuing debit cards charge to retailers 
each time a consumer uses a debit card to make a purchase.31 
Introduced in the late 1960s and early 1970s, debit cards allow 
consumers to access funds in their accounts electronically in a way 
that many consumers find more convenient than using checks or 
cash.32 Depository institutions, such as national banks and credit 
unions, typically issue debit cards to their account holders.33 Debit 
cards employ two different types of authentication methods: a 
physical signature that can often be accomplished electronically and a 
personal identification number (PIN).34 The debit-card infrastructure 
varies depending on the identification method the consumer selects.35 
Most debit-card transactions are processed over a four-party system 
in which a network, such as Visa or MasterCard, receives transaction 
information from a merchant and either electronically transfers the 
payment from the bank that issued the card to the merchant’s bank or 
declines to make the transfer.36  
The interchange fee is established by the network and is 
automatically paid out of the merchant’s account by the merchant’s 
bank to the card issuer.37 The purpose of the fee is to compensate the 
issuing bank for processing the transaction and to offset the 
additional losses that issuing banks inevitably incur due to fraudulent 
transactions.38 The two networks that dominate the market—Visa and 
MasterCard—compete with one another to win banks’ business by, 
among other things, setting high interchange fees on transactions.39 As 
debit cards gained increasing consumer acceptance during the 2000s, 
 
 31. 111 CONG. REC. S3651–52 (daily ed. May 12, 2010). 
 32. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,395 (July 20, 2011) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 43,396. 
 38. See id. at 43,394 n.2 (defining “interchange fee” as “any fee established, charged, or 
received by a payment card network for the purpose of compensating an issuer for its 
involvement in an electronic debit transaction” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 
43,401 (“[D]epending on the facts and circumstances, . . . the [electronic] transaction [may be] 
guaranteed and the amount of the transaction must be absorbed as a fraud loss by the 
issuer . . . .”). 
 39. James C. Miller III, Op-Ed., Debit Card Market Is Broken and Needs Fixing, ATLANTA 
J.-CONST., Apr. 7, 2011, at A17. 
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interchange fees increased fairly rapidly.40 The networks established 
operating rules, including rules that established interchange fees, on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis. Under this system, if a merchant did not 
comply with a network’s terms and conditions, it would lose access to 
the network and, presumably, much of the business derived from 
debit-card purchases.41 
By 2009, debit-card interchange fees totaled $16.2 billion.42 The 
average interchange fee was 56 cents—1.53 percent of the average 
transaction amount—for signature debit transactions and 23 cents—
0.58 percent of the average transaction amount—for PIN 
transactions.43 By contrast, the median per-transaction cost incurred 
by issuing banks across all debit-card issuers was 11 cents per 
transaction.44 Of this cost, the median amount attributable to fraud-
prevention activities was 1.7 cents per transaction.45  
The large difference between the average interchange fee and 
the average per-transaction cost translated into large profits for the 
issuing banks. Depending on the elasticity of the demand for the 
purchased items, merchants either absorbed the loss or passed it on to 
consumers in the form of higher prices. To the extent that the fees 
were passed along, though, all consumers paid the extra premium, not 
just those who purchased goods with debit cards. Consequently, very 
few consumers were aware of the fact that they were indirectly paying 
interchange fees through higher prices.46 
Interchange fees were, however, quite apparent to merchants. By 
2010, interchange fees in the United States were the highest in the 
 
 40. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,395 (stating that over 
the past decade, “[d]ebit card payments have grown more than any other form of electronic 
payment”); id. at 43,396 (noting that “most PIN debit networks raised the levels of the fixed and 
ad valorem components of fees, in addition to raising the caps on overall fees”); Miller, supra 
note 39 (asserting that interchange fees have increased rapidly). 
 41. See Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,396 (“[E]ach card 
network specifies operating rules that govern the relationships between network 
participants. . . . [M]erchants . . . may be required to comply with a network’s rules or risk losing 
access to that network.”). 
 42. Id. at 43,397. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th 
Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System) (pointing out that interchange fees are “[g]enerally unnoticed by the 
customer”).  
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world.47 In fact, interchange fees constituted the largest expense after 
payroll for some retailers such as 7-Eleven convenience stores.48 
Because the networks usually moved in tandem and had every 
incentive to please the issuers by keeping fees high, even large big-
box stores such as Wal-Mart seemed powerless to exert downward 
pressure on interchange fees.49 The merchants strongly supported 
legislation that would cap the fees at an amount that was reasonably 
related to costs and that would require issuers to accept at least two 
networks to ensure greater competition among the networks.50 
Relying on assurances from the retail industry that much of the 
savings resulting from governmental intervention would be passed 
along to consumers in the form of lower prices, consumer advocates 
supported the merchants’ efforts to place limits on interchange fees.51 
Debit-card issuers, a diverse group that includes large national 
banks, credit unions, and small community banks, strongly opposed 
 
 47. Id. at 30 (statement of Rep. Peter Welch). 
 48. Id. at 45 (statement of David Seltzer, Vice President and Treasurer, 7-Eleven Inc., on 
behalf of the Retail Industry Leaders Association). 
 49. See id. at 31 (statement of Rep. Peter Welch) (“Merchants have literally no power 
individually to be able to negotiate a price. So, we got to this point where the charges to our 
merchants, . . . mom-and-pop stores as well as the Wal-Marts and Home Depots, became the 
highest in the world.”). 
 50. See id. at 31 (statement of Sean P. Duffy, Member, Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & 
Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.) (observing that merchants “seem to advocate 
for Congress stepping in and advocating for price fixing in regard to Visa, banks, and their 
fees”); id. at 36 (statement of Constantino (Gus) Prentzas, Owner, Pavilion Florals and Life & 
Health Fitness) (noting that interchange “fees . . . have doubled in the last 2 to 3 years alone” 
and “fully support[ing] the debit card rules proposed by the Federal Reserve and any other 
efforts to help cur[b] swipe fees”); id. at 41–42 (statement of Doug Kantor, Partner, Steptoe & 
Johnson, on behalf of the Merchants Payments Coalition) (arguing that interchange fees are 
“tremendously unfair to merchants”); id. at 45 (statement of David Seltzer, Vice President and 
Treasurer, 7-Eleven Inc., on behalf of the Retail Industry Leaders Association) (stating that 
interchange fees for 7-Eleven franchisees quadrupled from 2002 to 2010); Edward Wyatt, 
Lowering of Fees for Debit Cards Is Lobby Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2011, at A1 (quoting 
Douglas Kantor, a lobbyist for the Merchants Payments Coalition, complaining that interchange 
fees are stifling businesses). 
 51. See Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 
46, at 9 (statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System) (“The idea is that lower interchange fees . . . would lower cost to merchants 
who possibly in competitive environments, could lower their cost to consumers.”); Oversight of 
Federal Payment of Interchange Fees: How To Save Taxpayer Dollars: Hearing Before a 
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. 44–46 (2010) (statement of Edmund 
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) (noting the 
impact of interchange fees on consumers and stating that “[t]he Durbin interchange 
amendment . . . takes important steps to end unfair and anti-competitive practices in the credit 
and debit card marketplace”). 
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any regulation of interchange fees.52 They worried that the caps would 
not take into account all of the risk factors that card issuers had built 
into the interchange fees.53 In particular, the banks believed that the 
merchant and consumer groups had greatly underestimated the costs 
of preventing and adjusting for fraud.54 According to the banks, in 
addition to forcing card issuers to lay off workers to reduce costs, 
capping interchange fees would discourage investment in new fraud-
prevention technologies.55 
Debit-card issuers argued that merchants would not necessarily 
pass the savings from lowered interchange fees on to consumers in 
the form of reduced prices because there would be no requirement 
that they do so.56 Moreover, the issuers contended, if issuing banks 
were unable to recoup their costs, they would have to tighten their 
standards for issuing debit cards, thereby making debit cards less 
available to low- and moderate-income consumers.57 Issuers also 
claimed that they would be forced to eliminate various rewards 
 
 52. See Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 
46, at 37 (statement of Frank Michael, President and CEO, Allied Credit Union, on behalf of 
the Credit Union National Association) (opposing the rules implementing the Durbin 
Amendment); id. at 40 (statement of David W. Kemper, Chairman, President, and CEO, 
Commerce Bank, on behalf of the American Bankers Association and the Consumer Bankers 
Association) (urging Congress “to take immediate action to stop the proposed [interchange-fee] 
rule from being implemented”). 
 53. Cf. id. at 43 (statement of Joshua R. Floum, General Counsel, Visa Inc.) (noting that 
the price controls would “make[] it virtually impossible for issuers to recover the cost of the 
infrastructure and operations required to build and manage a world-class debit system and 
[would] discourage[] future investment in fraud protection”). 
 54. Cf. id. at 44–45 (“The [Fed] admits that its interchange proposal will permit issuers to 
recover only a small fraction of their costs . . . . Investment in data security and fraud prevention 
can only be made if there [is an] . . . opportunity to recover the cost of these investments.”). 
 55. See id. at 43 (asserting that interchange-fee caps “discourage[] future investment in 
fraud protection”); Chris Serres, Bankers Push Back on Fee Limits, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), 
Mar. 9, 2011, at 1A (relaying concerns that interchange-fee caps would lead banks to discharge 
employees and citing one bank’s claim that it would have to lay off more than seventeen 
hundred workers). 
 56. Cf. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 
46, at 2 (statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System) (stating that interchange fees are “[g]enerally unnoticed by the customer”); id. 
at 44 (statement of Joshua R. Floum, General Counsel, Visa Inc.) (“[T]here is no requirement 
or evidence that merchants will pass on th[e] windfall to consumers.”). 
 57. See id. at 29 (statement of Rep. Stevan Pearce, Member, Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & 
Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.) (reasoning that the inability to offset the risk 
of debit-card overdrafts would lead banks “to start shutting off customers from access”); id. at 
40 (statement of David W. Kemper, Chairman, President, and CEO, Commerce Bank, on 
behalf of the American Bankers Association and the Consumer Bankers Association) (“[T]he 
Fed’s proposed rule will . . . push[] low-income customers out of the banking system.”). 
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programs that they had established to encourage consumers to use 
their debit cards.58 Finally, issuers argued that they would have to 
make up for losses in their debit-card operations by raising fees in 
other areas, such as checking accounts.59 
B. The Durbin Amendment 
Toward the end of the Senate’s consideration of the massive 
Dodd-Frank Act, Senator Richard Durbin offered an amendment 
that would authorize the Fed to regulate interchange fees.60 When it 
was eventually enacted, the Durbin Amendment required the Fed to 
prescribe regulations within nine months requiring interchange fees 
to be “reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer 
with respect to the transaction.”61 The agency was, however, 
empowered to “allow for an adjustment to the fee” as “reasonably 
necessary to make allowance for costs incurred by the issuer in 
preventing fraud.”62 In addition, the Fed was required to promulgate 
 
 58. See id. at 9 (statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System) (observing that debit-card “rewards are often made possible through 
higher interchange fees”). 
 59. See id. at 38 (statement of Frank Michael, President and CEO, Allied Credit Union, on 
behalf of the Credit Union National Association) (listing higher debit-card fees and elimination 
of free checking accounts as some of the changes that credit unions would need to make to 
replace the lost revenue); id. at 40 (statement of David W. Kemper, Chairman, President, and 
CEO, Commerce Bank, on behalf of the American Bankers Association and the Consumer 
Bankers Association) (“[B]anks will have to find other ways to recover revenue and this will 
ultimately lead to new fees for the consumer.”); id. at 43–44 (statement of Joshua R. Floum, 
General Counsel, Visa Inc.) (citing a study by the Independent Community Bankers of America 
in which “[m]ore than 90 percent of [the member banks] reported that they will be forced to 
increase other fees to consumer[s] to compensate for the interchange regulation”). 
 60. See 111 CONG. REC. S3651–52 (daily ed. May 12, 2010); Todd Zywicki, Durbin’s 
Innovation Killer, THE AM. (June 11, 2011), http://www.american.com/archive/2011/june/
durbin2019s-innovation-killer (noting that the Durbin Amendment was “[a]ttached as a floor 
amendment . . . to the Senate version of the Dodd-Frank legislation” “at the very last 
moment”). 
 61. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) 
§ 1075(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(2)–(3)(A) (Supp. IV 2010). To determine “reasonable and 
proportional” interchange fees, the statute required the Fed to “consider the functional 
similarity between” debit-card transactions and checks, which clear without interchange fees. Id. 
§ 1075(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1936o-2(a)(4)(A). Under the statute, the Fed must also distinguish 
between the incremental cost incurred by the issuer for a particular transaction and other costs 
that are not specific to a particular transaction. Id. § 1075(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(4)(B).  
 62. Id. § 1075(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(5)(A)(i); see also Understanding the Federal 
Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46, at 4 (statement of Sarah Bloom 
Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (noting that the Fed 
“requested comment on different conceptual approaches for implementing a fraud prevention 
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regulations prohibiting network “exclusivity arrangements” and 
requiring issuers to provide merchants with at least two unaffiliated 
network options for each debit-card transaction.63 Finally, the statute 
exempted small issuers with assets of less than $10 billion from the 
interchange-fee standard, although not from the exclusivity 
restrictions.64 
On the one hand, merchant and consumer groups were thrilled 
with these developments.65 The banking industry, on the other hand, 
stunned by this unanticipated last-minute amendment to the statute, 
made it known that it was unwilling to live with the new regulatory 
program.66 Outspoken JPMorgan Chase & Co. Chief Executive 
Officer Jamie Dimon told the Council of Institutional Investors that 
the Durbin Amendment was “idiotic” and should not have been 
passed because it “had nothing to do with the crisis” that had inspired 
the Dodd-Frank Act.67 The industry was thus determined to fight the 
Durbin Amendment at every step of its implementation. 
C. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
The Fed proceeded expeditiously with the rulemaking. Among 
other things, the agency commissioned a survey of sixteen payment-
card networks and 131 financial institutions that had assets of $10 
 
adjustment to the interchange fee standard” and that its members “[were] reserving judgment 
on the terms of the final rule until [they had] the opportunity to consider these comments”). 
 63. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1075(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(b)(1)(A) (“The Board 
shall . . . prescribe regulations providing that an issuer or payment card network shall 
not . . . restrict the number of payment card networks on which an electronic debit transaction 
may be processed to (i) 1 such network; or (ii) 2 or more such networks which are owned, 
controlled, or otherwise operated by [affiliated entities].”); see also Understanding the Federal 
Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46, at 3 (statement of Sarah Bloom 
Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (“[N]etwork exclusivity 
and routing provisions . . . could promote competition among networks and place downward 
pressure on interchange fees.”). 
 64. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1075(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(6)(A) (“[T]he Board shall 
exempt such issuers from [interchange-fee] regulations prescribed under paragraph (3)(A).”); 
Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46, at 2–3 
(statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System) (“The statute exempts small issuers . . . from this interchange fee standard but it does 
not exempt them from the exclusivity and routing restrictions.”). 
 65. T.W. Farnam, Simmons Wins Swipe Fee Deal for His Prepaid Card, WASH. POST, June 
24, 2010, at A19; Edward Wyatt, Lowering of Fees for Debit Cards Is Lobby Battle, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 8, 2011, at A1. 
 66. See Wyatt, supra note 65 (describing the banking industry’s opposition to the law). 
 67. Cheyenne Hopkins, JPMorgan: Delay Durbin, Save Perks?, AM. BANKER, Apr. 6, 
2011, at 1 (quoting Dimon) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
MCGARITY IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2012  12:12 AM 
2012] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS BLOOD SPORT 1689 
billion or more.68 In its notice of proposed rulemaking,69 published on 
December 28, 2010, the Fed requested comments on two alternative 
approaches to implementing the interchange-fee standard.70 The first 
approach would allow the issuer to comply with the standard either 
by calculating its allowable costs and ensuring that it did not receive 
any interchange fee in excess of those costs or by adhering to a “safe-
harbor” cap of seven cents per transaction.71 If the issuer did not elect 
to use the safe harbor, a cap of twelve cents per transaction would still 
apply.72 The second approach would adopt a flat twelve-cents-per-
transaction cap for all covered issuers and would require the networks 
to ensure that issuers did not receive amounts in excess of the cap.73 
Either approach would reduce fees substantially below the 2010 
average of forty-four cents per transaction.74 As required by statute, 
the proposal would exempt from the interchange-fee restrictions any 
issuer that, together with its affiliates, had assets of less than $10 
billion.75 
The proposal also offered two alternatives for implementing the 
statute’s network-exclusivity prohibition. The first alternative would 
allow a debit-card transaction to be routed over at least two 
unaffiliated debit-card networks—for example, one signature-based 
network and one unaffiliated PIN-based network.76 The second 
alternative would require a debit card to have at least two unaffiliated 
 
 68. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,478, 43,479 (interim final 
rule July 20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).  
 69. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722 (proposed Dec. 28, 
2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235). 
 70. Id. at 81,726. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 81,737. The agency based the twelve-cents-per-transaction cap on the average 
variable costs revealed in its industry survey. The median bank’s average variable cost was 
seven cents per transaction, but the twelve-cent number was based on the eightieth percentile of 
issuing banks that responded. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on 
Interchange Fees, supra note 46, at 7–8 (statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
 74. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46, 
at 3 (statement of Kenny Marchant, Member, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.) 
 75. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,756; see also Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1075(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(6)(a) 
(Supp. IV 2010) (exempting issuers with assets of less than $10 billion). 
 76. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,726; see also 
Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46, at 3 
(statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System) (summarizing the two alternatives in the proposed rule).  
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networks for each method of authorization that could be used with 
that card.77 The latter approach would provide more merchants with a 
routing choice but would entail much higher operational costs.78 
Finally, the proposal requested comments on two approaches to 
implementing the fraud-prevention adjustment to the interchange 
fee.79 The first approach would focus on the likelihood that major 
innovations would result in substantial reductions in industry-wide 
fraud.80 The second approach, without focusing on specific 
technologies, would focus on the steps that would be reasonably 
necessary for an issuer to take to maintain an effective fraud-
prevention program.81 Because the agency’s survey showed a 
substantially lower incidence of fraud for PIN-based debit 
transactions than for signature-based debit transactions,82 the Fed also 
requested comment on whether fraud adjustments should distinguish 
between PIN and signature transactions.83 
D. Judicial Challenge to the Durbin Amendment 
Unwilling to wait for the Fed to promulgate a final rule, TCF 
National Bank filed a lawsuit in federal district court in South Dakota 
challenging the constitutionality of the Durbin Amendment.84 The 
district court refused to grant TCF’s request for a temporary 
injunction,85 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed, holding that TCF was unlikely to prevail on its claim that 
 
 77. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,726–27. 
 78. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46, 
at 3 (statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System). 
 79. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,740. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 81,741. 
 83. Id. at 81,742–43. 
 84. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 WL 1578535 (D.S.D. Apr. 25, 
2011), aff’d, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. 2011). Compare Complaint at 1, TCF Nat’l Bank, No. 10-
4149, 2010 WL 3960576, at *1 (stating that the complaint was filed on October 12, 2010), with 
Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,394 (appearing in the July 20, 
2011, issue of the Federal Register). For background information on the TCF lawsuit, see Chris 
Serres, Limits on Debit Card Fees on Trial, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 4, 2011, at 1A. 
 85. TCF Nat’l Bank, 2011 WL 1578535, at *5 (denying TCF’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction). 
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the Fed’s threatened action would deprive it of substantive due 
process.86 
E. Reactions to the Proposal 
The Fed “received thousands of comments raising a variety of 
issues.”87 Merchant groups and some consumer groups supported the 
interchange-fee proposal.88 They preferred the first alternative for the 
interchange fee-standard, but they wanted to lower the cap from 
twelve cents per transaction to as low as four cents per transaction.89 
On the network-exclusivity issue, the merchants preferred the second 
alternative because it would provide more routing choices and 
because it would allow for more market discipline on interchange and 
network fees.90 With respect to the fraud-related proposals, they 
generally favored the first option, which focused on the likelihood 
that major innovations would result in substantial reductions in 
industry-wide fraud.91 
Issuers generally opposed the proposal entirely, arguing that 
both fee-limiting alternatives would result in increased fees for 
cardholders and other bank customers, would decrease the 
availability of debit cards to low-income consumers, and would stifle 
innovation.92 They preferred a single, stand-alone cap, but they urged 
the Fed to substantially increase the cap to reflect a number of 
additional costs.93 With respect to the network-exclusivity 
 
 86. See TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158, 1161, 1164–65 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[E]ven 
assuming that TCF possesses a sufficient property interest to raise a due-process challenge, we 
do not believe that TCF is likely to prevail. . . . [W]e affirm the district court’s denial of TCF’s 
motion for a preliminary injunction.”). 
 87. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46, 
at 4 (statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System). 
 88. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394, 43,402 (July 20, 2011) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235) (“Merchants, their trade groups, and some consumers 
supported the Board’s proposal . . . .”); Edward Wyatt, 9 Senators Seek To Delay Debit Card Fee 
Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2011, at B3 (stating that retailers and consumer groups were 
generally in favor of the proposal). 
 89. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,402. 
 90. Id. at 43,403. 
 91. Id. at 43,402; Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,478, 43,479 
(interim final rule July 20, 2011) (to be codified as 12 C.F.R. pt. 235). 
 92. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,402. 
 93. Id. Interestingly, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in the Treasury 
Department weighed in on the proposal and sided with the banks. See Donna Borak, OCC Joins 
Fight Against ‘Narrow’ Interchange Rule, AM. BANKER, Mar. 9, 2011, at 3 (reporting that the 
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requirements, the issuers preferred the first alternative but argued 
that even that alternative “would impose significant operational 
burdens” on networks and issuers with very “little [offsetting] 
consumer benefit.”94 Card issuers maintained that requiring them to 
allow access to at least two networks would precipitate a “race to the 
bottom” that would drive rates down as retailers sought the lowest-
price option “regardless of quality or value delivered to the 
consumer.”95 Finally, they favored the second fraud alternative 
because it would provide flexibility to issuers to “tailor their fraud-
prevention activities to address most effectively the risks they faced 
and changing fraud patterns.”96 
Although the proposal included the exemption for small issuers, 
small banks, and credit unions, these entities predicted that 
competition would force them to adhere to the lower caps that the 
Fed had established for the big banks.97 They suspected that few 
merchants would be willing to pay higher fees to small issuers when 
most of their customers procured their debit cards from large 
issuers.98 Several small banks argued that the Fed should provide an 
administrative exemption from the network-exclusivity requirements 
to match the statutory exemption from the interchange-fee 
requirements.99 
 
Comptroller of the Currency warned that the proposal could hurt banks); Serres, supra note 55 
(stating that the Comptroller of the Currency wrote to the Fed arguing that the proposal was 
too narrow). 
 94. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,403. 
 95. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46, 
at 44 (statement of Joshua R. Floum, General Counsel, Visa Inc.). 
 96. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,402; Debit Card 
Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,479. 
 97. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,402. 
 98. See Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 
46, at 38 (statement of Frank Michael, President and CEO, Allied Credit Union, on behalf of 
the Credit Union National Association) (“If the [small-issuer] carve out is entirely ineffective 
and credit union interchange fees converge on the rate set for very large institutions, credit 
unions will find their net income reduced by $1.6 billion.”); id. at 41 (statement of David W. 
Kemper, Chairman, President, and CEO, Commerce Bank, on behalf of the American Bankers 
Association and the Consumer Bankers Association) (“[T]he exemption for small banks will 
ultimately be ineffective. Every community banker . . . with whom I speak strongly believes his 
or her bank will be severely affected by the interchange price controls imposed on larger 
banks. . . . Market share will flow to the lower-priced product of big banks, forcing small banks 
to lose customers if they don’t follow suit.”). 
 99. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,403. 
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F. Lobbying, Campaign Contributions, and Public Relations 
Issuers launched a massive lobbying campaign to persuade 
agency personnel to adopt the issuers’ preferred approaches to the 
regulations and to persuade Congress to repeal or modify the Durbin 
Amendment—or at least to delay its implementation date until after 
the 2012 elections.100 One less apparent purpose of the congressional-
lobbying campaign was to persuade individual members of Congress 
to put pressure on the Fed to make the final rule friendlier to the 
banking industry. The Independent Community Bankers of America 
spent around $1.2 million lobbying banking regulators and Congress 
during the first quarter of 2011.101 The Credit Union National 
Association (CUNA), which spent approximately $750,000 on 
lobbying, also generated an estimated 144,000 contacts with 
lawmakers during the first three months of 2011.102 The two major 
networks, Visa and MasterCard, hired eighteen lobbying firms to 
influence the agency and Congress on the interchange-fee rule.103 The 
retail merchants followed suit with an intense lobbying campaign of 
their own.104 The Sunlight Foundation reported that the various 
interest groups advancing the merchants’ cause had hired 124 
lobbying firms to influence agency and congressional action with 
respect to the interchange-fee rule.105 
The affected industries backed up their lobbying activities with 
hefty campaign contributions to key senators and representatives.106 
According to the Sunlight Foundation, banking interests funneled 
 
 100. See Wyatt, supra note 65 (describing an “all-out assault on Capitol Hill” and the card 
issuers’ tactic of “enlisting a growing cadre of lawmakers and lobbyists to push for changes, 
delay or outright repeal”). 
 101. Ben Protess, Community Banks Lobby To Limit New Regulations, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK BLOG (May 23, 2011, 8:37 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/
community-banks-lobby-to-limit-new-regulations. 
 102. Victoria McGrane, Wall Street, Banks Press To Shape Dodd-Frank Rules, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 22, 2011, at A5. 
 103. Edward Wyatt, Senate Votes Down a Delay in Rules on Debit Card Fees, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 9, 2011, at B1. The Sunlight Foundation reported that sixty-eight of the seventy-nine 
lobbyists hired by Visa and MasterCard had previously worked in the federal government. Id. 
 104. See Wyatt, supra note 65 (naming the lobbying representatives of retailers and noting 
the intensity of the lobbying effort). 
 105. Paul Blumenthal, Merchants, Retailers Employ Revolving Door Lobbyists in Regulatory 
Fight, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Apr. 19, 2011, 12:16 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2011/
04/19/merchants-retailers-employ-revolving-door-lobbyists-in-regulatory-fight.  
 106. See Gary Rivlin, The Billion-Dollar Bank Heist, NEWSWEEK, July 18, 2011, at 9, 10 
(reporting that banks and trade associations contributed millions of dollars to the campaigns of 
representatives who could influence the Dodd-Frank Act). 
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$662,000 to selected committee members through the Electronic 
Payments Coalition during the first few months of 2011.107 CUNA’s 
political action committee sent more than $400,000 to federal 
candidates during the first four months of 2011.108 The 2010 elections 
presented a unique opportunity for Republican politicians to redirect 
the industry’s generous campaign contributions into Republican 
coffers. In September 2010, the financial-services industry sent 71 
percent of its campaign contributions to Republicans, compared to 44 
percent for the same month in 2009.109 The Sunlight Foundation found 
that 70 percent of the campaign contributions that House Committee 
on Financial Services Chairman Spencer Bachus received during the 
first quarter of 2011 came from the financial-services industry.110 
During the first quarter of 2011, seven of the ten Republican 
freshmen on the committee received about 40 percent of their 
campaign contributions from the financial-services industry.111 
The banking industry supported its lobbying campaign with an 
expensive public-relations campaign aimed at generating public 
pressure on the agency and Congress.112 A coalition of banks and 
networks placed advertisements in newspapers warning that 
“[b]ureaucrats want to take away your debit card!”113 Network-
television advertisements complained that “‘community banks and 
credit unions will be squeezed’” by ‘“bad’ regulation” if Congress did 
not stop the Fed.114 Banking-industry representatives told the media 
that the Fed’s proposed “price controls” would provide windfalls to 
big-box stores like Wal-Mart and would force banks to charge higher 
fees for debit cards and to do away with free checking.115 Several large 
banks announced that they were planning to reduce or eliminate 
 
 107. See Ylan Q. Mui & Cezary Podkul, Banks Lose Fight over Swipe Fees, WASH. POST, 
June 9, 2011, at A13 (citing figures reported by the Sunlight Foundation). 
 108. Trades Continue To Gear Up for Election, CREDIT UNION TIMES, June 1, 2011, at 28, 
28. 
 109. Nelson D. Schwartz, Power Shift Is Expected by C.E.O.’s, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2010, at 
B1.  
 110. Rivlin, supra note 106, at 11. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Cf. Mui & Podkul, supra note 107 (describing the industry’s campaign efforts). 
 113. Wyatt, supra note 65 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 114. Protess, supra note 101. 
 115. Serres, supra note 55 (internal quotation mark omitted) (predicting that banks would 
impose higher fees on consumers in response to the interchange-fee rule); Wyatt, supra note 65 
(reporting that the change in interchange fees would likely create windfalls for large retailers). 
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debit-card rewards programs but that they would not implement the 
changes if Congress delayed the Fed regulations.116 
The efforts to sway public opinion were not confined to the 
mainstream media. Metro cars in Washington, D.C.’s mass-transit 
system, in which many Fed employees presumably traveled, featured 
ads opposing the Fed’s proposal.117 A bankers’ group created a 
website called “Don’t Make Us Pay” to provide the banking 
industry’s take on the dispute and to urge consumers to send a form 
email to their congresspersons.118 CUNA posted a YouTube video in 
which the association’s president alluded to a massive security breach 
at Michaels arts-and-crafts stores as an example of the security risks 
that consumers would face if banks and credit unions did not receive 
sufficiently high interchange fees to support innovative fraud-
prevention technologies.119 
A group of retailers called the Merchants Payments Coalition 
responded to the banking-industry initiative with advertisements that 
depicted overweight bankers smoking cigars and rifling through one-
hundred-dollar bills, and criticized banks for accepting federal bailout 
money at the same time that they were “looking for another 
handout.”120 A public-relations firm hired by the merchants coined the 
term “swipe fee” as a substitute for the term “interchange fee” in the 
debates.121 In May 2011, the National Retail Federation (NRF) 
launched a “major nationwide 60-day lobbying, grassroots and media 
campaign” aimed at ensuring that the Fed promulgated an 
 
 116. See Hopkins, supra note 67 (quoting a JPMorgan Chase official as saying that the bank 
would not change its debit-card program if Congress delayed the regulation); E. Scott Reckard, 
Debit Cards Poised To Get Much Costlier, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2011, at B1 (reporting that JP 
Morgan, Wells Fargo, and other banks were phasing out or reducing debit-card rewards 
programs in response to the interchange-fee regulations); Bill Hardekopf, Debit-Card Rewards: 
Beginning of the End?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/
Business/2011/0401/Debit-card-rewards-beginning-of-the-end (announcing that Chase debit-
card holders would no longer receive rewards for using the card). 
 117. See Mui & Podkul, supra note 107 (reporting that financial firms covered Metro cars in 
advertisements). 
 118. DON’T MAKE US PAY, http://dontmakeuspay.org (last visited Apr. 11, 2012). 
 119. Cheney YouTube Video Urges Interchange Delay Action, CREDIT UNION NAT’L ASS’N 
(June 6, 2011), http://www.cuna.org/newsnow/11/wash060311-3.html. 
 120. Serres, supra note 84 (quoting the advertisement) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 121. See Marc Hochstein, The PR Whiz Who Coined ‘Swipe Fees,’ AM. BANKER, June 30, 
2011, at 8 (reporting that Taylor West, an employee of a Washington public-relations firm, 
coined the term swipe fee).  
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interchange-fee rule that was acceptable to retailers.122 Targeted 
advertisements aired across the country. For example, advertisements 
airing on television stations across Alaska warned that “[t]wo out of 
every one hundred dollars we spend in stores or online go to the 
credit card industry” and urged viewers to call the state’s two senators 
to “tell them to stop the big bank credit card industry from swiping 
our money.”123 
Consumer groups lacked the resources to launch a public-
relations campaign, but they did complain to the press that high 
interchange fees were wholly unwarranted. They noted that banks 
had saved billions in operating costs as consumers moved away from 
personal checks to debit cards and that the banks had failed to pass 
on the savings to consumers.124 Having coaxed consumers into using 
debit cards, banks were “diabolical” to begin raising debit-card fees.125 
G. Industry Allies 
Conservative think tanks and grassroots organizations also 
entered the fray. The probusiness Competitive Enterprise Institute 
(CEI) circulated a letter signed by many other groups, including 
Grover Norquist’s Americans for Tax Reform and the Christian 
Coalition of America, urging Congress to delay the implementation 
of the rule pending further study and analysis.126 One Tea Party 
 
 122. National Retail Federation Launches Major 60-Day Advocacy Campaign To Preserve 
Swipe Fee Reform, BUS. WIRE (May 18, 2011, 12:15 PM EST), http://www.businesswire.com/
news/home/20110518006516/en/National-Retail-Federation-Launches-Major-60-Day-Advocacy. 
Among other things, the campaign included an “intensive grassroots campaign mobilizing 
retailers from across the country”; a “fly-in with hundreds of business owners . . . to meet with 
members of Congress and urge that the reforms go through as planned”; an “aggressive media 
relations campaign including . . . interviews with national and local news outlets, and nationwide 
placement of op-eds”; a “nationwide print and radio advertising campaign 
including . . . hundreds of thousands of dollars in radio ads in key markets nationwide”; and the 
use of “social media and viral video to educate legislators and the public.” Id. 
 123. National Retail Federation Airs Radio Ads Urging Murkowski and Begich To Support 
Swipe Fee Reform, ENHANCED ONLINE NEWS (May 31, 2011, 5:33 PM EDT), http://eon.
businesswire.com/news/eon/20110531007077/en. 
 124. See Reckard, supra note 116 (reporting that consumer advocates were angry at banks 
for raising interchange fees because the cost savings of debit cards was not being passed on to 
consumers). 
 125. See id. (quoting Ed Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest 
Research Group) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 126. Letter from Grover Norquist, President, Ams. for Tax Reform, et al., to Members of 
Congress (Apr. 1, 2011), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/atrfiles/files/files/040111lt_
Interchange%281%29.pdf. John Berlau of the CEI warned that “we must stop the . . . oncoming 
train wreck that threatens the savings of consumers as well as the safety and soundness of the 
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organization featured the Fed’s interchange-fee rule on a webpage 
that prominently featured the slogan “Don’t Make Us Pay” and 
warned that the rule would result in fewer rewards, more debit-card 
restrictions, and higher debit-card fees.127 When Bank of America 
announced that it would introduce a five-dollar monthly debit-card 
fee, Rush Limbaugh rushed to the bank’s defense, telling his listeners 
that the fee was the bank’s proper response to the Durbin 
Amendment, “which was tacked on to the already despicable Dodd-
Frank bill at the last minute.”128 
H. Congressional Hearings 
Two hearings on the interchange-fee rule before the House 
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit 
provided a forum for opponents of the proposed rule to criticize it 
outside of the Fed’s ongoing rulemaking process.129 The first witness 
at the first hearing on February 17, 2011, was Sarah Bloom Raskin, a 
member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.130 
Although Raskin was reluctant to promise any particular outcome 
from the pending rulemaking, she was quite forthcoming about the 
studies underlying the proposal and the possibility that the small-
bank exclusion from the interchange-fee cap could prove illusory.131 
Nevertheless, she was subjected to browbeating exchanges by two 
subcommittee members. Representative Blaine Luetkemeyer 
peppered Raskin with questions, cut her off before she could respond, 
 
financial system with price controls that don’t even cover the cost of services to retailers.” Press 
Release, Ams. for Tax Reform, Competitive Enter. Inst. & 60 Plus Ass’n, Free-Market Groups 
Support Halting Dodd-Frank Price Controls (Apr. 5, 2011), available at http://s3.amazonaws
.com/atrfiles/files/files/040511pr_interchangefees.pdf (quoting Berlau). 
 127. Debit Card Rule; Take Action To Stop It, S. TIER TEA PARTY PATRIOTS, http://sttpp.
wordpress.com/action-alerts/take-action-stop-the-debit-card-rule (last visited Apr. 11, 2012). 
 128. The Rush Limbaugh Show (Premiere Networks radio broadcast Oct. 4, 2011) 
(transcript available at http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2011/10/04/dick_durbin_calls_for_
run_on_bank).  
 129. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46; 
The Effect of Dodd-Frank on Small Financial Institutions and Small Businesses: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 
(2011). 
 130. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46, 
at 2 (statement of Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
 131. See id. at 32 (discussing the survey conducted evaluating the impact of the Durbin 
Amendment and acknowledging that the impact on “small community banks” was not 
“included in the survey”). 
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and then chastised her for failing to be responsive.132 Representative 
Donald Manzullo insisted that the Fed was rushing to judgment and 
demanded that Raskin admit that “[her] survey and [her] studies 
[were] flawed.”133 When Raskin said that she was “not ready to admit 
that,”134 Representative Manzullo interrupted her and accused her of 
being disingenuous.135 
The banking industry’s witnesses focused on the adverse 
consequences that they predicted would flow from the Fed’s 
proposal.136 They urged Congress to call an immediate halt to the 
rulemaking process. If, after additional study and hearings, Congress 
should decide that further action was still needed, it could allow the 
Fed to reinitiate the rulemaking process.137 And if Congress was not 
prepared to pretermit the proceeding, it should at least delay the 
rulemaking process to give the banking agencies an opportunity to 
study the matter further.138 Representative David Scott told Raskin 
 
 132. See id. at 25 (statements of Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors, and Rep. 
Luetkemeyer, Member, Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs.) (“MR. LUETKEMEYER: Yet in your written testimony, your written testimony says the 
proposed rule interprets the incremental cost to be an exclusion of fixed costs would be 
required. Which one is it? . . . MS. RASKIN: It is actually both. MR. LUETKEMEYER: No, no, no. 
Yes or no? Which—we are not going there—take up my 5 minutes—very quickly. Which one is? 
MS. RASKIN: I am afraid I don’t see a conflict and I could— MR. LUETKEMEYER: I am sorry. I 
see a tremendous conflict . . . .”). 
 133. Id. at 33 (statement of Rep. Manzullo, Member, Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer 
Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.). 
 134. Id. (statement of Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System).  
 135. Id. at 33–34 (statement of Rep. Manzullo, Member, Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & 
Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.). 
 136. See The Effect of Dodd-Frank on Small Financial Institutions and Small Businesses, 
supra note 129, at 9 (statement of John P. Buckley, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, 
Gerber Federal Credit Union, on behalf of the National Association of Federal Credit Unions) 
(arguing that the proposed rule would be “disastrous for credit unions and the 19 million 
members [they] serve” because “the exemption for financial institutions under $10 billion in 
assets [would] not work”); id. at 14 (statement of James D. MacPhee, Chairman, Independent 
Community Bankers of America) (testifying that the proposal’s “[r]egulatory and paperwork 
requirements [would] impose a disproportionate burden on community banks, thereby 
diminishing their profitability and ability to attract capital and support their customers, 
including small businesses”). 
 137. Id. at 10 (statement of John P. Buckley, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, 
Gerber Federal Credit Union, on behalf of the National Association of Federal Credit Unions). 
 138. See Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 
46, at 43 (statement of Joshua R. Floum, General Counsel, Visa Inc.) (arguing that “Congress 
should consider extending the implementation date and requesting an impact study on 
unintended consequences”); Donna Borak & Stacy Kaper, Durbin Rules Revisited: Cold Feet on 
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that he hoped that she would take away from the hearing the message 
“that a delay in the implementation of this rule [was] definitely in 
order.”139 
Subcommittee Chairman Shelley Moore Capito questioned 
whether the small-bank exemption from the interchange-fee cap 
would be of any real benefit to small banks and credit unions in light 
of the possibility that the merchants might shift their business away 
from banks claiming the exemption to the big banks that were 
charging the lower regulated fees.140 Proponents of small banks 
argued that one way to ensure that the exemption was meaningful 
would be to require networks to impose a “two-tier” system on 
merchants that would prevent merchants from refusing to accept 
cards issued by small banks with their associated higher interchange 
fees.141 Raskin agreed that there were “legitimate questions regarding 
how in fact small issuers [were] going to in essence have this 
exemption work in their favor” because the agency had concluded 
that it lacked the authority to require the merchants to employ a two-
tier system.142 
I. Senator Tester’s Rider 
The intense lobbying efforts by the banking industry had a 
noticeable impact. By early 2011, several members who had voted for 
the Durbin Amendment in 2010 expressed reservations about the law 
and urged the Fed to err on the side of allowing issuers to charge 
higher interchange fees to account for fraud-prevention expenses.143 
In March 2011, Senator Jon Tester introduced a bill144 that would have 
 
Interchange Reg Proposal, AM. BANKER, Feb. 18, 2011, at 1 (stating that both political parties 
urged the Fed to delay the implementation of the interchange-fee regulation). 
 139. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46, 
at 15 (statement of Rep. Scott, Member, Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs.). 
 140. Cf. id. at 4–5 (statement of Rep. Capito, Chairman, Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & 
Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.) (“[T]he question [is] that if you are an issuer 
from a community bank or a credit union, [and] your interchange fee [can] remain higher, will 
there be, as you [Raskin] said, dollar pressure to move customers towards the lower cost 
interchange issuers?”).  
 141. Borak & Kaper, supra note 138 (quoting former Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) Chairperson Sheila Bair). 
 142. Understanding the Federal Reserve’s Proposed Rule on Interchange Fees, supra note 46, 
at 4–5 (statement of Sarah Bloom Raskin, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System). 
 143. Wyatt, supra note 65.  
 144. Debit Interchange Fee Study Act, S. 575, 112th Cong. §§ 3–4 (2011). 
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delayed the implementation of the interchange-fee regulation for two 
years and required the Fed to repropose the rule after further study.145 
Within seventeen days, Tester received campaign donations from a 
number of banking interests totaling at least $60,000.146 To the delight 
of Tester’s opponent in the 2012 campaign, retailers then reacted by 
filling the Montana airwaves and newspapers with attack ads 
characterizing Tester as a handmaiden of the big Wall Street banks.147 
The Montana Bankers Association and credit-union groups 
responded with a barrage of advertisements defending Tester.148 In 
the end, the retailers prevailed after supporters of an appropriations 
rider containing the Tester Amendment failed to garner the sixty 
votes necessary to override a promised filibuster.149 
J. The Notice of Final Rulemaking 
After the Tester Amendment’s defeat, the banking industry and 
its allies in the think tanks shifted their attention once again to the 
Fed, which had missed its April 2011 deadline for promulgating a 
final rule because it had to process more than 11,000 comments.150 The 
final rule, which came out on July 20, 2011,151 adopted a modified 
version of the stand-alone cap—the option favored by the banks.152 
Rather than forcing issuers to justify interchange fees up to a twelve-
cents-per-transaction cap,153 the final rule provided that an issuer 
could not receive a per-transaction interchange fee in excess of the 
 
 145. Cheyenne Hopkins, Interchange Limits Play Key Role in Tester Race, AM. BANKER, 
May 4, 2011, at 1. 
 146. Alexander Bolton, Swipe-Fee Opponents Direct Campaign Money to Tester, THE HILL, 
Apr. 20, 2011, at 9. 
 147. See Hopkins, supra note 145 (“Groups including the Montana Petroleum Marketers 
and Convenience Store Association, Montana Retail Association and several national merchant 
advocacy groups are portraying Tester as a friend of Wall Street banks.”). 
 148. See id. (“[Retailer ads supporting Tester] are being countered by ads from the Montana 
Bankers Association as well as community bank and credit union groups, who have launched 
their own TV, radio and print ads on the issue.”). 
 149. Mui & Podkul, supra note 107; Wyatt, supra note 103. 
 150. Joe Adler, Banks’ Swipe Fee Fight Shifts to Fed, AM. BANKER, June 9, 2011, at 1 
(stating that bankers focused on persuading the Fed to change the interchange-fee policy); Ylan 
Q. Mui, Retailers Fight Back over Debit-Card Swipe Fees, WASH. POST, May 19, 2011, at A13 
(reporting that the Fed said it had missed its deadline because over eleven thousand comments 
had been submitted). 
 151. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,394 (July 20, 2011) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235). 
 152. Id. at 43,402. 
 153. See id. at 43,401 (discussing the proposed twelve-cents cap). 
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sum of twenty-one cents plus an “ad valorem” component of five 
basis points of the transaction’s value.154 With respect to network 
exclusivity, the Fed again adopted the alternative favored by the 
banks, thereby requiring issuers to provide access to two unaffiliated 
networks for each transaction.155 The final rule exempted small banks 
from the interchange-fee standard but not from the network-
exclusivity requirements.156 
The Fed published a separate interim final rule to address the 
fraud-prevention adjustment.157 It adopted the “more general, less 
prescriptive approach” regarding the eligibility of an issuer to receive 
the adjustment, and it set the adjustment at one cent per 
transaction.158 To avail itself of the fraud-prevention adjustment, an 
issuer would be required to develop and implement policies and 
procedures designed to identify and prevent fraudulent transactions, 
to monitor the incidence of losses and reimbursements attributable to 
fraud, respond to suspicious electronic transactions, and to ensure 
that debit-card data remained secure.159 In explaining why it had 
selected the option preferred by the banks, the Fed observed that 
“[t]he dynamic nature of the debit card fraud environment requires 
standards that permit issuers to determine themselves the best 
methods to detect, prevent, and mitigate fraud losses.”160 
K. Reactions to the Final Rule 
Retailers were greatly disappointed by the new rule.161 In 
November, three retailer trade associations sought judicial review of 
 
 154. Id. at 43,472. For the average debit-card transaction of thirty-eight dollars, the ad 
valorem component was two cents. Edward Wyatt, Fed Halves Debit Card Bank Fees, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 30, 2011, at B1. 
 155. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,403, 43,468. 
 156. Id. at 43,467 (exempting small issuers from interchange-fee provisions but not 
mentioning exclusivity provisions). 
 157. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,478 (interim final rule July 
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235). 
 158. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,404. 
 159. Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,480. 
 160. Id. at 43,484. 
 161. See Donna Borak & Rob Blackwell, Fed Raises Swipe Fee Limit, but Banks, Retailers 
Cry Foul, AM. BANKER, June 30, 2001, at 1 (stating that retailers were unhappy with the final 
rule); Wyatt, supra note 154 (relaying the characterization by Mallory Duncan, chairman of the 
Merchants Payments Coalition, of the rule as “unacceptable to Main Street merchants” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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the rule in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.162 
Consumer groups agreed that the Fed had “capitulated to intense 
lobbying by bankers,”163 but they nevertheless hoped that consumers 
would receive “a small break” in lower prices for consumer goods.164 
The banking industry also expressed some dismay that the rule had 
effectively reduced interchange fees by almost one-half, but it 
recognized that the Fed had taken “a significant step in reducing the 
harm that could have resulted from the proposed rule.”165 Outside 
observers predicted that, although consumers would not experience a 
direct impact in lower prices, they might expect to see prices rising 
less rapidly for a time.166 
The networks immediately responded to the rule by assessing a 
new “network-participation” fee to all merchants using any of their 
cards, debit or otherwise.167 In response to the new fees, banks began 
to announce new cardholder fees. Two months before the rule went 
into effect, Wells Fargo announced that it would be charging a three-
dollar fee to its debit cardholders in five states for every month during 
which they used their cards.168 When the rule finally became effective 
in early October 2011, Bank of America announced that it would 
begin charging customers a fee of five dollars for every month during 
which they used their cards.169 Consumer reaction to the fees was 
extremely negative, and the reaction was compounded by the Occupy 
Wall Street movement, which at that moment was focusing public 
 
 162. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 1–6, NACS v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., No. 1:11-cv-02075 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2011); see also Edward Wyatt, Retailers Push 
Fed for Yet Lower Debit Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2011, at B1 (describing the background of 
the lawsuit); Maya Jackson Randall, Retailers Sue Fed over Debit-Card Fee Rule, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 22, 2011, 3:25 PM EST), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702045314045770
54433584869976.html (same). 
 163. Press Release, Pub. Citizen, Public Citizen Critiques Federal Reserve Surrender to 
Bank Lobbyists (June 29, 2011), available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroom
redirect.cfm?ID=3372. 
 164. See id. (pointing out that the new twenty-six-cents cap was still lower than the average 
prerule interchange fee of forty-four cents). 
 165. Wyatt, supra note 154 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 166. Cf. id. (predicting that consumers are more likely to see a slower increase in prices). 
 167. Andrew Johnson, Visa Revamps Its Pricing To Defend Debit Market Share, AM. 
BANKER, July 29, 2011, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 168. Will Hernandez, Wells Tests $3 Monthly Debit Fee in Five States, AM. BANKER, Aug. 
18, 2011, at 2. JPMorgan Chase tested a similar fee on checking accounts in a small market. Id. 
 169. Ylan Q. Mui, Bank of America Scraps Debit Card Fee amid Uproar, WASH. POST, Nov. 
2, 2011, at A1. 
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attention on the misbehavior of large banks.170 More than 300,000 
people signed an online petition to stop the cardholder fee, and 
21,000 people pledged to close their accounts with Bank of 
America.171 A month later, Bank of America and the other banks 
rescinded the fees.172 
II.  SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF BLOOD-SPORT RULEMAKING 
The interchange-fee rulemaking experience illustrates how 
stakeholders in high-stakes rulemakings have begun going beyond the 
conventional responses to rulemaking initiatives by adopting a new 
toolbox of strategies better suited to the deeply divided political 
economy. If the players on one side of the policy debate perceive that 
they are unlikely to prevail in the administrative arena, they will 
move the implementation game to another arena—the White House, 
a congressional hearing, a political fundraising dinner, a think-tank 
white paper, talk-radio programs, attack advertising, telephone 
solicitation and “push polls,” or Internet blogs. Many of these new 
venues were amply used in the battle that accompanied the 
interchange-fee rulemaking. In addition, although lawyers for the 
stakeholders employ the careful language of administrative law in 
arenas in which that language is expected, spokespersons and allies 
also employ the heated rhetoric of modern political discourse in 
arenas in which that language is more likely to succeed. This Part 
probes these, among other, contours of blood-sport rulemaking. 
A. Thoroughgoing Participation 
The stakeholders that employ blood-sport strategies continue to 
play vigorously on the traditional fields of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. They submit extensive filings during the comment 
period, testify at hearings, and participate in related exercises such as 
negotiated rulemaking.173 Affected entities with the financial 
resources to do so submit lengthy briefs containing hundreds and 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Tara Siegel Bernard, Bank of America Drops Plan for Debit Card Fee, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 2, 2011, at A1. 
 173. See Wagner, supra note 5, at 1371 (“The rulemaking review game, for example, 
produces incentives for stakeholders to fill the record with intricate details, raise every 
conceivable argument, err on the side of including attachments that may not be terribly helpful, 
engage in negotiations outside of formal notice-and-comment parameters, and raise every 
litigation threat within their grasp.”). 
MCGARITY IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2012  12:12 AM 
1704 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1671 
even thousands of pages of information, analysis, and argumentation 
that can quickly lead to what Professor Wendy Wagner characterizes 
as “information excess.”174 These submissions also constitute the 
factual basis for subsequent judicial challenges to the substance of the 
agency’s final rule.175 Empirical analyses of public comments in 
informal rulemakings generally reach the unremarkable conclusion 
that regulated industries typically dominate the public-comment 
process.176 Moreover, regulatee participation has a discernible impact 
on rulemaking outcomes. The result can be “information capture”—
the “excessive use of information and related information costs as a 
means of gaining control over regulatory decisionmaking in informal 
rulemakings.”177 A 2011 study of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) rules regulating hazardous air pollutants concluded 
that substantive changes to the rules in response to public comments 
favored industry over public-interest groups by a five-to-one 
margin.178 Information capture is by no means a new phenomenon, 
but the incentive to overwhelm an agency with information will 
generally be higher in the context of high-impact rules that are likely 
to give rise to blood-sport battles. 
B. Vigorous Lobbying 
Companies and trade associations with an interest in major 
rulemakings sometimes hire in-house or outside lobbyists to assist 
their efforts to affect rulemaking outcomes long before the 
publication of notices of proposed rulemaking in the Federal 
 
 174. Id. at 1355; cf. id. at 1331 (noting that “parties have little reason to economize on the 
information they submit to agencies” because they “are not held to any limits on the 
information they file, nor must they assume any of the costs the agency incurs in processing 
their voluminous filings”). 
 175. Cf. id. at 1381 (“Given the high level of deference that typically occurs during judicial 
review, regulated parties will perceive major advantages to getting in at the ground floor, before 
the proposed rule is published.”). 
 176. See, e.g., Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who 
Participates? Whose Votes Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 252–53 (1998) 
(finding that “business commenters” dominate the rulemaking process at the EPA and the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, submitting between 66.7 and 100 percent of 
the comments); Wagner et al., supra note 5, at 128 (“[I]ndustry comments . . . comprised over 
81% of the comments submitted on [hazardous air pollutants] rules during the notice-and-
comment period . . . .”). 
 177. Wagner, supra note 5, at 1325. 
 178. See Wagner et al., supra note 5, at 131 n.2 (“Industry enjoyed more affirmative changes 
relative to the public interest for 87% of the rules.”). 
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Register.179 The lobbyists are generally familiar with the agency, often 
because they are former employees, and they maintain close personal 
contacts with agency personnel to gain information on the likely 
content of proposed and final regulations.180 Knowing that their 
rulemaking activities are being carefully watched by companies and 
interest groups that have the power to influence the White House or 
Congress, agency staffers may “attempt to placate these monitors by 
formulating rules that are more palatable to them than the rules that 
otherwise would be sent to the agency head.”181 
The agency’s technical staff and economists are usually heavily 
dependent on others for the information needed to prepare agency 
analyses and craft agency proposals.182 Consequently, those entities 
with access to the needed information—often the regulated 
companies—may “enjoy special advantages in the [rulemaking] 
process.”183 Both before and after the formal comment period on a 
rule, during which time the agencies often place the content of 
communications with outsiders in the public record, “informationally 
endowed stakeholders and agency staff can negotiate regulatory 
policies in the shadows, where they are typically free of mandatory 
docket and recordkeeping requirements.”184 
Shadow conversations are not limited to technical staff and 
economists. High- and mid-level officials at most agencies are also 
generally willing to meet with lobbyists from beneficiary groups and 
affected industries both before and after the publication of the notice 
of proposed rulemaking to receive information, hear legal and policy 
arguments, and entertain suggestions for change.185 As the banking 
 
 179. See William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and 
Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 66, 69–70 (2004) (describing prenotice participation in rulemaking and highlighting 
concerns among agency officials about ex parte contacts); see also supra Part I.F. 
 180. See Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of Agency 
Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1079 (2001) (“[R]epresentatives of interest groups directly affected by 
an agency program are likely to be repeat players who maintain stable channels of 
communications with agency staff members.”). 
 181. Id. at 1079–80. 
 182. See Wagner, supra note 5, at 1380 (“In most complex rulemakings, the agency appears 
to be quite dependant on knowledgeable stakeholders to educate it about critical issues 
peculiarly within their grasp.”). 
 183. Id. at 1365. 
 184. Id. at 1366. 
 185. Cf. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492–93 (1992) 
(“No administrator in Washington turns to full-scale notice-and-comment rulemaking when she 
is genuinely interested in obtaining input from interested parties. . . . To secure the genuine 
MCGARITY IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2012  12:12 AM 
1706 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1671 
agencies began to implement the requirements of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the president of the Financial Services Forum, an industry trade 
association, stressed that it was “critical to have a seat at the table and 
participate in a dialogue.”186 Representatives of financial-services 
companies met with officials implementing the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
controversial Volcker Rule on more than 350 occasions before the 
agencies had even issued a notice of proposed rulemaking.187 Officials 
at OIRA are likewise willing to meet with affected groups both 
before and during the time that OIRA is reviewing a rule.188 A study 
of 1,056 rules about which OIRA met with outside groups found that 
43 percent of those meetings took place before the rule had been 
released to the public.189 These sorts of meetings undoubtedly 
influence the content of at least some of the rules that the agencies 
 
reality, rather than a formal show, of public participation, a variety of techniques is available—
from informal meetings with trade associations and other constituency groups, to roundtables, 
to floating ‘trial balloons’ in speeches or leaks to the trade press . . . .”); Seidenfeld, supra note 
180, at 1078 (“One suspects that agency staff also maintains contacts with representatives from 
affected interest groups . . . .”). 
 186. Schwartz, supra note 109 (quoting Rob Nichols) (internal quotation mark omitted); see 
also Robert Kuttner, Too Big To Be Governed?, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 2010, at 28, 28 (quoting 
former FDIC chairman Sheila Bair, who observed that “[e]very lawyer in town [was] on the 
payroll of one bank or another”). 
 187. Jean Eaglesham & Victoria McGrane, Behind Scenes, Battle for Face Time as 
Regulators Craft Rule’s Wording, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2011, at C2. Executives from the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce met on an almost daily basis with officials in the banking agencies and 
in the new CFPB during its formative stages. Eric Lichtblau & Robert Pear, Rule Makers 
Emerge from the Shadows, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2010, at A32. Goldman Sachs representatives 
met with the staff of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission fifty-five times during the last 
half of 2010 as the agency worked on the derivatives regulations that would be crucial to 
Goldman’s bottom line. Jim Puzzanghera, Goldman Sachs Flexes Its Lobbying Muscle, L.A. 
TIMES, July 5, 2011, at B1.  
 188. See RENA STEINZOR, MICHAEL PATOKA & JAMES GOODWIN, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE 
REFORM, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS AT THE WHITE HOUSE (2011) (discussing OIRA’s meetings 
with outside parties while conducting formal and informal reviews of proposed agency rules); 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-929, RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF 
AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 69 (2003) (“There 
was evidence that outside parties had contacted OIRA before or during OIRA’s formal review 
period regarding about half of the significantly changed rules . . . .”); see also Steven Croley, 
White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 
852–65 (2003) (providing an empirical analysis of OIRA’s meetings with outside parties during 
the rulemaking process); OMB Meets with Environmental Groups, Industry To Discuss 
Interstate Transport Rule, 42 ENV’T REP. 1374 (2011). Another example of the intense lobbying 
of agencies and the White House is the “lobbying blitz” that for-profit colleges aimed at the 
Department of Education in response to the Department’s efforts to promulgate regulations 
protecting prospective students from false and misleading solicitations. Eric Lichtblau, With 
Lobbying Blitz, Profit-Making Colleges Diluted New Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2011, at A1. 
 189. STEINZOR ET AL., supra note 188, at 10. 
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ultimately propose, or the participants would not spend their time 
and money setting them up.190 
In high-stakes rulemakings, lobbyists and the industries that 
employ them can sometimes exert sufficient pressure on agencies, 
either directly or indirectly through the intervention of important 
members of Congress, to take the additional step of meeting with the 
ultimate agency decisionmakers. For example, lobbyists for the 
Luminant Corporation were sufficiently influential to secure a 
meeting between company executives and EPA Administrator Lisa 
Jackson to discuss easing Luminant’s transition into compliance with 
the agency’s cross-state rule limiting the interstate transport of air 
pollutants.191 As a result of this meeting, the EPA increased 
Luminant’s share of the initial allowances to emit two pollutants.192 
Influential lobbyists can also prevail upon political operatives in the 
White House to persuade the head of OIRA or even the president to 
intervene in the decisionmaking process. For example, President 
Obama ordered EPA Administrator Jackson to withdraw a relatively 
stringent potential standard for ground-level ozone after a lobbyist 
 
 190. See Croley, supra note 188, at 876–77 (“While the type of interest groups represented at 
meetings do not predict a greater likelihood that a rule will be changed among the set of rules 
that are the subject of meetings, clearly rules that are the subject of meetings are more likely to 
be changed among the set of all rules under review. Thus, even if an OIRA meeting itself is not 
the cause of a change in a rule, a meeting reflects some underlying dynamic that leads to a 
change in a rule.”); Seidenfeld, supra note 180, at 1073 (concluding that industry has better 
access to OIRA and the White House than public-interest groups do); Wagner, supra note 5, at 
1366 (“Although proposed rules, on the surface, appear to be drafted by agency staff based on 
internal technical analyses, most of them are likely the result of extensive negotiations with 
interested parties that remain unrecorded and perhaps even unacknowledged.”). 
 191. Jessica Coomes, Jackson Among Top EPA Officials Working with Luminant on 
Compliance with Air Rule, 42 ENV’T REP. 2119 (2011). 
 192. EPA, Activists Reject Luminant Blaming Transport Rule for Plant Closures, INSIDE 
EPA, Sept. 16, 2011, available at Factiva, Doc. No. EPAW000020110915e79g0000a; see also Out 
of Thin Air: EPA’s Cross-State Air Pollution Rule: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Sci., Space 
& Tech., 112th Cong. (2011) available at http://science.house.gov/hearing/full-committee-
hearing-epas-cross-state-air-pollution-rule (prepared statement of Regina McCarthy, Assistant 
Administrator for Air and Radiation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) (“Based on 
technical information companies have recently provided, we are initiating a process to increase 
the emissions ‘budget’ for Texas by tens of thousands of additional tons . . . .”); Jessica Coomes, 
EPA Official Signals Agency’s Flexibility in Cross-State Air Rule Implementation, 42 ENV’T REP. 
2118 (summarizing the EPA’s effort to increase Texas’s emissions budget); Coomes, supra note 
191 (noting Administrator Jackson’s personal involvement in the compliance-assistance effort); 
Elizabeth Souder & Randy Lee Loftis, EFH Shutdown Plan Draws Skepticism, DALL. 
MORNING NEWS, Sept. 16, 2011, at A1 (describing Luminant’s complaints about the proposed 
rule and the EPA’s efforts to assist the company with compliance, including giving away 
emissions allowances).  
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for the American Petroleum Institute showed the White House chief 
of staff a map highlighting in red and blue the possible implications of 
that ozone standard for the president’s ongoing reelection 
campaign.193 
Additionally, companies and trade associations are well aware of 
the tendency of agency staff to tailor rules to fit the preferences of 
chairpersons of congressional committees.194 Therefore, these 
organizations also employ lobbyists to generate pressure on the 
agency from key members of Congress through telephone calls and 
letters demanding information and explanations during the pendency 
of the rulemaking.195 Occasionally, the efforts of the lobbyists are 
persuasive enough to generate a legislative response such as an 
amendment to the relevant statute or a limitation rider attached to 
must-pass legislation prohibiting the agency from spending any 
money on the rulemaking initiative.196 When the industry elects to 
pursue a legislative response, lobbying efforts can increase 
dramatically, as demonstrated by the use of the Tester rider to delay 
the implementation of the Fed’s interchange-fee rule.197 
C. Public-Relations Campaigns and Attack Advertising 
A rulemaking initiative can be so important to affected interests 
that those affected organizations are willing to spend considerable 
 
 193. John M. Broder, Re-election Strategy Is Tied to a Shift on Smog, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 
2011, at A1. Industry groups also launched a public-relations offensive against the rule that 
included letter-writing campaigns and advertisements in periodicals read by Washington, D.C., 
policymakers. Id. 
 194. Cf. Seidenfeld, supra note 180, at 1082 (“[T]raditional congressional oversight of 
agency rulemaking may induce the agency to tailor the rule to the preferences of members of 
the oversight committee, especially the chairpersons of such committees.”). 
 195. The American Bankers Association and the Independent Community Bankers 
Association, both of which were very active in the interchange-fee rulemaking and related 
congressional oversight, spent $2.2 million and $1 million respectively on lobbying during the 
first quarter of 2011. Richard Newman, Wall St. Reform Battle Escalates, STAR-LEDGER 
(Newark), June 26, 2011, at 1. Goldman Sachs alone spent $1.3 million lobbying during the first 
four months of 2011. Puzzanghera, supra note 187. All told, the banks and their trade 
associations spent more on lobbying the banking agencies and Congress during the first quarter 
of 2011—$27 million—than they did during the same period in 2010 when the debate over the 
Dodd-Frank Act was at its most intense—$26.3 million. McGrane, supra note 102; see also Ben 
Protess, Wall Street Lobbyist Aims To ‘Reform the Reform,’ N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG 
(July 14, 2011, 11:06 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/wall-street-lobbyists-try-to-
reform-the-reform (reporting that the banking industry spent an estimated $52 million on 
lobbying during the first quarter of 2011).  
 196. See McGarity, supra note 25. 
 197. See supra Part I.I. 
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sums on public-relations campaigns and advertising to influence the 
rulemaking outcome.198 One goal of these campaigns is to sway agency 
decisionmakers, who, like everyone else, watch television, read the 
newspaper, and travel on the local trains and buses. Another goal of 
these campaigns is to generate letters, emails, and phone calls from 
ordinary citizens to the agency or Congress demanding that the 
proposed rule be overturned or modified. Affected companies and 
interest groups can enhance the public response by working with 
grassroots organizations such as FreedomWorks, a prominent force 
behind the Tea Party movement,199 to educate the public about the 
proposed regulation and its possible economic consequences.200 
D. Coordination with Think Tanks, Media Pundits, and Bloggers 
Any agency launching a rulemaking initiative of any 
consequence can expect to be the object of sometimes thoughtful, but 
more often scornful, criticism from think tanks, media pundits, and 
bloggers. The American Enterprise Institute, the CEI, the American 
Legislative Exchange Council, and the Mercatus Institute, for 
example, are frequent critics of federal rulemaking activities.201 
 
 198. See supra note 122 and accompanying text; see also Erica Hepp, Note, Barking up the 
Wrong Channel: An Analysis of Communication Law Problems Through the Lens of Media 
Concentration Rules, 85 B.U. L. REV. 553, 569–71 (2005) (describing the advertising and public-
relations campaigns in response to Federal Communications Commission (FCC) consideration 
of media-ownership rules in the mid-2000s). 
 199. See generally Press Release, FreedomWorks for Am., FreedomWorks Launches Super 
PAC, “FreedomWorks for America” at Florida CPAC (Sept. 23, 2011), available at http://www.
freedomworksforamerica.org/press-releases/freedomworks-launches-super-pac-freedomworks-
for-america-at-florida-cpac (announcing the formation of the FreedomWorks for America super 
PAC and associating it with the Tea Party movement). 
 200. While the EPA was in the process of promulgating two high-stakes rules regulating 
emissions from power plants, FreedomWorks criticized the EPA for going “behind Congress’s 
back” to create “a series of unnecessary ‘train wreck’ environmental regulations” that would 
impose “hundreds of billions of dollars of costs on the economy.” James Hammerton, The Train 
Wreck at the Obama EPA, FREEDOMWORKS (July 21 2011), http://www.freedomworks.org/
blog/jhammerton/the-train-wreck-at-the-obama-epa. 
 201. See, e.g., DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, THE CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY 118–22 (2007) 
(discussing the American Enterprise Institute); ROSS GELBSPAN, THE HEAT IS ON 64–70 (1997) 
(“[T]he Republican majority on the [House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment] 
introduced their big guns in the case against ozone science—Fred Singer and several witnesses 
from ideologically conservative think tanks, including the Competitive Enterprise 
Institute . . . .”); DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT 181 (2008) (discussing the CEI 
and its efforts to challenge various EPA publications); JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN 
WOOLDRIDGE, THE RIGHT NATION 49 (2004) (noting that the American Enterprise Institute is 
“[t]he oldest conservative think tank in Washington”); DAVID M. RICCI, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 160–61 (1993) (describing the development of the 
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Because they can satisfy journalists’ demands for sound bites and 
titillating anecdotes within the timeframes demanded by media 
deadlines, think tanks are an attractive source of information for 
reporters.202 Talk-show host Rush Limbaugh is also a frequent critic of 
federal rulemaking.203 When agency rulemaking initiatives attract 
media attention, the regulatees can usually depend on Limbaugh to 
come to their aid with ad hominem attacks on the agencies and 
agency leaders.204 Limbaugh, for example, castigated the Durbin 
Amendment as the Fed was attempting to promulgate the 
implementing regulations.205 High-profile talk-show hosts have been 
joined by dozens of bloggers and podcasters who oppose virtually any 
form of government intervention into the marketplace.206 
 
American Enterprise Institute, including its 1971 emergence as a “Brookings-like think tank in 
opposition to the Carter administration”); Robert L. Borosage, The Mighty Wurlitzer, AM. 
PROSPECT, May 2002, at 13, 13 (discussing several think tanks, including the Heritage 
Foundation); Bob Davis, In Washington, Tiny Think Tank Wields Big Stick on Regulation, 
WALL ST. J., July 16, 2004, at A1 (discussing the Mercatus Institute’s criticism of government 
regulation). 
 202. See DAVID BROCK, THE REPUBLICAN NOISE MACHINE 52 (2004) (“[R]eporters 
quoted freely from conservative research . . . .”); WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE 
PEOPLE 300 (1991) (“The sponsored research at Washington think tanks has become a principal 
source for the ideas that reporters judge to be newsworthy and for the packaged opinions from 
‘experts’ that reporters dutifully quote on every current subject.”); JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL 
PIERSON, OFF CENTER 179 (2005) (“Over the past two decades, conservatives have succeeded 
in building a substantial media empire.”); WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, 
DISTORTING THE LAW 153 (2004) (“Most of the newspaper journalists . . . interviewed affirmed 
that they had received abundant reading material from tort reform groups and often had 
contacted such advocates for information or commentary on articles.”); TRUDY LIEBERMAN, 
SLANTING THE STORY: THE FORCES THAT SHAPE THE NEWS 9 (2000) (“Conservative groups 
have learned to boil down their messages to fit the new model of soundbite journalism, leaving 
the details for the weighty studies and policy analyses disseminated in more elite venues.”); 
Gregg Easterbrook, Ideas Move Nations, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1986, at 66, 69 (describing 
conservative think tanks’ efforts to woo reporters and the reporters’ eventual dependence on 
them). 
 203. See supra text accompanying note 128.  
 204. See, e.g., Quotes: The Big Voice on the Right, THE RUSH LIMBAUGH SHOW 
(Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2011/09/22/quotes_the_big_voice_on_the_
right (characterizing the federal government as a “marauding band” issuing a “never-ending list 
of regulations” and calling Elizabeth Warren “a parasite who hates her host” and “[who] is 
willing to destroy the host while she sucks the life out of it”). 
 205. See The Rush Limbaugh Show, supra note 128 (blaming the Durbin Amendment for 
the increase in interchange fees). 
 206. See, e.g., COFFEE & MARKETS, http://coffeeandmarkets.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) 
(archiving such podcasts). 
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E. Intense Congressional Oversight 
Congressional authorization and oversight committees have 
always paid careful attention to the major rulemaking activities of the 
agencies for which they are responsible.207 Congressional monitoring, 
through oversight hearings and less formal communications between 
congressional and agency staff, allows influential members of 
Congress to convey their preferences to agencies regarding particular 
rulemaking initiatives.208 As the political parties have become more 
ideologically unified, however, congressional committees controlled 
by one party have increasingly begun to push the boundaries of 
civility in overseeing rulemaking that is conducted by an 
administration controlled by the other party.209 Congressional 
oversight committees acknowledge few restrictions on their power to 
force agencies to take actions that may or may not be consistent with 
the statutes enacted by prior Congresses, even though, under the rule 
of law, such restrictions exist to cabin agency discretion, a 
phenomenon that Professors J.R. DeShazo and Jody Freeman refer 
to as “disjointed majoritarianism.”210 
Much of what oversight committees do can fairly be 
characterized as “message politics,” which Professor Neal Devins 
defines as the use of “the legislative process to make symbolic 
 
 207. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 130–
35, 138–39 (2006) (finding that Congress often “attempt[s] to influence the execution of the law 
by communicating directly with agency personnel”); McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 
176 (remarking that the “widespread perception that Congress has neglected its oversight 
responsibility is a widespread mistake”); Weingast & Moran, supra note 22, at 792 
(“Congressional institutions . . . afford considerable influence [over agencies].”). 
 208. Cf. Seidenfeld, supra note 180, at 1077–78 (noting that “Congress asserts its influence 
on agencies” through “active monitoring by congressional committees both on a formal and 
informal level” and that, “[g]iven the threat of cuts in appropriations or statutory limitations on 
agency authority, agencies have a strong incentive to conform their actions to be at least 
acceptable to the committee chair and a majority of committee members”). 
 209. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2311 (2001) 
(“[T]he possibility of significant legislative accomplishment . . . has grown dim in an era of 
divided government with high polarization . . . .”); cf. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, 
Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2344 (2006) (asserting that electoral 
accountability is least effective “when party control of government is divided”); Levinson & 
Pildes, supra, at 2363 (citing Kagan) (“Dean Kagan convincingly shows that, in an era of 
cohesive and polarized parties, divided government tends to displace policymaking from the 
legislative to the administrative process.”); McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 165 
(remarking that “neglect of oversight has become a stylized fact: widely and dutifully reported, 
it is often bemoaned, sometimes explained, but almost never seriously questioned”). 
 210. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition To Control Delegated 
Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1500 (2003). 
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statements to voters and other constituents.”211 During blood-sport 
confrontations over agency rulemaking, the intended recipients of 
these messages are the companies, trade associations, and interest 
groups that battle over rulemaking initiatives in the agencies.212 But 
the committees have the power to do much more than send messages. 
Agency leaders know that congressional committees have the power 
to amend agency statutes, cut agency budgets, and generally make life 
miserable for executive-branch officials who must testify in legislative 
and oversight hearings.213 One prominent industry lobbyist observed 
in 2010 that “[i]f a regulator knows they’re going to get yelled at on 
Capitol Hill, that influences their decisions.”214 
The 2010 elections ushered in a new focus on agency oversight. 
Just as banking agencies were promulgating the initial Dodd-Frank 
regulations, the midterm elections returned the House of 
Representatives to Republican control215 and left the Democratic 
Party with a razor-thin majority in the Senate.216 The fact that the Tea 
Party movement, which emphasized limited government and 
deregulation, played an important role in selecting the Republican 
candidates during primary season217—and arguably influenced the 
outcome of many general elections—placed regulatory oversight even 
 
 211. Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration of 
Constitutional Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 758 (2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Beermann, supra note 207, at 125 (noting that oversight hearings “provide an 
opportunity for members of Congress to express their views, often consisting of displeasure with 
the agency’s performance, to agency personnel and the voting public”). 
 212. Cf. Seidenfeld, supra note 180, at 1078 (“[C]ommittee members [may] wait[] until the 
interest groups that are affected by proposed agency actions come to them to complain about 
such actions. Such complaints act like a fire alarm, which, when rung, stimulates the committee 
to begin hearings and investigations. One suspects that agency staff also maintains contacts with 
representatives from affected interest groups and tries to keep such groups sufficiently placated 
to dissuade them from sounding the alarm to the oversight committee.” (footnote omitted)). 
 213. See Beermann, supra note 207, at 121 (“Informal [congressional] oversight and 
supervision often take place with a threat in the background that if an agency does not align its 
actions with the desires of legislators, it will find itself subject to legislation including changes to 
the substance of its program, changes to its structure, reductions or reallocations of its budget or 
targeted appropriations riders.”). 
 214. Schwartz, supra note 109 (quoting an industry lobbyist) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 215. See House Big Board, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2010/results/house/big-
board (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (listing the House election results). 
 216. See Senate Big Board, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2010/results/senate/big-
board (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (listing the Senate election results). 
 217. Kate Zernike, Shaping Tea Party Passion into Campaign Force, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 
2010, at A1 (“FreedomWorks has made Tea Party conservatives the surprise community 
organizing force of the 2010 midterm elections . . . .”). 
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higher on the House leadership’s list of priorities. The new chairman 
of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
Darrell Issa, promised to subject the regulators in the Obama 
administration to “seven hearings a week, times 40 weeks.”218 The 
new chairman of the House Committee on Financial Services, 
Spencer Bachus, explained that he believed that the purpose of the 
federal banking agencies was “to serve the banks.”219 The new 
chairman of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Credit, Shelley Moore Capito, announced that one of her 
top priorities would be to “reshape” several provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Act.220 
As discussed in Part I, the House committees that oversee 
financial-services regulation actively interjected themselves into the 
interchange-fee rulemaking while the comment periods for the rules 
were open and the agency was actively considering incoming 
comments.221 The hearings gave the interests favored by the 
committee leadership a second opportunity to influence the agency’s 
deliberations. They also gave committee members—no doubt armed 
with questions prepared by lobbyists—an opportunity to cross-
examine agency decisionmakers on issues of law, policy, and fact that 
the agency was in the process of resolving in the context of the 
rulemaking. These interactions conveyed a none-too-subtle warning 
that the agency would likely suffer adverse consequences if the final 
rules were not friendlier to banking interests than the initial 
proposals. 
 
 218. Editorial, The Corporate House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2011, at A26 (quoting Rep. Issa) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The committee held a number of hearings with provocative 
titles. E.g., How a Broken Process Leads to Flawed Regulations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (2011); Regulatory Impediments to Job Creation: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 219. Jay Fitzgerald, Barney Frank Lays into Successor, BOS. HERALD, Dec. 16, 2010, at 29 
(quoting Rep. Bachus) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 220. Stacy Kaper, New Subcommittee Chairs Target CFPB, GSE Reform, AM. BANKER, 
Dec. 10, 2010, at 1 (quoting Rep. Capito). 
 221. See Robert Schmidt, Wall Street Banking on GOP To Push Its Legislative Goals, PITT. 
POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 19, 2010, at A10 (stating that Wall Street will try to persuade members of 
Congress to influence the new financial regulations); Jean Eaglesham, Deborah Solomon & 
Victoria McGrane, Reprieve for Wall Street Is Expected To Be Limited, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704506404575592762664134550.html 
(describing the committees’ plans for involvement in the rulemaking); see also supra notes 129–
42 and accompanying text. 
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F. Lengthy Confirmation Battles 
At the outset of any new administration, interest groups attempt 
to persuade the White House to appoint to agency leadership 
positions people who are likely to favor the groups’ interests in future 
high-stakes rulemakings. Industry groups will oppose, and beneficiary 
groups will support, nominees who are likely to be aggressive 
regulators.222 Both will promise a difficult confirmation fight if the 
president nominates a disfavored candidate.223 And if the president 
nevertheless chooses such a candidate, the groups will press members 
of the relevant Senate committee to ask hard questions during the 
confirmation hearings and to vote against confirmation.224 Industry 
champions in the Senate will often extract substantive concessions 
from the administration by holding up nominations until some 
deregulatory condition has been met.225 To the extent that they can 
deliver the votes, senators representing the interests of beneficiary 
groups will do the same. 
In a highly partisan era, one in which the “Advice and Consent 
of the Senate”226 really means the consent of a supermajority of sixty 
senators,227 it is not especially difficult to hold up a presidential 
 
 222. For example, consumer groups strongly supported Elizabeth Warren, a strong 
consumer advocate, to be the first head of the CFPB, but banking interests strongly opposed her 
candidacy. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Warren’s Candidacy Raises a Partisan Debate, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 26, 2010, at B1 (noting that “[b]ankers oppose[d] [Warren’s] nomination” because 
she had “invented the idea” of the CFPB). 
 223. Cf. Beermann, supra note 207, at 110–11 (“[T]he Senate has a say in personnel and can 
refuse to approve appointments if it expects that the nominee will not execute the law in the 
manner favored by the Senate. This power is often used to ‘convince’ the President to nominate 
an individual favored by an influential Senator . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 224. See id. at 123 n.286 (citing Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the 
Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 50–55 (1995)) (listing confirmation hearings as one of 
the “ways in which congressional committees insinuate themselves into the execution of the 
law”). 
 225. For example, Senator David Vitter blocked a vote on President Obama’s candidate to 
head the Department of Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service until the Department had granted 
fifteen permits for deepwater drilling in the waters where the Deepwater Horizon disaster had 
spewed oil into the Gulf of Mexico for three months in 2009. Binyamin Appelbaum, Nominees 
at Standstill as G.O.P. Flexes Its Muscle, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2011, at A17. At that point, 
Senator John Barrasso placed a hold on the nomination until the Department could conduct a 
review of the protected status of wolves. Id.  
 226. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 227. Cf. JULIET EILPERIN, FIGHT CLUB POLITICS 36–40 (2006) (describing the growing 
partisan divide and animosity in Washington). Historically, it took a two-thirds majority (sixty-
seven votes) to break a filibuster by invoking cloture, but a post-Watergate rules change in 1975 
changed the requisite number of votes to sixty. David Nather, A Liberal Dose of 
Disappointment, 67 CQ WEEKLY 1947, 1951 (2009). As filibusters became easier to break, 
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nominee indefinitely. For example, not long after President Obama 
had nominated Professor Peter Diamond to a position on the Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors, Senator Richard Shelby placed a hold 
on the nomination.228 The fact that Professor Diamond received the 
Nobel Prize in Economics while his nomination was on hold229 did not 
improve his chances; the hold had nothing to do with his 
qualifications. Senator Shelby was adamantly opposed to the 
nomination, rather, because he had problems with Professor 
Diamond’s “economic philosophy.”230 Because Senator Shelby’s 
ideological objection had the tacit support of at least thirty-nine other 
Republican senators, the nomination languished for many months 
until Professor Diamond ultimately withdrew from the process in 
disgust.231 
Long, drawn-out confirmation battles can deprive agencies of 
much-needed talent in leadership positions in the early stages of an 
administration when aggressive action is most feasible.232 Extended 
confirmation processes are therefore more strategically advantageous 
to regulated entities that prefer agencies to engage in as little 
regulation as possible. Beneficiary groups may also oppose 
probusiness nominees, but they risk hamstringing the agency during 
the confirmation process. At the extreme, industry groups can use the 
confirmation process to stop an agency in its tracks. In one instance, 
Senator Shelby and forty-four other Republican senators, with the 
strong backing of the banking industry, refused to confirm any 
nominee to head the new CFPB until the president had agreed to 
replace the director of the agency with a five-member board 
composed of both Republicans and Democrats.233 Because the CFPB 
 
Senators were less reluctant to employ the strategy. Id. During the 111th Congress, the 
Democratic leadership apparently assumed that Republican senators would vote in lock-step 
against any cloture motion. Because the leaders were unwilling to hold up the legislative process 
by forcing a real filibuster, sixty votes were needed to pass any significant legislation. See infra 
notes 283–88 and accompanying text. 
 228. Appelbaum, supra note 225. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. (quoting Sen. Shelby). 
 231. Zachary A. Goldfarb & Neil Irwin, Leadership Gaps May Hit Financial Policymaking, 
WASH. POST, June 7, 2011, at A15. 
 232. For example, Senate Republican who were critical of the new CFPB established by the 
Dodd-Frank Act effectively prevented the agency from promulgating any rules under its new 
authority by promising to filibuster any vote to confirm Richard Cordray to be the head of the 
agency. Ben Weyl, GOP’s Procedural Blockade, 69 CQ WEEKLY 1846 (2011). 
 233. See Kate Davidson & Cheyenne Hopkins, GOP Move Likely To Force CFPB Recess 
Appt, AM. BANKER, May 6, 2011, at 1 (noting Senator Shelby’s involvement in the blockage); 
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could not promulgate any regulations until it had a full-time director, 
it was effectively prevented from implementing the consumer-
protection provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.234 In essence, a single 
senator was nearly able to repeal the new statute, and he successfully 
put it on hold for a year and a half.235 
G. Invocation of the Congressional Review Act 
The Congressional Review Act,236 enacted in 1996, provides a 
vehicle for Congress to overturn recently promulgated rules.237 Under 
that statute, a “major” rule cannot take effect until sixty days after the 
agency has published it in the Federal Register.238 If Congress takes no 
action during the review period, the rule goes into effect as written.239 
If, however, Congress passes a joint resolution disapproving of the 
rule during the review period and the president signs the joint 
resolution, or if the resolution is passed over a presidential veto, the 
rule may not take effect, and the agency may not issue a rule in 
 
Ylan Q. Mui, McConnell To Block ‘Any Nominee’ for Top CFPB Job, WASH. POST, June 10, 
2011, at A12 (stating that the Republicans wanted the single director to be replaced by a five-
member commission); Deborah Solomon & Maya Jackson Randall, Bank Challenger Picked To 
Run Consumer Agency, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405
2702303661904576451921505704258.html (describing the banking industry’s support for the 
Republican blockage). 
 234. JAMES HAMILTON & JOHN M. PACHKOWSKI, WOLTERS KLUWER LAW & BUS., THE 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: GOVERNANCE, STRUCTURE AND FUNDING 
ISSUES 3 (2011); Sewell Chan, Limits Emerge for a New Bureau Without a Director, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 1, 2010, at B4; see also Davidson & Hopkins, supra note 233 (“What they appear to be 
doing is holding the nomination hostage in return for concessions that would cripple the 
agency . . . .” (quoting Travis Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of 
America)); Brady Dennis, Chamber Seeking ‘Pause’ Before New Bureau Issues Rules, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 2, 2011, at A12 (noting that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce urged the Treasury to 
prohibit the CFPB from promulgating regulations until it had a permanent director). 
 235. President Obama finally made a recess appointment of Richard Cordray to head the 
CFPB. David Nakamura & Felicia Somnez, Obama Defies Senate, Puts Cordray in Consumer 
Post, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2012, at A1. 
 236. Congressional Review Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121, tit. II, subtit. E, 110 Stat. 868 (1996) 
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2006)). 
 237. See Beermann, supra note 207, at 83–84 (describing the procedures available to the 
Congress under the Congressional Review Act); Seidenfeld, supra note 180, at 1083–84 (noting 
that “the Congressional Review Act . . . provides for fast-track review of agency rules” and 
summarizing the statute’s procedures). 
 238. Congressional Review Act sec. 251, § 801(a)(3)(A), 110 Stat. at 869 (codified at 5 
U.S.C. § 801(a)(3)(A)). 
 239. Id. sec. 251, § 801(a)(5), 110 Stat. at 869 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(5)). 
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substantially the same form for ten years unless Congress enacts 
legislation specifically authorizing such action.240 
The Congressional Review Act is by nature confined to high-
stakes rulemaking, and it has been invoked very rarely. Between 
April 1996 and October 2007, federal agencies promulgated more 
than 46,000 rules, only thirty-two of which were the subject of a joint 
resolution under the statute.241 More recently, Senator Rand Paul 
attempted to use the Congressional Review Act to overturn an EPA 
rule regulating power-plant emissions.242 A similar attempt by Senator 
Lisa Murkowski to overturn the EPA’s “endangerment” finding, 
which had triggered the agency’s efforts to regulate greenhouse-gas 
emissions under the Clean Air Act,243 also failed after a close vote.244 
The statute has been successfully invoked on exactly one occasion—
the joint resolution overturning the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act’s245 ergonomics regulations, which were designed to protect 
workers from repetitive-strain disorders.246 Invocation of the 
Congressional Review Act is an available strategy for regulated 
entities during blood-sport rulemakings, but it has not proved 
especially effective. 
 
 240. Id. sec. 251, § 802(c), 110 Stat. at 871 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 802(c)). 
 241. CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34354, CONGRESSIONAL 
INFLUENCES ON RULEMAKING THROUGH APPROPRIATIONS PROVISIONS 1 (2008).  
 242. Dean Scott, Senate May Target EPA Cross-State Rule with Goal of Forcing Obama To 
Accept Delay, 42 ENV’T REP. 2231 (2011). 
 243. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
 244. See Juliet Eilperin, Senators Try To Thwart EPA Emission Curbs, WASH. POST, Jan. 
22, 2010, at A2 (describing Senator Murkowski’s proposal); GOP Rider Poses Key Test for 
Senate Democrats on EPA’s GHG Powers, INSIDE EPA, Sept. 25, 2009, available at LexisNexis 
(analyzing the potential political implications of the proposal); Carl Hulse, Senate Rejects 
Republican Effort To Thwart Carbon Limits, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, at A22 (stating that 
Senator Murkowski’s proposal was defeated in the Senate in a 53–47 vote); Siobhan Hughes & 
Corey Boles, Senate Rejects Ban on Greenhouse-Gas Rules, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2010, 7:29 PM 
EST), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704312104575298832211062408.html 
(same); see also Margaret Kriz Hobson, Questioning Cap-and-Trade, NAT’L J., Oct. 17, 2009, at 
64, 64 (noting that Senator Murkowski questioned whether cap-and-trade is the most effective 
means of addressing the climate problem).  
 245. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2006 & Supp. IV 
2010). 
 246. Joint Resolution of Mar. 20, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7; COPELAND, supra 
note 241, at 1; David S. Rubenstein, “Relative Checks”: Towards Optimal Control of 
Administrative Power, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2169, 2210 & n.206 (2010). 
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H. Rifle-Shot Amendments 
A far more successful strategy is a “rifle-shot” amendment to a 
particular provision of a regulatory agency’s statute that modifies or 
terminates an ongoing rulemaking initiative.247 Rifle-shot amendments 
can be offered as stand-alone bills or attached as riders to must-pass 
legislation, such as appropriations bills or continuing resolutions to 
keep the government running.248 If the goal is to postpone a 
rulemaking initiative, a three-line rider attached to an appropriations 
bill that provides that no monies may be expended on the rulemaking 
initiative can easily accomplish that goal.249 When included in 
subsequent appropriations bills, appropriations riders effectively 
terminate a rulemaking effort.250 
Rifle-shot amendments have become one of the most frequently 
invoked strategies of blood-sport rulemaking. As discussed in Part I, a 
bill introduced by Senator Tester would have delayed implementation 
of the interchange-fee regulation for two years if it had passed.251 
Three separate stand-alone bills would have amended the Clean Air 
Act to extend the statutory deadline for compliance with the EPA’s 
power-plant rules.252 Several other stand-alone bills were introduced 
in the first session of the 112th Congress to hamstring the CFPB and 
stall the EPA’s efforts to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions.253 When 
the stand-alone bills failed to move in the Senate, supporters attached 
 
 247. See McGarity, supra note 25 (describing “deregulatory riders” created to disrupt a 
particular ongoing regulatory program implemented pursuant to authorizing legislation). 
 248. See id. (describing how riders attached to must-pass legislation are used by House 
leadership to avoid the veto process and skirt the relevant authorizing committee’s legislative 
processes). 
 249. See COPELAND, supra note 241, at 1–2 (“Even though the [Congressional Review Act] 
has not proven to be an effective way for Congress to reverse agency rulemaking, Congress does 
influence regulatory activity in a variety of other ways [such as] provisions included in the text 
of agencies’ appropriations bills.”); Beermann, supra note 207, at 85 (observing that 
“[a]ppropriations riders typically single out a specific regulatory activity and prohibit the 
expenditure of funds for carrying out that regulatory activity or plan”); McGarity, supra note 25 
(noting the effectiveness of limitation riders “associated exclusively with appropriation bills, 
and . . . prohibit[ing] the relevant agency from expending any of the appropriated funds to 
engage in a proscribed activity”). 
 250. COPELAND, supra note 241, at 3. 
 251. Hopkins, supra note 145; see also supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text. 
 252. Jessica Coomes, Johanns Bill Would Delay Cross-State Rule, Allow States To Submit 
Implementation Plans, 42 ENV’T REP. 2519 (2011); Ryan Tracy, New EPA Rules Split Power 
Industry, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020353730
4577028393431399820.html. 
 253. McGarity, supra note 25 (describing stand-alone bills introduced by members of 
Congress to weaken the CFPB). 
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the same or very similar provisions to appropriations bills that 
Congress had to pass to keep the government running.254 
III.  SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE BLOOD-SPORT MODEL FOR 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
The interchange-fee experience demonstrates that blood-sport 
rulemakings are exceedingly contentious.255 The disputes range across 
a number of institutional settings as the regulated industries and 
beneficiary groups attempt to move the disputes to any forum that is 
likely to work for them.256 The lesson of blood-sport rulemaking is not 
 
 254. See id. (describing the two-tiered approach to a deregulatory agenda pursued by House 
leadership, first attempting to pass stand-alone deregulatory bills, and then incorporating these 
bills into riders as necessary to overcome pushback from the Senate and the president); cf. H.R. 
REP. NO. 112-151, at 7 (2011) (“In light of ongoing concerns expressed by a bipartisan cross 
section of Members, the Committee has included as General Provisions a number of EPA 
funding prohibitions including a one-year prohibition on the use of funds for the 
implementation of greenhouse gas regulations . . . .”); H.R. REP. NO. 112-136, at 8 (2011) (“The 
Committee includes language limiting the transfer from the Federal Reserve to the BCFP to 
$200,000,000 for fiscal year 2012. In addition, language is included limiting the BCFP’s authority 
to obligate funding to $200,000,000 for fiscal year 2012.”). Senator Tester attempted to attach a 
slightly modified version of his bill as a rider to the proposed Economic Development and 
Revitalization Act of 2011, S. 782, 112th Cong. (2011). See James Hamilton, Tester-Corker 
Amendment to Dodd-Frank Interchange Fee Provisions Would Delay Implementation Pending 
Fed Study, JIM HAMILTON’S WORLD OF SEC. REGULATION (June 8, 2011, 09:54 AM) http://jim
hamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/tester-corker-amendment-in-dodd-frank.html (describing 
the Tester-Corker Amendment). The rider would have required the Fed to repropose the 
regulation after completion of a six-month study. See id. 
 255. The participants in other major rulemaking efforts since the early 2000s have adopted 
blood-sport strategies. The FCC’s media-consolidation rulemaking generated fierce public-
relations campaigns, congressional-oversight hearings, and attempts to overturn the rules with 
rifle-shot legislation and riders. See Hepp, supra note 198, at 563–75 (describing the process).  
 256. For example, in an effort to block or amend the EPA’s Utility MACT rule, utility 
industry groups and supporters from labor unions testified at the EPA’s hearings. Air Toxics 
Rule Backed by Most Speakers at Atlanta Hearing, Faulted by Utility Officials, 42 ENV’T. REP. 
1206 (2011); Sandy Bauers, Unusual Allies Speak Out at EPA Hearing on Proposed Mercury 
Limit Rule, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 25, 2011, at B1. They also met with OIRA on four occasions 
while the regulations were under review before that agency. OMB Meets with Environmental 
Groups, Industry To Discuss Interstate Transport Rule, 42 ENV’T REP. 1374 (2011). At the same 
time, they launched a major lobbying campaign directed at the EPA and the committees in 
Congress that had the power to influence or reverse the EPA’s decision. Manuel Quinones, 
Coal Industry Deploys Donations, Lobbying as Its Issues Gain Prominence, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/10/13/13greenwire-coal-industry-deploys-
donations-lobbying-as-it-45582.html. During the first nine months of 2011, coal-mining interests 
donated more than $2.8 million to federal candidates, and the electric-utility industry 
contributed more than $5.9 million. Id. The top recipients were Speaker of the House John 
Boehner and Fred Upton, the chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. Id. A 
coalition of coal and utility companies spent around $35 million on television advertising 
criticizing the Utility MACT rule and the cross-state rule. Anna Palmer & Dave Levinthal, 
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lost on the high-level agency officials who might suffer budget 
reductions or, worse, be required to defend the agency action—and 
their own integrity—before a hostile subcommittee chairperson in a 
congressional hearing. The easy way to avoid such an unwelcome 
experience is to kill the regulation, delay it for further study and 
thereby insulate the agency from attacks from beneficiary groups, or 
soften its provisions to make them palatable to the industry if the 
industry appears to have the upper hand. 
I could, of course, be wrong to suggest that the battles over the 
interchange and power-plant rules are different in kind from 
conventional notice-and-comment rulemaking. Federal agencies have 
overseen contentious rulemakings and have taken abuse from 
congresspersons and pundits in the past.257 Except in relatively rare 
cases such as that of the Federal Trade Commission’s notorious “kid 
vid” rulemaking,258 however, attacks on agencies have tended to be 
 
Energy Wars, POLITICO (Aug. 9, 2011, 2:29 PM EDT), http://www.politico.com/politico
influence/0811/politicoinfluence74.html; Daniel J. Weiss, Poor Little Big Coal Says EPA Smog 
Standards Too Expensive, GRIST (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.grist.org/coal/2011-11-17-poor-
little-big-coal-says-epa-smog-standards-too-expensive. 
 257. A good example is the EPA’s highly contentious 1978 rulemaking to amend the New 
Source Performance Standards in light of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 
95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006 & Supp. III 2009)). 
The Subcommittee on Fossil and Nuclear Energy Research, Development and Demonstration 
of the House Committee on Science and Technology conducted oversight hearings on the 
rulemaking before the agency had even published the notice of proposed rulemaking. Oversight: 
Effect of the Clean Air Act Amendment on New Energy Technologies and Resources: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Fossil & Nuclear Energy Research, Dev. & Demonstration of the H. 
Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 95th Cong. (1978). The electric-utility and coal industries lobbied the 
EPA and Congress on the matter throughout the pendency of the rulemaking. William C. 
Banks, EPA Bends to Industry Pressures on Coal NSPS—And Breaks, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 67, 85–
88 (1980); Dick Kirschten, The New Clean Air Regs—More at Stake Than Breathing, 10 NAT’L J. 
1392 (1978); Charles Mohr, Billions at Stake as U.S. Weighs Clean-Air Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
2, 1978, at A1; see also Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal 
and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1551 (1980) (describing how a “dirty coal-dirty air 
alliance” formed to resist the EPA’s suggested amendment to the New Source Performance 
Standards). EPA Administrator Douglas Costle adopted the industry-preferred sliding-scale 
approach to the standard after he and high-level White House officials met with Senate 
Majority Leader Robert Byrd to hear his complaints about the economic impact of a stringent 
standard on Eastern coal-producing states. Banks, supra, at 86–87. 
 258. Children’s Advertising, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967 (proposed Apr. 27, 1978); see also Ass’n of 
Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 460 F. Supp. 996, 999 (D.D.C. 1978) (enjoining, at the request of 
concerned trade associations and companies, the chairman of the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) from participating in the rulemaking), rev’d, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979); MICHAEL 
PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION: THE RISE AND PAUSE OF THE CONSUMER 
MOVEMENT 71 (1982) (“Now it was the [Federal Trade] [C]ommission—not amoral business—
that allegedly threatened to undermine the moral fibre and authority of the family by seeking to 
substitute government-imposed censorship for parental discipline.”); SUSAN J. TOLCHIN & 
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generic in nature and have not focused upon particular agency 
rulemaking initiatives. There may also have been instances in which 
the regulated industry has lobbied Congress to take away a previously 
delegated power before the agency has promulgated a single rule. But 
in my experience, agencies implementing protective statutes enacted 
in the wake of crises have had a reasonable opportunity to make their 
respective statutes work before their efforts come under attack for 
being job-killing overregulation.259 
The national debate over the role of the government in 
protecting citizens from the adverse effects of private-sector activities 
is far more contentious today than it was during the 1960s and 1970s, 
an era in which the legitimacy of government regulation was taken as 
a given and interest-group representation became the dominant 
model of administrative law.260 The future will likely bring many more 
blood-sport battles, as the banking agencies and the CFPB 
 
MARTIN TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA: THE RUSH TO DEREGULATE 7 (1983) (“Critics 
linked regulation with America’s declining productivity and industrial growth, and claimed that 
regulation created an uncertainty that discouraged investors.”). 
 259. For example, despite an energy crisis in 1973–1974 that inspired several attempts to 
amend the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7642 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)), Congress allowed the EPA and 
the states to promulgate and implement the original National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
before amending the statute in 1977 to address problems that had arisen during the 
implementation process. See JOHN QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA: AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 205 (1976) (“By the middle of 1973 a consensus 
was growing that certain amendments to the Clean Air Act would be required.”); id. at 170 
(describing the 1974 industry advertising campaign challenging pollution-control requirements); 
ROBERT L. SANSOM, THE NEW AMERICAN DREAM MACHINE: TOWARD A SIMPLER 
LIFESTYLE IN AN ENVIRONMENTAL AGE 45–46 (1976) (stating that President Nixon and 
“energy ‘czar’” John Love announced in 1973 that “environmental standards should be 
relaxed”); JOHN C. WHITAKER, STRIKING A BALANCE: ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL 
RESOURCES IN THE NIXON-FORD YEARS 106 (1976) (noting that the Nixon administration 
drafted amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1974). See generally Comment, The Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1977: Expedient Revisions, Noteworthy New Provisions, 7 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10,182 (1977) (describing the 1977 amendments).  
 260. Cf. Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in 
Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 451 (2010) (“One response to the transmission-belt 
model’s collapse was the emergence of an ‘interest-group representation’ model rooted in public 
choice theory. Rather than focus on Congress’s statutory instructions as a source of democratic 
legitimacy, the interest-group representation model characterized the public’s direct 
participation in notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings under the APA as a form of 
popular representation.” (footnotes omitted)); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So 
Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 
459, 487–88 (2008) (“Since [the middle of the twentieth century] . . . polarization has been 
increasing—and most dramatically so since the late 1970s. . . . [P]olitical polarization has figured 
prominently both in presidential efforts to gain control of independent agencies and in efforts 
by the opposition party in Congress to limit presidential control.”). 
MCGARITY IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2012  12:12 AM 
1722 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1671 
promulgate regulations with a large economic impact on the powerful 
banking industry. Should the EPA, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA), the Federal Drug Administration 
(FDA), the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, or any of the other 
federal regulatory agencies initiate high-stakes rulemakings in the 
near future, blood-sport strategies will probably be in evidence. If 
these strategies prove to be as successful as they apparently were in 
the context of the interchange-fee rulemaking,261 then administrative-
law scholars need to think about the role of the law, lawyers, and the 
courts in a world of no-holds-barred, blood-sport rulemaking. In this 
Part, I offer some preliminary thoughts on the implications of blood-
sport rulemaking for several important aspects of modern 
administrative law, starting with its implications for the never-fully-
resolved bedrock question of the legitimacy of administrative 
rulemaking. 
A. Administrative Law and Legitimacy 
Countless trees have been sacrificed for debates among 
administrative-law scholars over whether one or more of several 
competing models of administrative rulemaking best legitimizes the 
role that regulatory agencies play in the modern political economy. 
The question of legitimacy largely has to do with “accountability and 
democratic responsiveness.”262 But the question ultimately turns on 
the extent to which regulatees, regulatory beneficiaries, and ordinary 
citizens are willing to accept agency exercises of rulemaking power as 
legitimate intrusions of governmental authority into private economic 
arrangements. 
At the outset of the New Deal, the dominant paradigm for 
informal rulemaking was the transmission-belt model. Under this 
model, the regulatory agency acted as a “transmission belt,”263 
dutifully applying the policy decisions made by Congress at the time it 
enacted the agency’s statute to the relevant facts as divined by the 
agency during its factfinding proceedings.264 Under this model, the 
 
 261. See supra Part I. 
 262. Nina A. Mendelson, Foreword: Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1348 (2011). 
 263. Criddle, supra note 260, at 450–51; Kagan, supra note 209, at 2253. 
 264. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1667, 1663–64 (1975) (describing the traditional model of administrative rulemaking, 
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exercise of administrative rulemaking power was legitimate because 
Congress, not the unelected administrators, was prescribing the 
policies.265 This model was replaced by the expertise model that 
evolved during the 1940s and 1950s, largely in response to the 
development of the New Deal agencies.266 Agency implementation of 
the Public Interest Era statutes inspired the interest-representation 
model, which styled regulatory statutes as legislative articulations of 
“compromises struck between competing interest groups” and 
portrayed administrative rulemaking as a continuation of the 
legislative process through which interest groups once again debated 
and compromised over the policy questions that arose in the context 
of particular rulemaking exercises.267 A more recent model stresses 
presidential control as the source of legitimacy.268 That none of these 
models has supplied a generally accepted theory of legitimacy should 
not come as a surprise. 
All of these models take the legitimacy of regulatory 
intervention itself as a given, so long as the intervention is authorized 
by the agency’s statute.269 But this Article concerns the possible 
emergence of a new period, one in which the animating debate is not 
over the legitimacy of administrative rulemaking but over the 
legitimacy of any government intervention into private economic 
 
wherein agencies must use “factfindings supported by substantial evidence and the reasoned 
application of legislative directives to the facts found”). 
 265. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 470–71 (2003). 
 266. Id. at 471–72; Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An 
Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1618–19 (1985); Kathyrn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for 
Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 33–34 (2009). 
 267. Stewart, supra note 264, at 1712; see also Bressman, supra note 265, at 475–78 
(discussing the emergence of the interest-group-representation model); Kagan, supra note 209, 
at 2253 (same). 
 268. Cynthia R. Farina, The “Chief Executive” and the Quiet Constitutional Revolution, 49 
ADMIN. L. REV. 179, 180 (1997); Kagan, supra note 209, at 2250–51 (“[I]n comparison with 
other forms of control, the new presidentialization of administration renders the bureaucratic 
sphere more transparent and responsive to the public, while also better promoting important 
kinds of regulatory competence and dynamism.”); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” 
Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1137–38 (2010). Another model 
regards administrative agencies as “agents and trustees of the people” such that they have 
fiduciary obligations to exercise broad grants of delegated power in the best interest of the 
beneficiaries of the relevant regulatory program. Criddle, supra note 260, at 466–67 & n.138 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 269. Cf. Stewart, supra note 267, at 1676–77 (noting that agencies’ authorizing statutes often 
leave agencies with considerable discretion to direct economic and social policy). 
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arrangements.270 The Tea Party’s extreme hostility to federal 
regulation is only one manifestation of a populist/libertarian assault 
on government that has spanned much of the period between 1976 
and 2012.271 The battle over an otherwise-routine bill to raise the debt 
ceiling during the summer of 2011 demonstrated that a sufficient 
number of members of Congress with extreme anti-interventionist 
views were in place to have a demonstrable impact on public policy.272 
In the dysfunctional Senate, where any legislation essentially requires 
sixty votes to be enacted,273 a single libertarian senator halted 
legislation to improve pipeline safety—offered in the wake of the 
massive San Bruno, California, explosion on September 10, 2010—
that had the support of both the industry and consumer advocates 
solely because he was opposed to government regulation on 
philosophical grounds.274 If I am correct, then no simple change within 
or among the various models is likely to render agency rulemaking 
more legitimate in the minds of those who are convinced that the very 
task of regulation is illegitimate. 
When the legitimacy of government intervention is a seriously 
debated question in the broader political economy, every significant 
rulemaking exercise becomes a possible occasion for acrimonious 
debate over the need for government regulation. Those who contest 
the legitimacy of any intervention feel free to launch an all-out war 
against an agency whenever the agency engages in a significant 
rulemaking effort, without regard to the impact on the agency’s 
ability to carry out its statutory mandate.275 The industries affected by 
 
 270. See generally William Greider, Rolling Back the 20th Century, NATION, May 12, 2003, 
at 11 (discussing what Greider perceives to be the George W. Bush era’s “assault” on modern 
liberalism through deregulation and the protection of private wealth). 
 271. See MCGARITY, supra note 2 (manuscript ch. 7). 
 272. See generally Fred Barbash & Richard E. Cohen, Summer of Strife, 69 CQ WEEKLY 
1736, 1736–39 (2011); Elizabeth Drew, What Were They Thinking?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 18, 
2011, at 13. 
 273. See Kagan, supra note 209, at 2311–12 (discussing the increased use of the filibuster as 
evidence of the polarization of political parties in Congress). 
 274. Joan Lowy, No Regs Are Good Regs: Single Senator Blocks Pipeline Safety Bill on 
Principle, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 27, 2011, available at Factiva, Doc. No. 
APRS000020110927e79r001bx. After about a month, the senator grudgingly relented, and the 
Senate passed the Pipeline Transportation Safety Improvement Act of 2011, S. 275, 112th Cong. 
(2011). Jaxon Van Derbeken, Tea Party Senator Lifts His Hold on Safety Bill, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 
18, 2001, at A1. 
 275. Senator Paul’s objection to the Pipeline Transportation Safety Improvement Act, see 
supra note 274 and accompanying text, is a good example of this phenomenon. The attacks by 
many members of Congress on the EPA’s 2009 finding that greenhouse gases endanger public 
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proposed regulations have in the past attracted support from various 
coalitions of companies, such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, that 
might be affected by similar regulations in the future.276 But now, 
industries can draw into the fray a wide variety of other organizations, 
such as think tanks, business-oriented grassroots groups, talk-show 
hosts, and bloggers, that are persuaded that because government is 
always the problem, it can never be the solution.277 
The experience with the interchange-fee rule suggests that 
agencies may have more reason to fear congressional oversight than 
in the past. First, during the 112th Congress, the House of 
Representatives intervened earlier in the implementation process 
than past Congresses by passing bills containing rifle-shot 
amendments to agency statutes regarding matters that had only 
reached the proposal stage or that were still percolating within the 
agency. For example, in early March 2011, Representative Fred 
Upton and Senator James Inhofe introduced identical bills to prohibit 
the EPA from promulgating any regulation or taking any other action 
to address climate change—or even from considering the emission of 
a greenhouse gas when undertaking such action.278 Second, during two 
decades of fiercely divided government, the majority party in one or 
 
health and welfare provides another example. Among other things, Senator John Barrasso 
placed a hold on the nomination of Regina McCarthy to be the EPA’s Assistant Administrator 
for Air and Radiation, claiming that the “economic consequences of hi-jacking the Clean Air 
Act [would] be devastating.” Press Release, Sen. John Barrasso, EPA Nominee on Hold, 
Barrasso Fears Hijack (Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://barrasso.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?
FuseAction=PressOffice.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=f8ef2677-e376-4d55-ddc6-d1c95b
07e842 (quoting Sen. Barrasso). Senator James Inhofe excoriated the finding as “the beginning 
of a regulatory barrage that will destroy jobs, raise energy prices for consumers, and undermine 
America’s global competitiveness,” and he urged Congress to pass legislation immediately 
overturning the finding without any acknowledgment of the impact of such an action on the 
climate. Press Release, Sen. James Inhofe, Inhofe Says EPA Endangerment Finding Will 
Destroy Jobs, Harm Consumers (Apr. 23, 2009), available at http://inhofe.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=b4d0a2a5-802a-23ad-
43a2-5cb9149b73a7&Region_id=4ac9611a-f866-2d29-9bcc-49bf092f17c0&Issue_id=4afeb468-
d083-8a0b-ce78-0731b2c4df61 (quoting Sen. Inhofe) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 276. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for example, has been “standing up for American 
Enterprise” in Washington, D.C., since 1912. About the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.uschamber.com/about (last visited Apr. 11, 2012); 100th 
Anniversary, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.uschamber.com/about/100th-
anniversary (last visited Apr. 11, 2012). Other coalitions include the Business Roundtable, the 
National Association of Manufacturers, and the National Federation of Independent Business. 
See MCGARITY, supra note 3. 
 277. See supra notes 201–06 and accompanying text. 
 278. Energy Tax Prevention Act of 2011, H.R. 910, 112th Cong. (2011); Energy Tax 
Prevention Act of 2011, S. 482, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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both houses of Congress has been more aggressive in attaching riders 
to appropriations and other must-pass legislation to change specific 
agency policies.279 For example, the resolution to fund the government 
for the remainder of 2011 contained a number of riders prohibiting 
the EPA from expending any funds to pursue environmental 
initiatives, including the regulation of mountaintop-removal mining.280 
Third, the interrogation of high-level agency officials in congressional 
oversight hearings may be less civil than in the past.281 For example, 
Republican members of the House Subcommittee on Energy and 
Power spent more than two hours berating EPA Administrator 
Jackson for finding that greenhouse-gas emissions endanger the 
public health and the environment; they asserted that the science 
underpinning her finding was a hoax and accused the Obama 
administration of killing jobs in a quixotic quest to address a 
nonproblem.282 Finally, members of the Republican Party in both 
houses of Congress have grown far more likely to vote in lockstep 
than in the past, when many members characterized themselves as 
“moderate” Republicans.283 In particular, Republican senators are not 
likely to defy a demand by the leadership to vote against cloture.284 
This lockstep voting pattern ensures that no legislation of any 
significance can pass Congress without the approval of the 
Republican leadership when the Republican Party holds more than 
forty seats in the Senate—a number that becomes even smaller when 
Independents or conservative Democrats are willing to support a 
filibuster.285 
 
 279. McGarity, supra note 25. 
 280. 157 CONG. REC. H1304 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 2011). 
 281. I do not want to press this point too strongly because congressional committee hearings 
have also created spectacles in the past. For example, House committees were very hard on 
high-level EPA officials during the Gorsuch scandals of 1983. See, e.g., EPA: Investigation of 
Superfund and Agency Abuses (Part 2): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 98th Cong. 130–48 (1983) (relaying 
how then-Representative Al Gore grilled EPA officials on the agency’s failure to clean up 
contaminated sites).  
 282. H.R. ___, The Energy Tax Prevention Act of 2011: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Energy & Power of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 30–72 (2011); John M. 
Broder, House Republicans Take E.P.A. Chief to Task, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, at A16; 
Margaret Kriz Hobson, Political Tidal Wave Turns EPA Strategy, 69 CQ WEEKLY 335 (2011).  
 283. Kagan, supra note 209, at 2311–12.  
 284. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 3, at 210–11. 
 285. Only three of the thirty-eight Republican senators voted in favor of the Dodd-Frank 
Act in July 2010. See 156 CONG. REC. S5932–33 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (recording the votes on 
the conference report of the Dodd-Frank Act); H.R. 4173 (111th): Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
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B. Implications for Agency Structure 
Congress pays a great deal of attention to the structure of 
regulatory agencies when it enacts statutes empowering agencies to 
intervene in private economic arrangements.286 Congress places many 
regulatory agencies in the executive branch, where agency leaders are 
appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate 
but are subject to removal at will by the president.287 Congress also 
creates independent agencies that are shielded from the political 
influence emanating from the White House and, to a lesser extent, 
from Congress.288 Usually designed as multimember commissions 
made up of appointees from both major political parties, independent 
agencies are supposed to stand above the political fray.289 Yet 
although independent agencies have never been entirely immune to 
politics,290 it appears that they are even less so in the context of high-
impact rulemaking, particularly when the participants employ blood-
sport strategies.291 The fact that the Fed, perhaps the most 
 
Reform . . . (On the Conference Report), GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/
111-2010/s208 (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (breaking down the results by political party).  
 286. See Beermann, supra note 207, at 108 (recounting the debate between labor and 
business interests over how to structure agency enforcement of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1592 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–
678 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010))); Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, 
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control 
of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 431–32 (1989) (describing the “extensive debate” in Congress 
over how to structure the EPA’s rulemaking process). 
 287. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW AND PROCESS § 4.4.1, at 99–100 (5th ed. 2009). 
 288. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 19 (2010) (“The aim in creating an independent agency is to 
immunize it, to some extent, from political pressure.”); see also Devins & Lewis, supra note 260, 
at 459, 464–66 (discussing concerns about presidential control over agency policy). But see 
O’Connell, supra note 6, at 484–85 (noting political constraints on agency rulemaking). 
 289. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 260, at 462–63 (describing how the bipartisan, 
politically insulated nature of independent regulatory agencies is intended to facilitate 
expertise-driven approaches to policy problems). 
 290. See Beermann, supra note 207, at 109 (“Theoretically, these agencies are supposed to 
be insulated from politics, but the truth is that while the independent agencies may be insulated 
from the President, they are often much more responsive to direct (albeit informal) 
congressional supervision than agencies within the executive branch.”); Keith S. Brown & 
Adam Candeub, Partisans & Partisan Commissions, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 789, 810 (2010) 
(“The scholarly literature underappreciates that independent agencies need not necessarily be 
independent. . . . Independence is a choice . . . .”); Calabresi, supra note 224, at 83–84 (“[T]here 
are no ‘independent’ government actors in Washington, D.C.”). 
 291. See Devins & Lewis, supra note 260, at 461–62 (referencing federal agencies’ politicized 
responses to Hurricane Katrina and the credit crisis of 2008). 
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independent of all of the regulatory agencies, became the locus of a 
blood-sport battle over interchange fees suggests that the structure of 
regulatory agencies may have little impact on the inclination of 
participants to engage in blood-sport battles.292 If Congress wants to 
shield agency decisionmaking from the influence that blood-sport 
tactics are capable of generating, it will probably have to look beyond 
agency structure for solutions. 
C. Implications for the Quality of Agency Leadership 
The blood-sport model has powerful implications for the quality 
of agency leadership. In a contentious political environment, it is very 
difficult for a nominee to achieve Senate confirmation if he or she has 
taken a strong position in the past on issues that he or she is likely to 
face when in office.293 In the not-too-distant past, the opposition party 
assumed that the president was entitled to choose his people to head 
regulatory agencies without much second guessing from opposition-
party senators.294 That is no longer the assumption. A single senator 
can place an indefinite hold on a nominee that will last until the 
nominee’s proponents can put together the sixty votes necessary to 
overturn what has become an automatic filibuster threat.295 Unless 
one party attains a dependable sixty-senator majority, affected 
interest groups, through their allies in Congress, can enjoy an 
effective veto over any nomination to an important regulatory 
agency. 
 
 292. Cf. id. at 465–66 (describing congressional concerns about the Fed’s independence). 
 293. Karen Sloan, Law Professors Find a Hard Road to Federal Appointments, NAT’L L.J., 
July 25, 2011, at 1. 
 294. See Beermann, supra note 207, at 136 (writing in 2006 that “[t]he Senate normally 
recognizes the President’s prerogative to appoint high-level officials”). Professors Devins and 
Lewis chronicle the increase in partisan opposition to a president’s appointees since the 
beginning of the Reagan administration. Devins & Lewis, supra note 260, at 461. 
 295. See Beermann, supra note 207, at 110–11 (“[U]nder Senate rules and practices, a 
committee can prevent a nomination from coming up for a vote, and less than a majority of the 
full Senate can filibuster, which also prevents the full Senate from taking a vote.”); Devins & 
Lewis, supra note 260, at 462 (noting that “the opposition party in the Senate will make use of 
holds and other delaying strategies . . . to ensure the President appoints opposition-party 
commissioners [to multimember commissions] who are acceptable to opposition-party 
leaders”); David E. Lewis, The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for 
Presidential Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies, 34 
BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 377, 378 (2004) (“[Congress has] diluted presidential appointment powers by 
giving agency administrators fixed terms and writing into law specific qualifications for 
appointees.”). 
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In addition, nominees opposed by powerful interest groups can 
be subjected to intensive questioning about every aspect of their lives 
and about their positions on important issues of the day, regardless of 
how irrelevant such matters may be to their qualifications to lead the 
agency.296 Such nominees can also be harassed by committees other 
than the ones with jurisdiction over the nomination.297 And nominees 
can count on being subjected to withering attacks from surrogates in 
think tanks, on talk radio, and in the blogosphere.298 Ad hominem 
attacks on nominees do not cease after those nominees’ 
confirmations. They can continue throughout the nominees’ eventual 
tenures at the agencies. Former Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) Commissioner Michael Powell, for example, was 
subjected to “[s]evere personal attacks” during the FCC’s 
consideration of its media-ownership rules.299 One commentator 
suggested that “[i]f Saddam Hussein had stayed in business, Powell 
might have made a great minister of information.”300 Given the abuse 
that nominees typically take both during confirmation hearings and 
after assuming office, it is a wonder that any highly credentialed 
candidate with a job would agree to become a nominee. 
 
 296. Cf., e.g., Nomination of Harold Craig Becker: Hearing of the S. Comm. on Health, 
Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 111th Cong. 1, 3 (2010) (opening statement of Tom Harkin, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions) (noting that Becker, “a nominee for 
the National Labor Relations Board,” answered more than 280 written questions from 
committee members); id. at 4 (prepared statement of Michael B. Enzi, Member, S. Comm. on 
Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions) (demanding to know whether Becker’s “financial interests 
ha[d] changed” during the past seven months); id. at 16 (prepared statement of Orrin G. Hatch, 
Member, S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions) (questioning Becker about work that 
he had performed in the past for ACORN, a community-organizing group); id. at 17 
(complaining that Becker’s answers “to well over 200 written questions” that Hatch had 
submitted to Becker the previous year had been “entirely unsatisfactory”).  
 297. See How Will the CFPB Function Under Richard Cordray?: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on TARP, Financial Services, & Bailouts of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 
Reform, 112th Cong. (2012), available at http://oversight.house.gov/hearing/how-will-the-cfpb-
function-under-richard-cordray. 
 298. Personal attacks on agency heads are not a new phenomenon. FDA head David 
Kessler, a vigorous regulator who was appointed by President George H.W. Bush and then 
reappointed by President Clinton, was the target of fierce personal attacks by the drug industry 
and its allies in Congress. Then-House Speaker Newt Gingrich called Kessler “a thug and a 
bully.” John Schwartz, Conservative Foes of Government Regulation Focus on the FDA, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 21, 1995, at A7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 299. Hepp, supra note 198, at 572–73. 
 300. Id. at 573 (quoting Jeff Chester, Executive Director, Center for Digital Democracy) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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D. Implications for Agency Choice of Policymaking Vehicles 
Most agencies can choose to make policy through notice-and-
comment rulemaking; through case-by-case adjudication in 
permitting, licensing, or enforcement actions; or through nonbinding 
articulations of agency policy in policy statements, interpretational 
rules, guidance documents, and the like.301 Over two decades, many 
agencies have migrated toward less formal policymaking tools in 
response to the congressional and presidential imposition of 
additional analytical requirements for informal rulemaking and more 
intense judicial review under the “hard-look” doctrine.302 When faced 
with the daunting prospect of blood-sport battles, however, agencies 
may be even more inclined to adopt less constrained policymaking 
tools. To avoid a looming battle, most agencies have two alternatives: 
negotiated rulemaking and various nonbinding options.303 
Negotiated rulemaking, a process that gained prominence in the 
early 1980s, initially offered a promising decisionmaking method for 
escaping rulemaking ossification.304 Under this approach, which has a 
statutory basis,305 the agency convenes a group of representatives from 
all of the affected interests and charges the committee with reaching a 
 
 301. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1383, 1386–90 (2004) (describing the “[m]enu” of agency choices). 
 302. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Transformation of the U.S. Rulemaking Process—For Better or 
Worse, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 469, 478 (2008); Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and 
Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 164–66 (2000); see also 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of Agency Rules: How Federal 
Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 11–12 (1991) 
(describing the increasing reliance on ad hoc adjudication, instead of publicly visible 
decisionmaking procedures, in administrative rulemaking to deflect pressure from hostile 
legislatures and constituencies). See generally McGarity, supra note 21 (identifying ossification, 
its causes, and tools to avoid it); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency 
Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995) (discussing jurisprudential shifts with the potential to 
deossify agency rulemaking).  
 303. Rakoff, supra note 302, at 166–67. 
 304. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated 
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1261–62 (1997) (“Negotiated rulemaking was introduced more 
prominently in the early 1980s as a way of curing a ‘malaise’ that some thought characterized 
federal rulemaking practice at the time.” (quoting Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A 
Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 113 (1982))); Daniel P. Selmi, The Promise and Limits of 
Negotiated Rulemaking: Evaluating the Negotiation of a Regional Air Quality Rule, 35 ENVTL. L. 
415, 417 (2005) (“For almost 25 years the possibility of utilizing negotiation as a means of 
breaking deadlocks over administrative rulemaking has attracted the attention of academic 
commentators.”). 
 305. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570a (2006) (codifying “a 
framework for the conduct of negotiated rulemaking”). 
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consensus on as many aspects of the rulemaking initiative as 
possible.306 If the committee is successful, the agency publishes the 
consensus rule as a proposal and accepts public comments in what is 
hopefully a pro forma exercise.307 Although it is unnecessary for every 
affected entity to agree with the consensus, negotiated rulemaking 
fails if a party is sufficiently troubled by the consensus result to 
challenge it in court or in another public arena.308 Whatever benefits 
negotiated rulemaking may bestow on the agencies that use it to 
facilitate routine rulemakings, it is not likely to be of any use in the 
high-stakes rulemaking initiatives in which the stakeholders are 
tempted to engage in blood-sport strategies. In a divided and highly 
partisan atmosphere, an agency’s desire to secure a truce among the 
warring factions in a high-stakes rulemaking is often wishful thinking. 
Agencies usually have the option of avoiding notice-and-
comment rulemaking altogether by issuing guidance documents, 
policy statements, and interpretative rules that are not legally binding 
but that nevertheless determine agency policy for purposes of issuing 
permits or filing enforcement actions.309 These less formal actions 
“can have substantial practical impact when issued by those in 
power.”310 The advent of blood-sport strategies should give agencies 
an even stronger incentive to avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking 
and to make policy through these less formal decisionmaking 
vehicles. This strategy may ultimately fail, however, as stakeholders 
with the resources to do so may follow the agency into these less 
charted waters with additional blood-sport strategies, such as 
 
 306. Id. §§ 563–570a (establishing the rules for convening a rulemaking committee and the 
duties of such a committee). 
 307. See Coglianese, supra note 304, at 1257 (“[When] the committee reaches consensus, the 
agency typically adopts the consensus rule as its proposed rule and then proceeds according to 
the notice-and-comment procedures specified in the APA.” (footnote omitted)). 
 308. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 33–66 (1997) (describing the negotiated-rulemaking process and providing illustrations 
of the process in action); Harter, supra note 304, at 28–31 (identifying several advantages of 
negotiated rulemaking, including the ability of parties to shape substantive rules); Rakoff, supra 
note 302, at 166 (“The assumption . . . is that the negotiated rule will become the final rule and, 
moreover, that it will not be challenged in court because it has already been vetted by the 
interests involved.”). 
 309. Administrative Procedure Act (APA) § 4(b)(3)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2006); see 
also David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 
120 YALE L.J. 276, 278 (2010) (“Nonlegislative rules . . . are not meant to have binding legal 
effect, and are exempted from notice and comment by the APA as either ‘interpretative rules’ 
or ‘general statements of policy.’” (quoting APA § 4(b)(3)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A))). 
 310. Rakoff, supra note 302, at 167. 
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persuading Congress to expand notice-and-comment and regulatory-
analysis requirements to policy statements and guidance documents 
that have a significant impact on the economy. 
E. Implications for Rulemaking Procedure 
Administrative-law scholars understand that the rulemaking 
process is a good deal more complicated in the real world than the 
conventional model suggests. The advent of blood-sport rulemaking 
represents what may be the culmination of a long-running tendency in 
rulemaking away from the informal, but still confining, procedures of 
the conventional model toward an unconstrained, influence-oriented 
model that more closely resembles a political free-for-all. A single 
private meeting with the head of an agency or the head of OIRA may 
have a greater impact on the outcome of a rulemaking exercise than 
ten thousand pages of technical data and analysis. A single hearing in 
which members of Congress who are sympathetic to a regulated 
industry cross-examine the agency decisionmaker may be worth more 
than the most deftly crafted appellate brief. Public policymaking 
through rulemaking has become a full-contact sport in which the 
strategies highlighted in this Article and strategies that are still in the 
process of evolving are more likely to yield results than even the most 
thoughtful and thoroughly prepared public comments. 
In the context of adjudication, the APA prohibits ex parte 
overtures to the decisionmaker.311 Given that the content of such 
communications is not part of the public record and is not reflected in 
any written opinion, these communications are inconsistent with the 
due-process norm that the decision should be based on the evidence 
presented at trial.312 In addition, ex parte contacts raise the unseemly 
possibility that the judge’s decision may be based on irrelevant 
considerations or on “threats, bribes or flattery.”313 In the context of 
legislation, however, things are very different. Attempts to influence 
legislators are part of the everyday life of the highly paid lobbyists 
 
 311. See APA § 8(d), 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (banning ex parte communications in formal 
adjudications); Edward Rubin, It’s Time To Make the Administrative Procedure Act 
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 119 (2003) (“The prohibition of ex parte contacts 
emanates from the basic character of adjudication as an adversary proceeding with a decision 
‘on the record’ by an impartial decision maker.”). 
 312. Rubin, supra note 311, at 119. 
 313. Id. 
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who inhabit K Street in Washington, D.C.314 In high-stakes 
rulemaking, attempts to influence agency staff and high-level agency 
officials either directly or through the intervention of the White 
House or sympathetic congresspersons are common blood-sport 
strategies. In these situations, agency officials, OIRA staff, and even 
the White House chief of staff think nothing of meeting with lobbyists 
who represent stakeholders with sufficient resources to pay them.315 
Although the contents of those conversations are rarely made public, 
one suspects that they include threats, flattery, and even thinly veiled 
bribes in the form of campaign contributions or a loss of 
appropriations. 
The law on the extent to which ex parte overtures are 
permissible remains “somewhat murky.”316 The Supreme Court has 
yet to decide a case on point, and the D.C. Circuit precedents are not 
altogether consistent.317 In Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,318 the D.C. 
Circuit held that an agency should place in the rulemaking record any 
written ex parte contacts and written summaries of any ex parte oral 
communications that have occurred during the comment period.319 In 
Sierra Club v. Costle,320 however, the same court held that an “ex 
parte blitz” of contacts from interested parties after the close of a 
comment period, including numerous meetings with lobbyists for 
interested parties and members of Congress, was not prohibited by 
the APA.321 The court observed that “[w]here Congressmen keep 
their comments focused on the substance of the proposed rule . . . , 
administrative agencies are expected to balance Congressional 
pressure with the pressures emanating from all other sources.”322 The 
court did, however, find that provisions in the Clean Air Act 
prohibited the EPA from relying on any material not included in the 
rulemaking record and required the EPA to place in the rulemaking 
 
 314. See generally JACK ABRAMOFF, CAPITOL PUNISHMENT: THE HARD TRUTH ABOUT 
WASHINGTON CORRUPTION FROM AMERICA’S MOST NOTORIOUS LOBBYIST (2011) (detailing 
Jack Abramoff’s experience as a lobbyist); JOHN HARWOOD & GERALD F. SEIB, 
PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE: PROFILES IN BACKROOM POWER (2008) (exploring the modern 
political process through profiles of effective dealmakers).  
 315. See supra notes 185–93. 
 316. Beermann, supra note 207, at 130. 
 317. Id. at 131. 
 318. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam). 
 319. Id. at 57. 
 320. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 321. Id. at 396. 
 322. Id. at 409–10. 
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record any documents it had received and summaries of any oral 
communications that had been of central relevance during the 
rulemaking.323 The consensus appears to be that, because the APA 
does not prohibit such contacts in informal rulemaking and does limit 
them in formal rulemaking and adjudication, they are probably not 
unlawful per se.324 
Yet, as Professor Rubin notes, “There is something vaguely 
troubling . . . about the image of all those legally required written 
comments flowing in, to be time-stamped and filed by the back-room 
myrmidons, while interest group representatives whisper into the ears 
of the agency’s top officials over steak and champagne dinners.”325 
Members of the public-health and environmental groups who had 
spent more than a decade trying to persuade the EPA to lower the 
primary National Ambient Air Quality Standard for ozone were no 
doubt more than vaguely troubled to learn that President Obama had 
ordered the administrator of the EPA to withdraw the agency’s final 
ozone rule after the president met with industry lobbyists who had 
focused his chief of staff’s attention on the political implications of 
tightening the standard.326 But for the oil companies whose economic 
interests were greatly advanced during that meeting, the overture 
only confirmed the value of blood-sport strategies in rulemaking. 
F. Implications for Transparency in Policymaking 
By almost any measure, the conventional model of informal 
rulemaking is quite transparent.327 Under the APA as interpreted by 
 
 323. Id. at 402. 
 324. See Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin & Evan Mendelson, Transparency and Public 
Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process: Recommendations for the New Administration, 
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 932 (2009) (reading the case law as clarifying “that there is no 
inherent legal bar” against “interactions with external entities following the issuance” of the 
notice of proposed rulemaking); Rubin, supra note 311, at 119–20 (“[P]rovisions [that bar ex 
parte communications relevant to the merits of the proceeding and require other ex parte 
contacts to be placed on the public record] do not apply to informal rulemaking under [5 
U.S.C.] § 553 . . . .”); Watts, supra note 266, at 48 (“The APA expressly regulates ex parte 
contacts in the context of formal adjudications and formal rulemakings required to be 
conducted on the record but not in the context of informal notice-and-comment rulemakings. 
This suggests that Congress did not intend to prohibit or limit ex parte communications, 
including those coming from political actors, in informal rulemakings.” (footnote omitted)). 
 325. Rubin, supra note 311, at 120. 
 326. See supra text accompanying note 193.  
 327. See Coglianese et al., supra note 324, at 930 (“Compared to many other countries, the 
United States has long had a relatively open and transparent rulemaking process.”); Jacob E. 
Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and Transparency in the 
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the courts, agencies must identify the information that they have 
relied on and the policy judgments that determine the outcome of 
individual rulemakings in their notices of proposed and final 
rulemaking.328 But OIRA review is not governed by the APA, and the 
transparency of that review process has waxed and waned over the 
years.329 Negative reactions by beneficiary groups to attempts by 
regulated interests to influence rulemaking outcomes through 
sympathetic officials in OIRA during the 1980s resulted in somewhat 
more transparency with respect to communications between outsiders 
and OIRA—as well as between OIRA and the agencies—while rules 
are pending.330 Often this information winds up in the administrative 
record, either because the agency places it there or because one of the 
participants submits it.331 
The content of conversations between lobbyists and agency 
officials during the preproposal stage of informal rulemaking, 
however, need not be disclosed to the public; nor do communications 
among lobbyists, officials in OIRA, and the immediate inner circle at 
the White House have to be disclosed.332 OIRA review remains far 
 
Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1161–62 (2009) (“Conceptually, we note that 
administrative agencies in the United States are some of the most extensively monitored 
government actors in the world. Almost all policy decisions an agency makes must be published 
in the Federal Register for all to see.”).  
 328. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS §§ 7.2, 7.3.3, at 382–84, 390–92 (5th ed. 2009) (describing 
the Court’s jurisprudence requiring agencies to provide substantial evidence from agency 
rulemaking procedures in order to enable judicial review of agency decisions). 
 329. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1309–10 (2006) (“OIRA has a long and well-documented 
history of secrecy. Although sustained criticism in the 1980s led to reforms that made the review 
process more transparent, it remains remarkably difficult today for outsiders to get a strong 
grasp of what OIRA review entails.” (footnote omitted)).  
 330. Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 533, 580–82 (1989) (describing the pressure to reform OIRA). 
 331. See id. at 582–86 (describing OIRA’s increased transparency following 1986 reforms); 
Kagan, supra note 209, at 2287 (“[A]fter publication of the regulatory action (or a decision not 
to go forward with it), OIRA was required to disclose all written communications between itself 
and the agency.”); John Shattuck & Muriel Morisey Spence, The Dangers of Information 
Control, TECH. REV., Apr. 1988, at 62, 72 (“[Congressional efforts to cut OIRA’s funding] 
prompted OIRA director Wendy Gramm to set up a policy of disclosing OMB exchanges with 
other agencies . . . .”). 
 332. See Wagner, supra note 5, at 1368 (“The agency must log its ex parte contacts in the 
public record only after publishing the proposed rule and generally not before.”). In 1986, OMB 
reached an agreement with members of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in 
which it agreed to send to agencies the written materials it had received from outside parties 
and to advise the agency of all of its outside communications. Bruff, supra note 330, at 582–83. I 
am aware of no judicial holding that these disclosures were required; and, more importantly, the 
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from transparent because the rules of engagement with agencies are 
often ignored in practice.333 A 2011 study concluded that OIRA had 
routinely violated the governing executive order’s334 requirement that 
OIRA disclose the content of its communications with agencies.335 
Still another round of conversations between industry and 
interest-group representatives and government officials may take 
place after the rule has been challenged in court,336 a virtual certainty 
in high-stakes rulemaking. At that time, the parties will negotiate 
about the content of the regulations as part of an overall effort to 
settle the litigation amicably.337 These negotiations are not bound by 
any rules or procedures, and the content of the discussions is not 
generally available to the public.338 
Similarly, I am not aware of any disclosure requirements 
regarding the content of conversations between lobbyists for affected 
entities and members of Congress or their staffs, even when the 
lobbyists are feeding questions to members of committees or drafting 
rifle-shot legislation to overturn or delay ongoing rulemaking. Indeed, 
the riders themselves are often far from transparent, and members 
may vote favorably on legislation containing riders without even 
knowing that the riders are in the bill.339 And I am unaware of any 
requirement that the provenance of attack advertisements and other 
sophisticated public-relations exercises be disclosed to the public. 
Think tanks functioning as 501(c)(3) charities need not disclose the 
identities of the individuals who have contributed to their coffers or 
 
agreement did not oblige the agency to disclose the information it received from OMB to the 
public. See id. at 583 (noting that OMB agreed to “make[] available in its public reading room 
written materials and lists of meetings and communications involving persons outside the 
federal government”). 
 333. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 329, at 1309–10 (describing OIRA’s stubborn lack of 
transparency); Mendelson, supra note 262, at 1354 (noting the difficulty of determining the 
influence of executive review on specific rules). 
 334. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
app. at 745 (2006), and 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 108 (Supp. IV 2010). 
 335. STEINZOR ET AL., supra note 188, at 7. 
 336. Wagner, supra note 5, at 1369. 
 337. See id. (“Litigation thus opens the doors to a second round of negotiations that, even 
more than the pre-NPRM period, can involve secret deals over details, interpretations, and 
related features of a rule with only a narrow slice of the affected interests.”). 
 338. Cf. id. at 1369–70 (explaining that the privileged status of this round of negotiations 
contributes to an even greater degree of secrecy). 
 339. Beermann, supra note 207, at 88–89. 
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the content of their interactions with their sponsors.340 And bloggers 
who may receive substantial support from industries that have been 
aided by those bloggers’ attacks on regulatory agencies do not have to 
reveal such support in their blogs and podcasts.341 In short, the aspects 
of informal rulemaking that fall within the conventional model are 
modestly transparent, whereas the blood-sport strategies that often 
characterize high-stakes rulemaking are generally shielded from 
public disclosure. 
G. Implications for the Quality of Agency Decisionmaking 
One of the primary functions of regulatory agencies is to provide 
the expertise needed to resolve complex questions that arise in the 
course of implementing regulatory programs.342 An agency acquires 
technical expertise by hiring scientists, engineers, economists, and 
other professionals with the training and experience in the kinds of 
issues that the agency must typically resolve.343 Blood-sport strategies, 
by contrast, are designed to win policy battles, not to achieve 
technically sound policy outcomes. Blood-sport contests are fought 
over easily comprehensible concepts that can be reduced to sound 
bites. For example, when the Luminant Corporation announced that 
it would be closing two power plants and laying off five workers 
because of the EPA’s cross-state rule, the debates focused on the 
EPA’s willingness to adjust the emissions cap for the state of Texas, 
not on the engineering logistics of complying with standards that 
 
 340. Note, The Political Activity of Think Tanks: The Case for Mandatory Contributor 
Disclosure, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1502, 1515 (2002) (“Think tanks offer a way to affect the 
political process while avoiding disclosure; indeed, such avoidance is often a primary motivation 
for using section 501(c)(3) organizations rather than political committees.”). 
 341. The FTC published guidelines governing endorsements of products, companies, 
services, or industries by bloggers. Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials 
in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.0–.5 (2011). The guidelines, however, do not apply to 
endorsements or criticisms of regulations or legislation. See id. § 255.0 ex. 8. 
 342. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative 
Law: Agency Power To Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 607, 655 (1985) (“[I]n any 
area of regulation, the federal government is likely to have some comparative advantage in 
access to expertise vis a vis smaller states.”); Rubenstein, supra note 246, at 2184 (“[A]gencies 
generally have more expertise with regulatory issues than do Congress, the President, or the 
courts.”).  
 343. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL 
BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES 180 (2008) (“Federal regulatory agencies typically 
employ their own experts to gather information and prepare analyses of proposed agency 
actions. When specialized expertise is required, they can hire independent consultants. They can 
also call on more formal sources of expertise by empaneling scientific advisory 
committees . . . .”). 
MCGARITY IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2012  12:12 AM 
1738 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1671 
similar power plants were meeting with relative ease.344 In addition to 
breeding public distrust in agency decisionmaking, this tendency of 
blood-sport strategies to allow political salience to trump expertise is 
a recipe for bad decisions that may have adverse long-term 
consequences.345 
H. Implications for the Rulemaking Record and Judicial Review 
Judicial challenges to agency rules are routine in high-stakes 
rulemaking, but the advent of blood-sport strategies may alter the 
focus of judicial review of agency action.346 In the future, beneficiaries 
of regulatory programs may attempt to persuade courts to set aside 
regulations on the ground that the decisionmaker had been unduly 
influenced by political pressure generated by the regulated industries 
and channeled through sympathetic members of the relevant 
oversight and appropriations committees.  
 
 344. Nancy J. Moore, Luminant To Close Texas Facilities, Sues EPA over Cross-State Air 
Rule, 42 ENV’T REP. 2057 (2011) (relaying Luminant’s and Texas Governor Rick Perry’s 
complaints that the regulation would lead to lost jobs); Elizabeth Souder, EFH Says It Will Keep 
500 Jobs if EPA Backs Off Pollution Rule, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Sept. 14, 2011, at D1; 
Souder & Loftis, supra note 192 (reporting a dispute between Luminant and the EPA over 
Luminant’s ability to comply with regulations); Elizabeth Souder, Utility Blames EPA for Job 
Cuts, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Sept. 13, 2011, at A1 (same); Jim Marston, Playing Politics with 
Power, ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Sept. 15, 2011), http://blogs.edf.org/texascleanairmatters/2011/
9/15/playing-politics-with-power (quoting Robert Flexon, CEO of Dynergy, as seeking 
enforcement of the cross-state rule to protect his company’s “investment-backed expectations”). 
 345. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 209, at 2363 (“We should expect that the same party 
competition under divided government that gridlocks the legislative process and motivates 
presidential administration will create an adversarial ‘oversight arms race’ between the 
President and Congress over the bureaucracy. The administrative equivalent of legislative 
impasse is a politicized, strategic bureaucracy, subject to fragmented and conflicting 
accountability, sacrificing neutral competence and efficiency . . . .” (footnotes omitted) (quoting 
Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through Presidentialism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 227, 235 (1998))).  
 346. The APA empowers a court to set aside an agency rule that reflects an impermissible 
interpretation of the agency’s statute, that was arrived at through impermissible procedures, or 
that was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 
Administrative Procedure Act § 10(2)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). The Fed’s interchange-
fee rule, the EPA’s greenhouse-gas rules, and the EPA’s cross-state rule have all been 
challenged in the federal courts. See Robin Bravender, 16 ‘Endangerment’ Lawsuits Filed 
Against EPA Before Deadline, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/
02/17/17greenwire-16-endangerment-lawsuits-filed-against-epa-bef-74640.html (listing the 
lawsuits filed in response to EPA’s greenhouse-gas endangerment finding); Gabriel Nelson, 
Lawsuits Pour in Before Deadline To Challenge EPA’s Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, N. Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/10/10/10greenwire-lawsuits-pour-in-
before-deadline-to-challenge-67959.html (noting that over thirty lawsuits were filed in response 
to the cross-state rule); see also supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
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The Fifth Circuit, in Pillsbury Co. v. FTC,347 held that a 
congressional committee’s intense questioning of the chairman of an 
independent agency on a legal question central to the resolution of a 
pending adjudication could be grounds for setting aside the agency 
action.348 Then, in the Three Sisters Bridge case,349 Judge David 
Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit suggested that a threat by a powerful 
congressman to reduce an appropriation to the Department of 
Transportation for a subway construction project could invalidate the 
agency’s quasi-adjudicatory decision to build a bridge from the 
Virginia suburbs to the District of Columbia.350 Applying the nascent 
hard-look doctrine of judicial review, Judge Bazelon reasoned that 
the agency’s statute specified the exclusive decisionmaking criteria 
that the agency could consider, and a threat of lost congressional 
appropriations for a subway did not fall within those criteria.351 
According to Judge Bazelon, allowing the agency’s decision to turn 
on such congressional pressure would “effectively emasculate the 
statutory scheme,” which was designed to preserve urban parkland.352 
Several years later, the D.C. Circuit limited the scope of the 
Three Sisters Bridge dicta in Sierra Club v. Costle, a case involving the 
EPA’s monumental struggle to promulgate a New Source 
Performance Standard for coal-fired steam electric plants.353 In that 
case, which involved informal rulemaking, the court addressed an 
environmental group’s allegation that Senator Robert Byrd had 
improperly influenced EPA Administrator Douglas Costle’s 
 
 347. Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 348. Id. at 965. 
 349. D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe (Three Sisters Bridge), 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 
1972). 
 350. Id. at 1246–47. 
 351. Id. at 1247–48. 
 352. Id. at 1248; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in 
Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 496 
(1990) (“The court found that Secretary Volpe’s decision was infected with impermissible bias 
as a result of pressure from the legislative branch.”); Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of 
Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review 20–21 (Nov. 18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961753 (“[T]he District Council’s response to the threat 
regarding the withholding of subway funds constituted a consideration of a factor that was not 
relevant to the approval of the bridge.”). 
 353. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 311–12 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“On this appeal we 
consider challenges to the revised [standards] brought by environmental groups which contend 
that the standards are too lax and by electric utilities which contend that the standards are too 
rigorous. Together these petitioners present an array of statutory, substantive, and procedural 
grounds for overturning the challenged standards.”). 
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decisionmaking process by “strongly hinting” to Costle and White 
House adviser Stuart Eizenstat that he would withdraw his much-
needed support for the pending Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty354 
and the windfall-profits tax if the EPA’s standard were to constrict 
national markets for West Virginia coal.355 Relying on the Three 
Sisters Bridge case, the court stated that an informal rulemaking 
would be overturned if two conditions were met: “First, the content 
of the pressure upon the [agency] is designed to force [it] to decide 
upon factors not made relevant by Congress in the applicable 
statute. . . . Second, the [agency’s] determination must be affected by 
those extraneous considerations.”356 In the case before it, the court 
held that there was no “persuasive evidence” that either criterion had 
been satisfied.357 The relevant question for blood-sport rulemaking is 
whether the Three Sisters Bridge case retains any vitality or is merely 
a quaint judicial relic that should be placed on a shelf next to Judge 
Bazelon’s opinion in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.358 
But the pressure emanating from congressional committees is 
not always covert, such that “persuasive evidence” may be difficult to 
gather. Sometimes it is exposed to full view, such as in the case of 
Senator Estes Keefauver’s grilling of FTC Chairman John Howrey in 
Pillsbury Co. v. FTC.359 The pressure may come from a member of 
Congress bent on securing a particular regulatory outcome for a 
constituent, but it is more likely to come from a member who has 
voted against the law that the agency is tasked with implementing. Is 
capitulation to a browbeating member of Congress—who strongly 
 
 354. Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., June 18, 1979, S. Exec. Doc. Y, 96-1 (1979).  
 355. Costle, 657 F.2d at 409 n.539 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Margot Hornblower, EPA 
Will Relax Pollution Rules for Coal Power, WASH. POST, May 5, 1979, at A1 (emphasis added)). 
 356. Id. at 409.  
 357. Id. 
 358. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 547 F.2d 633 
(D.C. Cir. 1976), rev’d sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); see also id. at 646 (observing that to preserve the meaningful 
dialogue envisioned by the APA’s rulemaking section, agencies must provide a “reasoned 
response,” including “particulars in the record”). Professor Richard Pierce argues for the latter 
view. See Pierce, supra note 352, at 496–98 (calling the Three Sisters Bridge decision “hard to 
explain” and “a singularly arrogant decision”). 
 359. Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952, 956 (5th Cir. 1966) (“The questions were so probing 
that Mr. Howrey, the chairman of the Commission, announced to chairman Kefauver of the 
subcommittee that he would have to disqualify himself from further participation in the 
Pillsbury case.”). 
MCGARITY IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2012  12:12 AM 
2012] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS BLOOD SPORT 1741 
believes that the agency should not be doing what the statute instructs 
the agency to do—a sufficient departure from reasoned 
decisionmaking to warrant overturning an insufficiently stringent 
agency rule? This question goes to the first of the two Sierra Club 
inquiries—whether the content of the pressure was designed to use 
statutorily irrelevant factors to affect the agency’s decision.360 Is a 
member’s conviction that Congress erred in enacting the statute 
under which the agency is acting a relevant factor? Is a direct or 
indirect threat to the agency’s appropriation a statutorily irrelevant 
factor? If Three Sisters Bridge has any vitality left, these are questions 
that easily could come up during judicial review of agency decisions 
allegedly influenced by improper congressional pressure.361 
There exists a lively debate among administrative-law scholars 
over the extent to which reviewing courts should allow agencies to 
rely on political considerations as part of their reasoned analysis in 
support of rulemaking. Nearly all scholars acknowledge that political 
considerations are relevant to, and sometimes dominate, regulatory 
decisionmaking in high-stakes rulemakings. According to Professor 
Nina Mendelson, agencies almost never relate the political 
considerations that have influenced their decisions in informal 
rulemaking, even though such considerations often play as strong a 
role in determining the outcome as the factors identified in the 
agency’s statute.362 Professor Kathryn Watts suggests that a primary 
reason for this phenomenon is that agencies know that courts would 
be highly unreceptive to such explanations.363 Consequently, agencies 
either “fail[] to disclose or affirmatively hid[e] political factors that 
enter[ed] into the mix.”364 
Professor Watts argues that courts should expand what they 
count as “valid” considerations to include “certain political influences 
from the President, other executive officials, and members of 
Congress, so long as the political influences are openly and 
 
 360. See supra text accompanying note 356. 
 361. The conspicuous invocation of the Three Sisters Bridge case in Aera Energy LLC v. 
Salazar, 642 F.3d 212 (D.C. Cir. 2011); id. at 220, suggests that the case has retained its 
relevancy. 
 362. See Mendelson, supra note 268, at 1146–59 (“Despite [presidential] directives and the 
executive order disclosure requirements . . . public information about the content of the 
executive supervision of an agency decision itself . . . is surprisingly rare.”). 
 363. Watts, supra note 266, at 5–6. 
 364. Id. at 6. 
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transparently disclosed in the agency’s rulemaking record.”365 She 
reasons that if courts accept that agencies may properly be influenced 
by political considerations in rulemaking, then courts should be 
prepared to deal with an agency’s truthful acknowledgment of that 
reliance and should allow the agency to cite such considerations in its 
rulemaking rationales.366 Among other things, this revision in 
permissible considerations would reduce the pressure that agencies 
feel to stretch scientific and technical rationales to explain decisions 
reached on political grounds and would increase political 
accountability.367 
Not all administrative-law scholars—and, one suspects, appellate 
judges—are prepared to accept Professor Watts’s bold suggestion.368 
One serious problem with increased transparency and candor about 
relying on externally generated political considerations is that such 
considerations will rarely be among the criteria specified in an 
agency’s statute or susceptible of derivation from less-than-precise 
statutory language.369 I am not aware of any regulatory statute that 
lists “politics” or “political considerations” among the factors that 
agencies may consider in promulgating particular rules, and it is 
unlikely that Congress would ever list “the President’s political 
preferences” as a criterion. There is, however, authority for the 
proposition that agencies may consider factors in rulemaking that are 
not explicitly identified in the statute at issue if those factors are 
consistent with the underlying policies of the statute.370 
 
 365. Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 366. Id. at 32–33. 
 367. Id. at 40–42. 
 368. See Seidenfeld, supra note 352, at 2–3 (rejecting Professor Watts’s suggestion). 
Professor Mark Seidenfeld worries that allowing agencies to rely upon political considerations 
runs the risk of encouraging them to “hide value judgments behind simple incantations that 
their actions are justified by political influence.” Id. at 3, 22–24.  
 369. In its seminal opinion in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), the Supreme Court concluded that 
a reviewing court may set aside an agency action as arbitrary and capricious when “the agency 
ha[d] relied on factors which Congress ha[d] not intended it to consider,” id. at 43; see also FCC 
v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1829 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
applicable law “does not permit [agencies] to make policy choices for purely political reasons 
nor to rest them primarily upon unexplained policy preferences”). 
 370. See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4, at 453–55 (4th 
ed. 2002) (noting that “[t]he D.C. Circuit had adopted the interpretation” that an agency is 
prohibited from “considering a factor only if Congress prohibited an agency from considering 
that factor”); Watts, supra note 266, at 47–48 (positing that “Congress’s silence leaves agencies 
free to consider political factors and influences” when not explicitly prohibited). 
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Professor Watts sees a way around this objection by 
distinguishing between “valid” or “permissible” political 
considerations, upon which agencies may properly rely, and “invalid” 
or “impermissible” political considerations, which the agencies may 
not cite in support of their decisions and, apparently, must ignore.371 
In the first category are “those influences that seek to further policy 
considerations or public values,” whereas the second category 
includes “those that seek to implement raw politics or partisan 
politics unconnected in any way to the statutory scheme being 
implemented.”372 In the real world of high-stakes rulemaking, 
however, it is highly unlikely that any agency would ever rely on “raw 
politics or partisanship” to explain a regulatory decision, and not just 
because such an explanation would invite judicial reversal. Pundits 
and partisans from the other party would pillory the agency and the 
president it served if the agency were to cite raw political advantage 
as a reason for government intervention into the marketplace. 
Instead, the agency would always frame the political contribution to 
its decisionmaking process in terms that were compatible with public 
values or the policies underlying the agency’s statute.373 From a 
transparency perspective, it is hard to see how this arrangement 
would be an improvement over the status quo. 
An even more serious drawback to Professor Watts’s suggestion 
is that it would leave the matter entirely within the agency’s 
discretion. If political considerations do in fact play a prominent role 
in determining the outcome of the rulemaking process—a definite 
possibility when blood-sport strategies are employed—it is unclear 
why it should be up to the agency to decide when to cite those 
considerations and how to characterize them in its “reasoned 
decisionmaking.”374 If one or more of the rulemaking participants 
have evidence to suggest that political considerations, be they valid or 
invalid, played a role in the agency’s decision, it is unclear why that 
evidence should not be included in the record for the parties to cite in 
 
 371. Watts, supra note 266, at 8–9 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 372. Id. at 9; see also id. at 53–57 (discussing “what sorts of political influences should be 
viewed as legitimate”). 
 373. See Seidenfeld, supra note 352, at 27 (“[T]he administration would couch its decision as 
being based on opposition to intrusive and needless government regulation, or some similar 
political platitude.”); id. at 36 (“Any government action can be framed as serving some purpose 
other than merely satisfying the preferences of those in political power.”). 
 374. Watts, supra note 266, passim. 
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challenges to the rule under the arbitrary-and-capricious test.375 Nor is 
it clear why reviewing courts should not require the agency to explain 
how political considerations did or did not affect the rulemaking 
outcome if a participant introduces evidence of political pressure into 
the rulemaking record.376 
I. Implications for the Stability of Regulatory Regimes 
Stability is a virtue in any legal regime. It is, for example, the 
primary virtue underlying the hallowed common-law doctrine of stare 
decisis.377 Individuals and organizations that are subject to particular 
rules or that benefit from particular rules need to know that those 
rules are not likely to change dramatically over short periods of time 
to be able to plan for the future. Companies that spend millions of 
dollars complying with regulations need some assurance that those 
regulations will not be changed in a way that gives an advantage to 
competitors that have not bothered to comply. If every decision made 
by an agency is instantly contestable and subject to renegotiation 
after every national election, the necessary stability will be lacking. 
The blood-sport model of rulemaking is generally inconsistent 
with regulatory stability. Participants in blood-sport attacks on agency 
rules sometimes challenge not merely a specific aspect of a particular 
rulemaking, but also the legitimacy of the entire rulemaking 
exercise.378 On some occasions, the interest groups engaged in blood-
 
 375. For example, Professor Watts cites as an example of an invalid consideration that 
should not be citable by an agency to support a decision “one congressman’s ‘hard-ball’ threats 
made through the back door to an executive agency (e.g., a threat that if the agency proceeds 
with a certain rule, the congressman will withhold all financial support for other unrelated 
programs).” Watts, supra note 266, at 65. In my view, if evidence of such a threat is included in 
the record, either by the agency or by some other person, the agency should be required to 
explain the role that the threat played in a subsequent decision to withdraw the rule or soften its 
requirements. If the agency may rely on valid political overtures in its reasoned decisionmaking, 
it should also be obliged to include in its analysis an explanation as to how it excluded invalid 
overtures. 
 376. Id. at 66. 
 377. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 723, 749 (1988) (“At its most general level, stare decisis operates to promote systemwide 
stability and continuity by ensuring the survival of governmental norms that have achieved 
unsurpassed importance in American society.”).  
 378. Several opponents of the EPA’s greenhouse-gas rules took the position that the entire 
rulemaking exercise had been illegitimate, despite a Supreme Court holding in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), that the EPA did have the authority to regulate greenhouse gases 
under the Clean Air Act, see, e.g., H.R. ___, the Energy Tax Prevention Act of 2011, supra note 
280, at 76 (prepared statement of Greg Abbott, Att’y Gen., State of Texas) (advocating for 
legislation that would overrule the EPA’s greenhouse-gas endangerment finding); GEORGE 
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sport attacks opposed the statute at the time it was enacted and have 
never reconciled themselves to the new statutory regime.379 One 
suspects that these groups’ ultimate strategy is to undermine political 
support for the statutory regime and overthrow it. To these 
combatants, regulatory stability is not a significant concern. 
J. Implications for Influence Asymmetries 
Administrative-law scholars have long observed that the broadly 
participatory informal-rulemaking model has evolved into an 
unwieldy amalgamation of submissions, analyses, and explanations 
that favors those entities with the resources to generate the most 
information and the most sophisticated arguments.380 Professor 
Wagner cautions that “[p]luralistic processes integral to 
administrative governance threaten to break down and cease to 
function when an entire, critical sector of affected interests drops out 
due to the escalating costs of participation.”381 High-stakes 
rulemakings are precisely the sort of proceedings in which companies 
and trade associations have a strong incentive to control the outcome 
by flooding the agency with information and analysis. 
The advent of e-rulemaking has greatly facilitated participation 
by individual members of the public and representatives of 
beneficiary groups in the conventional aspects of rulemaking.382 But it 
has not necessarily increased their influence over rulemaking 
 
ALLEN & MARLO LEWIS, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., OVERTURNING EPA’S 
ENDANGERMENT FINDING IS A CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE 2–3 (2010), available at http://
cei.org/sites/default/files/Marlo%20Lewis%20-%20Overturning%20EPA's%20Endangerment
%20Finding%20-%20FINAL,%20May%2019,%202010,%20PDF.pdf (arguing that the EPA’s 
tailoring rule constituted a “blatant breach of the separation of powers”). 
 379. The banking industry opposed the Durbin Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act and the 
interchange-fee rule that implemented that amendment. See supra notes 66, 84–86, 92–119 and 
accompanying text. Similarly, large Wall Street banks opposed the Volcker Amendment to the 
Dodd-Frank Act and later the regulations implementing that amendment. David D. 
Kirkpatrick, Irked, Wall St. Hedges Its Bet on Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2010, at A1 
(noting the banking industry opposition to the Volcker Rule prior to its enactment); Aaron 
Lucchetti & Liz Rappaport, Officials, Bankers Face Off on Reach of Volcker Rule, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 8, 2010, at C1 (“Dozens of career regulators at the Federal Reserve, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the Treasury Department are facing off against bankers, lawyers 
and other officials at financial firms that want to soften the impact of the rule named after 
former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker . . . .”). 
 380. See, e.g., Coglianese et al., supra note 324, at 932 (“Agency officials too often hear 
mainly from politically popular or well-organized interests, which may make up only a subset of 
the overall interests that will be affected by many regulatory decisions.”). 
 381. Wagner, supra note 5, at 1332. 
 382. Lubbers, supra note 302, at 479. 
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outcomes. Professor Mendelson notes that comments from individual 
members of the public tend “to relate to . . . questions of value or 
policy” rather than to the economic and technical underpinnings of 
the rulemaking exercise.383 Because agencies are putatively more 
interested in sophisticated technical input—which is far more relevant 
to judicial review than expressions of opinion—they tend to discount 
comments from members of the public.384 Consequently, those who 
have sufficient resources and access to prepare sophisticated 
economic and technical analyses retain a considerable advantage in 
conventional rulemaking.385 This advantage persists in the context of 
high-stakes rulemaking despite the fact that policy considerations, 
rather than technical judgments, often dominate.386 When regulatees 
deluge the agency with thousands of pages of technical comments, the 
flood can distract the agency from the less technical comments 
submitted by other groups.387 
The influence asymmetry persists when the forum shifts to 
OIRA. A 2011 analysis of meetings between OIRA officials and 
members of the public from 2001 to 2011 found that 65 percent of the 
rulemaking participants who had met with OIRA officials 
represented regulated industries, whereas only about 13 percent of 
the meetings had been with representatives of public-interest 
groups.388 OIRA met with representatives of industry alone 73 percent 
of the time, and it met with representatives of public-interest groups 
alone only 7 percent of the time.389 OIRA changed 76 percent of the 
rules submitted for review during the Obama administration and 64 
percent during the George W. Bush administration.390 Rules that were 
the subject of meetings with outsiders were changed 29 percent more 
often than other rules.391 Thus, the survey suggests unsurprisingly that 
information asymmetry benefits industry. 
 
 383. Mendelson, supra note 262, at 1346. 
 384. Id. at 1346, 1359. 
 385. See id. at 1357–58 (noting that “business groups dominate rulemaking participation 
[because] . . . participation is not cost free” and because “regulated entities possess greater 
control of certain types of information . . . that may be especially valuable to agencies”). 
 386. See id. at 1349–52 (“[A]gencies must decide values and policy questions left unresolved 
by their authorizing statutes.”). 
 387. Id. at 1358. 
 388. STEINZOR ET AL., supra note 188, at 21. 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. at 9. 
 391. Id.  
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There are good reasons to believe that the disparity is even 
worse when the forum shifts to Congress or the court of public 
opinion.392 Rifle-shot legislation and appropriations riders are the 
tools of special-interest lobbyists with access to key congressional 
players; they are not the tools of the ordinary citizens who are the 
intended beneficiaries of most regulatory programs.393 Public-interest 
groups can be effective lobbyists for these beneficiaries, but these 
groups lack sufficient resources to flood the agencies and halls of 
Congress with well-connected staffers and former legislators to get 
responses from people in power.394 
Beneficiary groups can also sponsor the occasional 
advertisement in the Washington, D.C., area or on television and 
radio networks in key congressional districts, but they cannot devote 
the tens of millions of dollars that business groups such as the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, and the American 
Petroleum Institute can spend on a single public-relations initiative.395 
Likewise, a few progressive think tanks, such as the Center for 
American Progress, the Center for Progressive Reform, and the 
Economic Policy Institute, can produce white papers and blogs on 
high-stakes rulemakings.396 But even they cannot match the output of 
 
 392. Mendelson, supra note 262, at 1370 (“[C]ompared with well-organized groups, 
individuals who submit comments may have less ability to invoke forms of political discipline 
(whether it is congressional or presidential oversight) and fewer resources with which to 
challenge an agency action in court.”). 
 393. Cf. Beermann, supra note 207, at 88 (“[One] criticism of the use of riders is that they 
often fly below the political radar, placed in the bill by a few connected members of 
Congress.”). 
 394. As described in Part I.F, the Independent Community Bankers of America alone spent 
around $1.2 million lobbying banking regulators and Congress during the first quarter of 2011. 
See supra text accompanying note 101. The Public Interest Research Group, a lobbyist for 
consumer interests in the interchange-fee proceedings, expended a total of $48,336 on all its 
issues for the entire year. U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GRP., LOBBYING REPORT 1 (2011), 
available at http://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=getFilingDetails&filingID=41D32B79-
96D7-4927-836C-2C0B49C28A2D. 
 395. For example, the Global Climate Coalition—which was composed of most of the major 
oil companies, the American Forest and Paper Association, the American Petroleum Institute, 
the major automobile manufacturers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and managed by a 
major Washington, D.C., public-relations firm—spent more than $63 million between 1994 and 
2001 on advertising and a “grassroots” letter-writing and telemarketing campaign against efforts 
in Congress and the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases. SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, 
TRUST US, WE’RE EXPERTS! 270–71 (2002). The entire budget for the Public Interest Research 
Group in 2009 was $1,363,768. U.S. PUB INTEREST RESEARCH GRP., IRS FORM 990: RETURN 
OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX pt. 3, § 4a, at 2 (2010). 
 396. See, e.g., John Irons & Isaac Shapiro, Regulation, Employment, and the Economy, 
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.epi.org/publication/regulation_employment_
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the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, or the 
Mercatus Center, all of which devote considerable attention to 
regulatory issues.397 Because blood-sport strategies are largely 
employed by regulated interests with money to spend and not by 
beneficiaries or beneficiary groups, they give those regulated interests 
an inherent advantage in high-stakes rulemaking exercises.398 
K. Implications for Administrative Lawyers 
For administrative lawyers, perhaps the most difficult question 
raised by the ascent of blood-sport strategies in high-stakes 
rulemaking concerns the extent to which lawyers should engage in 
blood-sport battle. In administrative adjudications, the lawyer’s role is 
virtually identical to that of the attorney in civil litigation. In the 
context of rulemaking, however, attorneys for both the agency and 
the stakeholders serve their clients best when they provide legal 
arguments for interpreting the relevant statute consistently with their 
clients’ positions, present technical and economic studies in the light 
most favorable to their positions, and marshal policy arguments to 
support their preferred outcomes. Although the latter two functions 
are not foreign to civil litigation, they are far more common in 
informal rulemaking. 
The American Bar Association’s (ABA’s) Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct399 provide that lawyers representing clients in 
nonadjudicative proceedings must conform to most of the rules 
governing candor toward the tribunal, fairness to opposing parties, 
impartiality, and decorum that apply to attorneys representing clients 
before courts.400 Thus, the ethical obligation of an attorney not to 
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation is fully applicable to attorneys engaged in 
 
and_the_economy_fears_of_job_loss_are_overblown; Alice Kaswan, Greenhouse Gas Standards 
for New Power Plants: Glass Half-Full and Half-Empty, CPRBLOG (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.
progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=5AB070F0-CCCE-C1CD-B9F7C9D9AB10A2F9; 
Daniel J. Weiss & Zachary Rybarczyk, Don’t Believe the Hype: Opponents of Mercury Rules 
Puff Up Costs While Ignoring Benefits, THINK PROGRESS (Feb. 9, 2012, 10:04 AM), http://think
progress.org/romm/2012/02/09/421812/dont-believe-the-hype-opponents-of-mercury-rules-puff-
up-costs-while-ignoring-benefits. 
 397. Cf. supra note 201 and accompanying text.  
 398. See CROLEY, supra note 3, at 29–52 (discussing various theories that explain the 
collective-action problem in agency decisionmaking). 
 399. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2010). 
 400. Id. R. 3.9. 
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rulemaking activities and is not limited to factual statements.401 
Attorneys would presumably run afoul of their ethical obligations if 
they consciously falsified data in a submission or manipulated an 
economic or technical analysis in a way that rendered it misleading.402 
High-stakes rulemaking might generate pressure from clients to 
violate these ethical obligations, but conscious falsification of data or 
manipulation of analyses are hopefully not characteristics of blood-
sport rulemaking. 
The role of the lawyer as a lobbyist in high-stakes rulemaking is 
also nothing new. Full-service law firms are prepared to present 
information and arguments to agencies outside of the procedural 
confines of informal rulemaking and to lobby members of Congress 
for legislation that they have drafted that would change relevant 
statutes.403 When they engage in lobbying activities, lawyers are bound 
by similar rules of professional conduct.404 Rule 5.7 of the ABA Model 
Rules provides that a lawyer who provides “law-related services,”405 a 
term that includes lobbying,406 is subject to all of the rules applicable 
to nonadjudicative proceedings if those services are provided “by the 
lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer’s 
provision of legal services to clients.”407 Representing a client in an 
administrative rulemaking by lobbying agency officials before, after, 
 
 401. Cf. id. R. 8.4(c) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation . . . .”). 
 402. Falsifying data would also presumably violate Model Rule 3.3(a)(1), which provides 
that a lawyer shall not knowingly “make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal.” 
Id. R. 3.3(a)(1). 
 403. Cf. Michelle Gilbert, Some Law Firms Hire Non-Lawyers as Their Lobbying Arm on 
Capitol Hill, 15 NAT’L J. 1899 (1983) (describing law firms that specialize in lobbying); Burt 
Solomon, Clout Merchants, 19 NAT’L J. 662 (1987) (describing “mega-firms” that “offer one-
stop, all-purpose cures for what ails their clients”); Matthew C. Stephenson & Howell E. 
Jackson, Lobbyists as Imperfect Agents: Implications for Public Policy in a Pluralist System, 47 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 5–6 (2010) (describing “‘contract lobbyists’—typically public relations 
firms or law firms”). 
 404. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.9 (“A lawyer representing a client before 
a legislative body or administrative agency in a nonadjudicative proceeding . . . shall conform to 
the provisions [governing candor to the tribunal, fairness, impartiality, and decorum].”). 
Comment 3 clarifies that “[t]his Rule only applies when a lawyer represents a client in 
connection with an official hearing or meeting of a governmental agency or a legislative body to 
which the lawyer or the lawyer’s client is presenting evidence or argument.” Id. R. 3.9 cmt. 3. To 
the extent that a lawyer’s lobbying efforts are carried out in connection with such an official 
hearing or meeting, the provisions of Rule 3.9 apply.  
 405. Id. R. 5.7(a). 
 406. Id. R. 5.7 cmt. 9. 
 407. Id. R. 5.7(a)(1). 
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or during the formal comment period is probably indistinguishable 
from providing other legal services to those clients. Whether lobbying 
for a client to change an agency’s statute is similarly a “law-related 
service[]”408 is perhaps a closer question, but it is probably also 
indistinguishable from the provision of other legal services. 
The role of the lawyer in more far-ranging blood-sport strategies, 
such as public-relations campaigns aimed at swaying public opinion 
and feeding information to talk-show pundits and bloggers, has been 
the subject of little attention in the legal literature.409 One question 
worth raising at the outset is whether such activities are “law-related 
services” within Rule 5.7, which defines that term to mean “services 
that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in 
substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are 
not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a 
nonlawyer.”410 Although lawyers have not traditionally been 
associated with the preparation of advertisements, press releases, 
blogs, and the like on issues of relevance to ongoing rulemakings, 
their involvement is apparently becoming more common in blood-
sport rulemakings.411 The prescriptions and proscriptions of the Model 
Rules are therefore arguably applicable to these functions when 
lawyers perform them for clients. In any event, the proscription in 
Rule 4.1 against a lawyer’s knowingly making a false statement of 
material fact to a third person is presumably applicable to statements 
made in support of a client’s position in advertisements; in press 
releases; and in overtures to think tanks, pundits, and bloggers.412 
Professor Michele Beardslee has written an important two-part 
article413 on the ethical obligations of corporate counsel with respect 
to public-relations campaigns undertaken by their companies on legal 
 
 408. See supra note 405 and accompanying text. 
 409. See Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion (pt. 2), 23 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1119, 1123 (2010) (noting the lack of scholarship in this area). 
 410. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.7(b) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 411. See Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion (pt. 1), 22 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1279 (2009) (“A major sentiment [in the literature] is that lawyers 
are behind the eight ball when it comes to legal [public relations]. . . . However, more recently, 
there is . . . literature contending that lawyers are increasingly developing sophisticated, 
integrated legal [public-relations] strategies.” (footnote omitted)). 
 412. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (prohibiting lawyers from making 
“false statement[s] of material fact” “[i]n the course of representing a client”). 
 413. Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion (pts. 1 & 2), 22 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259 (2009), 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1119 (2010). 
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matters that are tried in the “court of public opinion.”414 Although 
both parts of the article are mostly limited to corporate public-
relations campaigns in the context of ongoing civil or criminal 
litigation, some of the analysis is clearly relevant to public-relations 
campaigns undertaken in association with high-stakes rulemaking 
activities.415 The corporate counsel whom Professor Beardslee 
interviewed demonstrated a clear concern for “the way that a legal 
issue is spun in the media,” and they indicated that “corporate 
lawyers are avidly advocating in the court of public opinion, but doing 
so ‘behind the scenes.’”416 
Professor Beardslee’s analysis of the applicable rules of 
professional responsibility suggests that “current ethics rules are not 
relevant for corporate practice as it relates to public relations,” 
because they “do not provide adequate guidance to lawyers on how 
far they may or should go towards using the media in favor of their 
corporate client when they are not acting as spokespersons but 
instead are managing legal PR behind the scenes.”417 According to 
Professor Beardslee’s assessment, the existing rules “do not actively 
encourage lawyers to behave socially responsibly or to convince 
clients to behave socially responsibly in the court of public opinion.”418 
Indeed, the existing rules, which are “grounded in the adversary 
ethic[,] risk a race to the bottom—where corporate lawyers act like 
‘hired guns,’ valued (professionally and economically) for 
manipulating legal PR over providing effective legal advice that 
incorporates PR concerns and the corporation’s and public’s long-
term interests.”419 The absence of clear guidance is even more 
apparent in the context of public-relations activities undertaken in 
support of a company’s position in an agency rulemaking proceeding 
or during congressional consideration of legislation that would affect 
the outcome of a particular rulemaking proceeding.420 Administrative 
 
 414. Beardslee, supra note 411, at 1259; Beardslee, supra note 409, at 1121–22. 
 415. Beardslee, supra note 409, at 1123–24 (“The first installment of this Article investigates 
the emerging trend of general counsels acting as legal public relations managers for legal issues 
facing large, publicly traded corporations . . . . [T]his installment . . . turns to the existing ethical 
obligations that regulate attorneys’ management of legal [public relations].”).  
 416. Id. at 1124. 
 417. Id. at 1124–25; see also id. at 1145 (“For statements that misrepresent or stretch the 
truth, the current interpretations of the Model Rules do little to constrain the behavior with 
which this Article is concerned.”). 
 418. Id. at 1124–25. 
 419. Id. at 1125. 
 420. Cf. supra notes 402–12 and accompanying text. 
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lawyers need better ethical guidance tailored to the rulemaking 
environment. 
IV.  SOME POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO BLOOD-SPORT STRATEGIES 
The APA was enacted in 1946421 after “a long period of study and 
strife”422 in which the business community resisted the regulatory 
controls that had been imposed in response to strong public demand 
for a greater government role in protecting citizens in the wake of the 
Great Depression.423 The APA represented an effort by the business 
community and its lawyers to square the exercise of bureaucratic 
power with existing legal norms.424 As the nation struggles with the 
economic dislocation brought on by the Great Recession and the 
financial meltdown of 2008, the government may be in the midst of a 
similar period of study and strife. It might therefore be an appropriate 
time to think about amending the rulemaking provisions of the APA 
to include procedural constraints on the tactics that may be employed 
to influence agency decisionmakers, or at least to think about 
imposing disclosure requirements aimed at exposing blood-sport 
strategies to the public. If the impetus for procedural change that 
ultimately insulated agencies from political influences in the early 
1940s came from the regulated industries, the advocates of change 
this time will be the representatives of beneficiaries who are greatly 
disadvantaged by the shift to blood-sport rulemaking. 
Administrative-law scholars should be thinking about several 
questions: (1) whether this new blood-sport approach to regulatory 
implementation is consistent with the due-process and participatory 
norms that underlie modern conceptions of administrative law; 
(2) whether blood-sport rulemaking is a desirable development; and 
(3) if the answer to either of the previous questions is “no,” whether 
 
 421. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006)). 
 422. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950), superseded by statute on other 
grounds, Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1951, ch. 1052, 64 Stat. 1044 (1950), as recognized in 
Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129 (1991).  
 423. George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromises: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges 
from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1561–62 (1996) (describing the pre-APA 
backlash from the business community against the “avalanche of new federal agencies and 
commissions” created under the New Deal). 
 424. Id. at 1569–72 (describing the ABA’s efforts on behalf of the APA as being driven both 
by “the elite bar’s fears for its major [industry] clients” and lawyers’ desire to protect the legal 
status quo). 
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blood-sport strategies can be cabined by law so as to make high-
stakes rulemaking more consistent with legal and democratic norms, 
given First Amendment425 constraints on the power of the federal 
government to limit the rights of citizens—human and, more recently, 
corporate426—to petition the government.427 Working from an 
assumption that many scholars would answer one of the first two 
questions in the negative, this Part suggests some potential responses 
to the third question. 
A. Legislative Responses 
1. Structural Shields.  Independent agencies were created to 
shield administrative decisionmaking from political influences.428 The 
Fed’s experience with the interchange-fee rulemaking, however, 
suggests that independence alone will not necessarily protect such 
agencies from blood-sport strategies.429 Nevertheless, political 
influence may be more difficult to exert on an agency whose head 
serves for a term of years and whose budget is not subject to annual 
appropriations. It may therefore be advisable for Congress to give 
future agencies greater financial independence from the annual 
budget-setting process, at least for the first few years of those 
agencies’ lives. Even with this added protection, however, the early 
history of the CFPB suggests Congress’s hesitancy to rely exclusively 
on agency structure to protect regulators from blood-sport 
strategies.430 
Proponents of stringent financial-services regulation originally 
designed the CFPB to have a single director and thus to be free from 
the institutional and administrative constraints of independent 
 
 425. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 426. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010) (“[T]he First Amendment does 
not allow political speech restrictions based on a speaker’s corporate identity.”). In Citizens 
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), the Court “explicitly overruled longstanding Court 
precedent and struck down as unconstitutional federal prohibitions on the use of corporate 
treasury funds for campaign finance expenditures.” Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 
IND. L. REV. 243, 243 (2010). 
 427. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of 
the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 428. See Barkow, supra note 288, at 19 (“The main aim in creating an independent agency is 
to immunize it, to some extent, from political pressure.”). 
 429. See supra notes 100–60 and accompanying text. 
 430. See supra notes 233–35 and accompanying text. 
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commissions and insulated from partisan attacks on its budget.431 But 
the financial-services industry’s allies in the Senate successfully 
neutered the new agency by refusing to confirm any appointee to be 
director of the agency unless the statute was amended to turn the 
leadership position into a multimember agency with an annual 
appropriation.432 The battle over the confirmation of a CFPB head is a 
testament to the staying power of blood-sport strategies in the context 
of independent agencies. 
2. Procedural Shields.  Congress could reduce the influence of 
stakeholders employing blood-sport strategies by limiting the contacts 
that can occur between agency officials and lobbyists for potentially 
affected parties. Ex parte contacts with an agency before the 
publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking and after publication 
of a notice of final rulemaking are not prohibited by the APA, and it 
is not at all clear that ex parte contacts during the time that the 
agency is receiving written submissions are prohibited either.433 A new 
APA could be modeled after the CPSC, which has promulgated 
regulations that govern ex parte contacts with respect to matters of 
“substantial interest,” a term that is defined to include any nontrivial 
issue “that is likely to be the subject of a regulatory or policy decision 
by the Commission.”434 The agency publishes public notice of all 
meetings between agency personnel and outside parties involving 
such matters and makes records of those meetings available to the 
public.435 The agency further discourages telephone conversations 
between agency staff and outside parties concerning matters of 
substantial interest, and when they do occur, the agency recipients are 
 
 431. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1011(b)(1), 12 
U.S.C. § 5491(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2010) (creating “the position of the Director, who shall serve as 
the head of the Bureau”). 
 432. See Solomon & Randall, supra note 233 (noting that Republican senators vowed to 
block confirmation of any CFPB director unless the agency was turned into a multimember 
commission and describing the banking industry’s support for this position). 
 433. See Richard A. Nagareda, Comment, Ex Parte Contacts and Institutional Roles: Lessons 
from the OMB Experience, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1988) (describing the ambiguities in judicial, 
legislative, and executive prohibitions on ex parte contacts in informal-rulemaking procedures 
and arguing that this lack of clarity has enabled regulated industries to influence administrative 
decisionmaking).  
 434. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1012.1(a), 1012.2(d) (2011); see also Bremberg, supra note 180, at 31–32 
(discussing the agency’s “[o]pen meetings policies”). 
 435. 16 C.F.R. § 1012.1(a). 
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required to memorialize the content of such conversations and then 
to place that documentation in a public file in chronological order.436 
A new APA could define a moment in time at which a similar 
“cloak of invisibility” is draped over agency officials involved in a 
particular rulemaking exercise to protect them from overtures by 
outsiders. The statute could allow agency officials to seek information 
from outsiders but could also make it improper for outsiders to 
initiate ex parte communications with agency officials from the 
initiation of the rulemaking initiative within the agency—usually 
signaled by the convening of a working group—through the 
publication of the final rule in the Federal Register.437 The same 
prohibitions would have to be imposed on contacts between 
stakeholders and OIRA during that time period. This statutory 
prohibition might not put an end to attempts by participants in high-
stakes rulemakings to influence agency officials, but it would give the 
officials a good reason to avoid unwanted overtures. 
To be effective, the prohibitions on ex parte contacts would have 
to be extended to members of Congress and their staffs. Otherwise, a 
stakeholder could simply avoid the prohibition entirely by channeling 
its contacts through a sympathetic congressional office. It is difficult 
to imagine a crisis of sufficient magnitude, however, to impel 
Congress to enact such legislation. Members of Congress have 
become so dependent on moneyed interests to finance their 
campaigns that, in my view, they are unlikely to vote for a measure 
that would predictably reduce the flow of funds from stakeholders 
who could no longer seek subtle quid pro quos for their contributions. 
Whether a similar prohibition should extend to OIRA and White 
House communications with agency staff and upper-level agency 
decisionmakers is a far more controversial topic that is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
3. Greater Transparency.  One response to the blood-sport 
phenomenon that should not be controversial would be to increase 
the transparency of interactions between the agency and interested 
outsiders, OIRA, and Congress. Transparency enhances the 
legitimacy of the rulemaking process, ensures that the decisionmaking 
 
 436. Id. § 1012.7. 
 437. Cf. Wagner, supra note 5, at 1422–23 (suggesting that agencies should “be largely, if not 
completely, insulated from stakeholders and political input during the embryonic stage of the 
development of [their] regulatory proposal[s]”). 
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process is not contaminated by extraneous and irrelevant political 
considerations unrelated to the agency’s statute, and generally 
enhances the quality of the policy decisions that underlie the resulting 
rules.438 In lieu of a flat prohibition on ex parte contacts, Congress 
could at least require that the content of such contacts be 
memorialized and placed in the public record. Disclosure could go a 
long way toward holding the initiators and recipients of such contacts 
accountable for their behind-the-scenes attempts to influence the 
outcomes of high-stakes rulemakings. Disclosure should reduce the 
incidence of backroom deals in which agencies barter away public 
protections in return for promises from stakeholders and members of 
Congress to reduce political pressure. And that dynamic in turn may 
make stakeholders and members of Congress more reluctant to 
initiate contacts in the first place. 
Greater transparency will not, however, eliminate blood-sport 
strategies in high-stakes rulemaking. Even if stakeholders were to 
avoid direct overtures to agency personnel, they could still make their 
positions known through public-relations and advertising campaigns, 
and think tanks and media pundits would continue to amplify 
stakeholder attacks. Another step in the direction of greater 
transparency would be a requirement that entities, such as the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, that pay for political advertisements439 must 
identify the companies that have contributed toward the purchase of 
those advertisements. This requirement would allow the public to 
draw the connection between the economic interests of the 
companies sponsoring the advertisements and the content of the 
advertisements. 
4. Leveling the Playing Field.  One unintended consequence of 
the interest-group-representation model was to cast regulatory 
beneficiaries as just another interest group with a place at the 
bargaining table, thereby relieving the regulatory agency to some 
extent of its statutory obligation to represent the intended 
beneficiaries of protective regulation.440 The practical problem with 
 
 438. Coglianese et al., supra note 324, at 927–28. 
 439. See Tom Hamburger, Chamber of Commerce Vows To Punish Anti-Business 
Candidates, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008, at A1 (describing how the Chamber of Commerce uses 
corporate contributions to create “attack ads targeting individual candidates without revealing 
the name of the businesses involved in the ads”). 
 440. Cf. Stewart, supra note 267, at 1764 (arguing that “‘[p]ublic interest’ advocates . . . do 
not represent . . . the interests of the community as a whole”). 
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the model is that the representatives of beneficiary groups do not 
bring equivalent resources to the table and therefore lack equivalent 
bargaining power.441 Because all of the participants in a high-stakes 
rulemaking presumably know that the regulatees can direct more 
firepower at the agency than beneficiary groups can, this disparity can 
predictably affect the outcome of the rulemaking exercise.442 
A strong argument can be made that blood-sport rulemaking is a 
desirable way to democratize bureaucratic decisionmaking. Blood-
sport strategies may render agencies more responsive to the interests 
that engage in those strategies. But they do not necessarily make 
agencies more responsive to the beneficiaries of regulatory programs. 
Although blood-sport strategies have been employed by public-
interest groups representing the beneficiaries of regulation, the 
overall impact of the move toward blood-sport strategies in 
administrative rulemaking has been to advance the interests of the 
regulatees over those of the beneficiaries, despite numerous polls 
reporting that a large majority of Americans supports strong 
regulation of business conduct.443 
Professor Wagner suggests that Congress should consider 
subsidizing public participation in “specific rulemakings in which 
certain sets of interests, such as those representing the diffuse public, 
will be otherwise underrepresented.”444 This suggestion was high on 
the political agenda in the 1970s,445 but it fell out of favor during the 
Reagan administration.446 Though this leveling approach remains 
 
 441. See Kuttner, supra note 186, at 28 (“Every lawyer in town is on the payroll of one bank 
or another. There is a huge imbalance of resources . . . .” (quoting former FDIC Chairperson 
Sheila Bair) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 442. See Stewart, supra note 267, at 1713 (“It has become widely accepted, not only by 
public interest lawyers, but by academic critics, legislators, judges, and even by some agency 
members, that the comparative overrepresentation of regulated or client interests in the process 
of agency decision results in a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 443. See Rena Steinzor, The Truth About Regulation in America, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
323, 334 (2011) (summarizing the results of a poll demonstrating public support for strict 
regulation). 
 444. Wagner, supra note 5, at 1416. 
 445. Federal Agencies That Pay the Way, 12 NAT’L J. 778 (1980); Paying To Hear Divergent 
Views, BUS. WK., Jan. 15, 1978, at 110; Taking Public Hearings Public, BUS. WK., Mar. 7, 1977, 
at 43. 
 446. See, e.g., Michael Wines, Miller’s Directive to the FTC—Quit Acting like a “Consumer 
Cop,” 13 NAT’L J. 2149 (1981) (“[FTC Chairman James Clifford Miller III]’s proposed 1982 
budget would eliminate funds for the agency’s ‘public intervenor program,’ under which public 
interest groups receive grants to research consumer issues and present arguments to the 
commission.”). 
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attractive, it probably does not represent an adequate response to the 
blood-sport phenomenon for at least two reasons. First, it is 
extremely unlikely that Congress in this highly partisan age would 
enact such legislation. Second, should Congress manage to pass such 
legislation, the bill would still do nothing to remedy the disparate 
resources of companies and trade associations that can bring blood-
sport strategies to other fora, such as the broadcast media. The same 
legislative realities probably doom other solutions aimed at enhancing 
the ability of beneficiary groups to participate in blood-sport 
rulemaking—solutions like creating consumer advocates within 
agencies to solve the collective-action problems in regulatory 
programs with diverse and unorganized beneficiaries. 
B. Judicial Responses: Modifying Judicial Review 
In light of the advent of blood-sport strategies in high-stakes 
rulemaking, it may make sense to take Professor Watts’s suggestion a 
step further and to allow any participant in a rulemaking to raise 
political considerations in its comments, invite participants to add 
evidence of agency reliance on political overtures to the rulemaking 
record, and require agencies to explain how such considerations did 
or did not affect their decisions. First, the courts might expand the 
scope of “political” considerations to include political pressure from 
sources other than officials located in the executive and legislative 
branches of government. For example, a subtle warning from a well-
connected lobbyist that the agency’s budget might suffer if the 
lobbyist’s client were adversely affected by a proposed rule should 
count as a political consideration.447 
Second, if the record reveals that political considerations may 
have influenced the agency, then the courts might require, not merely 
allow, agencies to include documentation of communications 
involving those considerations in the rulemaking record and to 
explain how those communications factored into the agency’s 
decision.448 If, for example, orchestrated attacks on agency 
decisionmakers are now the norm in high-stakes rulemaking, then it 
 
 447. Professor Watts would apparently limit the sources of political influence to formal and 
informal communications from the president, high-level White House officials, and members of 
Congress. See Watts, supra note 266, at 57–65 (identifying the president, other high-level 
officials in the executive branch, and Congress as the source of opinions that “might most 
appropriately count as valid factors”).  
 448. See Mendelson, supra note 268, at 1129–31 (proposing judicially enforced disclosure 
requirements to reveal political motivators in agencies’ decisionmaking processes). 
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might be appropriate to expand the definition of the rulemaking 
record to include evidence of those attacks and to allow that evidence 
to be cited by parties seeking judicial review. 
Third, the courts might require agencies to respond to comments 
referencing evidence of ex parte communications of a political nature 
by explaining how those communications affected the agency’s 
decisions. Finally, if political considerations or ex parte 
communications have played a role in the decisionmaking process, 
the reviewing court might consider whether such considerations are 
relevant factors under the agency’s empowering statute during its 
substantive review of the rule.449 
These suggestions naturally raise the practical question of 
enforcement. How would anyone know whether an agency 
decisionmaker has received ex parte communications of a political 
nature? The Freedom of Information Act450 may be available to 
uncover documentary evidence of attempts to exert improper 
political influence.451 Beyond that, media reports and congressional 
investigations can draw out such information, and when they do, 
there is no reason not to include that information in the rulemaking 
record. If the reports or investigations are factually erroneous, the 
agency may say so in its reasoned analysis.452 Many political overtures 
that influence high-stakes rulemakings will no doubt escape public 
scrutiny, but that fact should not deter the courts from requiring 
agencies to explain those overtures that do find their way into the 
rulemaking record. 
C. Legal Responses: Changing the Political Culture 
There are many grounds for pessimism about the prospect of 
reforming rulemaking to reduce the impact of blood-sport strategies 
on regulatory agency decisionmaking. Attacks on government in 
 
 449. See supra note 369. 
 450. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
 451. See id. (setting “public information” requirements for government agencies). 
 452. Professor Watts raises the possibility that an affirmative obligation should be imposed 
on agencies to disclose political influences as they are brought to bear on an agency. Watts, 
supra note 266, at 76. She correctly notes that this change would no doubt require an 
amendment to the APA, and she ultimately concludes that such a change “would likely face 
various hurdles—including claims of executive privilege.” Id. I agree that requiring disclosure of 
political pressure from the Oval Office and nearby offices might raise executive-privilege claims, 
but that in no way undermines the attractiveness of the suggestion as it applies to ex parte 
contacts from members of Congress, their staffs, and politically well-connected lobbyists.  
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general and regulatory agencies in particular are commonplace, and 
this constant “bureaucrat bashing” has bred a political culture in 
which the public no longer trusts regulatory agencies to enhance the 
public welfare.453 Before any significant substantive or procedural 
changes can be implemented, there will probably need to be a change 
in the prevailing culture of distrust. 
It may be that the same American legal culture that resisted the 
politicization of regulatory agencies in the post-New Deal years will 
likewise resist the politicization of the regulatory process through 
blood-sport rulemaking. In an era in which government agencies are 
perceived by many powerful politicians as wholly illegitimate, it is 
encouraging to see Peter Barton Hutt, the dean of food and drug 
lawyers, urging Congress and anyone else who will listen to support 
legislation to maintain a robust FDA.454 Professor Beardslee suggests 
that lawyers who engage in public-relations activities should serve as 
a “professional conscience” to their clients, “balancing public-
mindedness against zealous partisanship.”455 If the attorneys who 
regularly participate in high-stakes rulemakings could be persuaded 
to adopt a public-conscience role in their lobbying activities as well as 
their public-relations work, it might go a long way toward civilizing 
blood-sport strategies. 
As I have discussed, the ABA Model Rules do not directly 
address the lawyer’s role in public-relations activities related to 
informal rulemaking.456 As blood-sport strategies, which nearly always 
involve public-relations exercises, become more prevalent in agency 
rulemaking, more detailed guidance from the ABA along these lines 
would be beneficial. Such guidance is unlikely to materialize, 
however, because a professional-conscience role is not one to which 
many lawyers have become accustomed. Moreover, it is difficult for 
in-house lawyers and even outside counsel “to separate themselves 
and their professional ethical obligations from organizational 
 
 453. Steinzor, supra note 443, at 329 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 454. See Peter Barton Hutt, The State of Science at the Food and Drug Administration, in 
SUBCOMM. ON SCI. & TECH., FDA SCI. BD., FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK app. B at B-1 
(2007) (“Congress must commit to a two-year appropriations program to increase the FDA 
employees . . . and to double the FDA funding, and then at least to maintain a fully burdened 
yearly cost-of-living increase . . . across all segments of the agency.”). 
 455. Beardslee, supra note 409, at 1126 n.20 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 456. See supra notes 402–12, 417–20 and accompanying text. 
MCGARITY IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2012  12:12 AM 
2012] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS BLOOD SPORT 1761 
objectives and the norms elevated by the most powerful players” in 
the corporations that they serve.457 
CONCLUSION 
As the radical regulatory reformers of the 104th Congress 
aggressively attempted to tear down the protective governmental 
infrastructure that Congress had put in place during the Public 
Interest Era of the 1960s and 1970s, I wrote the following about the 
prospects for a revival of the role of government in regulating 
business conduct: 
The prospects for a revived regulation scenario are probably highest 
if the radical relief scenario first plays itself out. Congress may be 
willing to contemplate enacting additional protections only after a 
period of time in which the radical anti-interventionists and free 
marketeers have their way: the existing protective statutes are 
repealed or undermined, the free market reigns supreme, the 
consequences of unrestrained capitalism become increasingly 
apparent, and pressures build to remedy the most egregious abuses. 
It may, in other words, take another tragedy like the Great 
Depression to revive the conviction that government has an 
important protective role to play in private arrangements.458 
During the past five years, this nation has experienced just such a 
confluence of crises, including a financial meltdown, the largest oil 
spill in U.S. history, the deadliest mining disaster in decades, and a 
deep recession with persistently high unemployment rates. Yet blood-
sport strategies have, if anything, become even bloodier. Government 
agencies seem even less capable of going about the business of 
regulating than they were before the enactment of the reform 
legislation of the late 2000s. 
The reaction of the financial-services industry to the new 
consumer-protection program of the Dodd-Frank Act demonstrates 
how far beyond the familiar processes and procedures of 
administrative law the strategies have ranged. Rather than hiring 
seasoned administrative lawyers to engage in the familiar process of 
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eroding statutory protections, the regulated industries have begun 
employing political strategists, lobbyists, and public-relations experts. 
These players pursue strategies aimed at indirectly disrupting the 
implementation of regulatory programs by blocking Senate 
confirmation of new agency leaders, cutting off promised funding for 
agencies, introducing rifle-shot riders aimed at undoing ongoing 
agency action, and subjecting agency heads to contentious oversight 
hearings in an attempt to intimidate them into adopting industry-
friendly positions. 
At this early juncture, I remain pessimistic about the prospect of 
limiting these blood-sport strategies in informal rulemaking. They 
could be a transient phenomenon, limited to a moment in time in 
which the business community somehow co-opted a budding populist 
movement by replacing that movement’s outrage over government 
bailouts of Wall Street banks with outrage over government spending. 
But that assessment overlooks important realities. Blood-sport 
strategies were largely in place before the Tea Party made its surprise 
appearance in 2009, and they are likely to remain in place until their 
practitioners are shamed into abandoning them or until they no 
longer work. Because members of Congress have become heavily 
involved in blood-sport strategies, such strategies are likely to 
continue for as long as voters fail to punish their representatives for 
uncivil attacks on regulatory agencies and the public servants who are 
attempting to advance the goals of protective legislation. 
